This is a case where the Southwestern Illinois Development Authority (SWIDA) usedits advertised power of eminent domain to transfer ownership of property from one privateentity to another. SWIDA took property owned by an Illinois not-for-profit religiouscorporation, the Masjid Al-Muhajirum, and Ruth McGee (collectively, the Mosque), andtransferred it to a limited partnership composed of private investors. The partnership wasformed to acquire and amass a large tract of East St. Louis land. The land acquisition wasto be the first step of an ambitious development project. The new owners of the Mosque'sland intend to use it, along with numerous other adjoining tracts of land acquired withoutSWIDA assistance, to build a multimillion-dollar, mixed-income residential complex. Theconstruction, funded with private venture capital, would completely renovate a run-downarea of East St. Louis, Illinois, an area that the city has designated as blighted. The plannedtransformation of an area of urban decay and ruin into a massive residential complex has amotive long uncommon to the land in question. The private investors intend to make moneyfrom the housing project.

The owners who lost their land to the limited partnership bring this interlocutoryappeal from the St. Clair County circuit court decision that approved SWIDA's eminent-domain quick-take action. On appeal, they first argue that SWIDA's eminent-domain powerunder the Southwestern Illinois Development Authority Act (the Act) (70 ILCS 520/1 et seq.(West 1998)) is unconstitutional. Alternatively, they contend that SWIDA lacks theconstitutional authority to take the Mosque's land and convey it to a private party for privateprofit. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court decision.

In 1987, the Illinois General Assembly passed the Act. Pub. Act 85-59, eff.September 20, 1987. The legislation created the Southwestern Illinois DevelopmentAuthority and, among other things, empowered it to quick-take land by eminent domain forconveyance to private developers (see 735 ILCS 5/7-103 (West 1998)). The legