People v. Taylor (Ill. S.Ct.)
Docket No. 85907-Agenda 4-March 1999.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. TORY R.TAYLOR, Appellant.
Opinion filed May 20, 1999.
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Tory R. Taylor, was convicted in the circuit court of Winnebago County ofaggravated discharge of a firearm (720ILCS 5/24-1.2(a) (West 1994)) under the theory of accountability (720 ILCS 5/5-2 (West 1994)).The appellate court affirmedthe conviction (287 Ill. App. 3d 254), and defendant sought leave to appeal to this court. In denyingdefendant's petition for leaveto appeal, this court exercised its supervisory authority and directed the appellate court to vacate itsjudgment and to reconsiderthe cause in light of our opinion in People v. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87 (1998). On remand,the appellate court entered an orderpursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23(b) (166 Ill. 2d R. 23(b)) once again affirming defendant'sconviction. We alloweddefendant's subsequent petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)) and now reverse thejudgments of the appellate andcircuit courts.
BACKGROUND
This case arose from a traffic altercation on August 28, 1993, in Rockford, Illinois. Defendant,who was 15 years old at the time,was driving an automobile accompanied by his friend, Lynn Hollingshed. Witnesses testified thatdefendant was the driver of thevehicle and that Hollingshed was a passenger sitting in the front seat. Defendant testified that, whiledriving, Hollingshed showedhim a .25-caliber handgun that he had pulled out of his pocket. At approximately 7:30 p.m., defendantturned from a large streetonto a two-lane, two-way side street.
At the same time, Edward Dawson, his wife Alta, and a friend were traveling on the same sidestreet. Vehicles were parked onboth sides of the street, diminishing the lane sizes. Defendant turned onto that street as Edward wasapproaching the intersection.The accounts of the incident vary beyond these facts. Edward and Alta testified that defendant'svehicle came quickly around thecorner, partially occupied both lanes, and forced their vehicle close to a parked car. Defendanttestified that the street was toonarrow for both automobiles to pass and that he stopped his car and backed it up to allow the othervehicle to pass.
Edward and Alta testified that they exited their vehicle to look for damage done to it or anyparked cars. They stated thatHollingshed then exited defendant's vehicle and that Edward asked whether the young man had a"problem." Defendant testifiedthat, as Edward drove past, Edward directed the racial remark, "You got a problem you fu*** n***?"at defendant andHollingshed. Both Edward and Alta testified that Hollingshed had a small, black machine gun in hisleft hand and that, whenasked if he had a problem, Hollingshed responded, "Yes, I got a fu*** problem, white boy."According to the Dawsons,Hollingshed then removed a small handgun and fired it in Edward's direction. Defendant testified thatthe shot was fired upward,while Edward testified that the bullet "whizzed" past his ear. Edward testified that he jumped backinto his automobile as anotherbullet was immediately fired. Alta, who had also exited the vehicle, stated that she abruptly reenteredthe car and wrote down thelicense plate number of defendant's vehicle. Defendant and the Dawsons testified that Hollingshedthen reentered defendant'sautomobile and that defendant drove from the scene. The Dawsons then proceeded to the closestservice station and called thepolice.
Defendant testified that Hollingshed was the shooter. According to defendant, Hollingshed wasangered by Edward's racial slurand had told defendant to stop the vehicle. Defendant stated that Hollingshed did not indicate whyhe wanted him to stop the car,nor did he give defendant any reason for exiting the car. Defendant testified that Hollingshed jumpedout of the automobile,yelled back at Edward, and quickly fired two shots into the air in Edward's general direction.Defendant further testified that hewas startled when the first shot rang out and that, after immediately firing a second shot in the air,Hollingshed came back todefendant's car. Defendant asked Hollingshed why he fired the shots, but received no response fromhim. Defendant then drovefrom the scene.
Defendant was arrested and later charged with aggravated discharge of a firearm. Defendant wassubsequently convicted of thatoffense under the theory of accountability, and he appealed to the appellate court. The appellate courtaffirmed, and defendantpetitioned this court for leave to appeal. We denied defendant's petition, but, under our supervisoryauthority, directed theappellate court to vacate its judgment affirming defendant's conviction and to reconsider the actionin light of our decision inDennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87. Upon reconsideration, the appellate court once again affirmeddefendant's conviction, reasoning that,because defendant knew of Hollingshed's prior possession of a gun and became aware of theaggravated discharge of a firearmoffense during its commission, a rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubtthat defendant formed therequisite intent to aid Hollingshed.
Defendant once again filed a petition for leave to appeal to this court. We allowed defendant'spetition and now reverse thejudgment of the appellate court.
ANALYSIS
The issue in the present appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence to convict defendantunder accountability on the groundthat he facilitated the commission of aggravated discharge of a firearm by providing Hollingshed withan escape from the scene ofthe incident. Defendant contends that, in light of Dennis, he was not proven guiltybeyond a reasonable doubt of aggravateddischarge of a firearm under the theory of accountability and that the appellate court erred in basingits affirmance on itsconclusory determination that defendant simply could have "formed the intent to aid his passenger."We agree.
In assessing whether the evidence against a defendant was sufficient to prove guilt beyond areasonable doubt, a reviewing courtmust determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, anyrational trier of fact could havefound the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v.Batchelor, 171 Ill. 2d 367, 376 (1996);People v. Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d 1, 25 (1994); People v. Furby, 138 Ill. 2d434, 455 (1990), quoting People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d237, 261 (1985). A defendant's conviction should not be set aside on grounds of insufficient evidenceunless the proof is soimprobable or unsatisfactory that a reasonable doubt exists about the defendant's guilt.Furby, 138 Ill. 2d at 455; Collins, 106 Ill.2d at 261.
The Illinois statute on accountability states, in relevant part, that a defendant is legallyaccountable for the actions of anotherwhen:
"(c) Either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intentto promote or facilitate such commission, hesolicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of theoffense." 720 ILCS5/5-2(c) (West 1994).
Consequently, in order to hold defendant accountable for aggravated discharge of a firearm,defendant must have, with therequisite intent, aided or abetted Hollingshed prior to or during the commission of the offense.
Importantly, this court addressed the scope of the accountability statute in Dennis,concluding that:
"for purposes of accountability, the duration of the commission of an offenseis defined by the elements of the offense ***[and that,] [c]onsistent with our accountability statute, a defendant may be held accountable for thecommission of [anoffense] if, either before or during the commission of the offense, he aided or abetted[an offender] in 'conduct which is anelement of [the] offense.' " (Emphasis added.) Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d at 101.
This court further determined in Dennis that:
"A person who forms the intent to facilitate an escape only after [the offense]has occurred can neither aid nor facilitate theconduct which is an element of [the offense]. That person is less culpable than the perpetrator andhis action serves merelyto impede apprehension of the perpetrator. This separate offense is subject to penalization under thecurrent version of our'accessory-after-the-fact' provision. See 720 ILCS 5/31-5 (West 1994)." Dennis, 181Ill. 2d at 104.
Significantly, we observe that a person may not be held accountable for a crime merely for beingpresent, even when that personknows that a crime is being committed. Batchelor, 171 Ill. 2d at 375-76; Peoplev. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d 131, 140 (1995); People v.Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 61 (1990). Similarly, a person generally will not be deemed accountablefor acquiescing to the criminalactivities of another. People v. Hobbs, 400 Ill. 143 (1948); People v.Powers, 293 Ill. 600 (1920); People v. Miscichowski, 143Ill. App. 3d 646 (1986).
In the present appeal, defendant argues that the appellate court erred in reaffirming his convictionin spite of this court's holdingin Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87. In Dennis, the defendant was charged underaccountability with armed robbery for driving the"getaway" car for a friend who had just completed an armed robbery. The defendant in that case hadno knowledge of his friend'splan of robbery and did not learn of the robbery until after he began driving the friend away from thescene of the robbery. Thiscourt reversed the defendant's conviction, reasoning that the defendant's facilitation of theperpetrator's escape amounted toneither a facilitation of nor an intent to facilitate the commission of any element of the underlyingoffense. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d at103-04.
We find Dennis to be instructive in the case at bar. As was the case inDennis, it is uncontroverted that defendant in this matterhad no knowledge of his passenger's intentions upon exiting defendant's vehicle. Immediately afterthe traffic incident, defendantmerely stopped his car upon Hollingshed's demand. As the State concedes, defendant did not knowthat Hollingshed was aboutto discharge his firearm after the traffic altercation. Moreover, as in Dennis, defendant'sactions were merely directed ateffectuating an escape and not at promoting the commission of an offense.
It is the State's position, however, that, by the mere fact that defendant knew of Hollingshed'spossession of a firearm that day,defendant knew that a crime was going to be committed after the traffic incident. The State furtherargues that the jury couldhave concluded that defendant "formed the intent to aid his passenger" during the minute period oftime between the first andsecond shots fired by Hollingshed. The State supports this contention with the fact that defendant didnot leave the scene of theoffense before the second shot was fired. Based on these arguments, the State contends thatdefendant satisfied the test foraccountability in that, during the commission of the offense, he intentionally aided Hollingshed byproviding a means of escapefrom the scene. In our opinion, the State's reasoning is unpersuasive.
As this court emphasized in Dennis, in order to convict a defendant underaccountability, the State must show that the defendant,either before or during the commission of the offense, intentionally aided or abetted an offender inconduct that constitutes anelement of the offense. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d at 101. In the present case, the elements ofthe offense of aggravated discharge of afirearm are (1) the knowing or intentional discharge of a firearm (2) in the direction of anotherperson.720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2)(West 1994). In this case, defendant neither had knowledge that Hollingshed intended to fire his gunupon exiting the vehicle normade any effort to aid Hollingshed in the discharge of the weapon. Furthermore, there is no evidencethat defendant knew of, orfacilitated, the shooting in the direction of the Dawsons. In accordance with Dennis,therefore, we conclude that, despite thedeference given to the State on review, no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonabledoubt that defendant, eitherbefore or during the commission of the offense, aided or abetted Hollingshed in the commission ofany element of the offense ofaggravated discharge of a firearm.
The State's additional arguments concerning defendant's intent are equally unavailing. Firstly,defendant's knowledge ofHollingshed's possession of a firearm on the day of the incident cannot satisfy the element inaccountability requiring specificintent to promote or facilitate an offense. The fact that defendant was involved in an unforeseeable,spontaneous trafficaltercation militates heavily against any notion that he somehow had knowledge of Hollingshed'sintentions once defendant'svehicle came to a halt and Hollingshed exited. Moreover, we are not convinced by the State'sreasoning that, beforeHollingshed's second shot, defendant may have formed the intent to aid his passenger by deciding toremain at the scene andprovide a means of escape for his friend. Even assuming that the evidence could support this inferenceof intent, we reiterate theprinciple stressed in Dennis: that guilt under accountability is not supported where onemerely facilitates the escape of anoffender and neither intends to facilitate nor aids or attempts to aid the offender in the commissionof any element of the offense.Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d at 103-04; see also In re D.C., 259 Ill. App. 3d 637(1994). Furthermore, as this court recently stressed inPeople v. Shaw, No. 80378, slip op. at 15 (October 22, 1998), "[p]resence at thecommission of the crime, even when joined withflight from the crime or knowledge of its commission, is not sufficient to establish accountability.Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d at 108." Seealso Furby, 138 Ill. 2d at 456 (mere presence at scene of offense is not sufficient tosustain conviction under accountabilitytheory); People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 61 (1990) (same); People v. Ruiz,94 Ill. 2d 245, 256 (1982) (same).
Escape is not an element of aggravated discharge of a firearm, and it is uncontested thatdefendant did not facilitate, or intend tofacilitate, the commission of any element of that offense. Defendant's intent to facilitate anescape-even if it occurred during thecommission of the offense-did not amount to both an intent to facilitate as well as an actual attemptto aid in the commission ofany conduct constituting an element of aggravated discharge of a firearm. Instead, defendant'spossible intent to effectuateHollingshed's flight from the scene related solely to defendant's involvement with Hollingshed's escapeand not to any element ofthe firearm offense. See Shaw, slip op. at 14 ("Unless the accompliceintends to aid the commission of a crime, no guilt willattach" (emphasis in original)), citing Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d at 105. Accordingly, we holdthat the appellate court erred inconcluding that there was sufficient evidence upon which a jury could have based defendant'sconviction for aggravateddischarge of a firearm under the theory of accountability.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the judgments of the appellate and circuitcourts.
Judgments reversed.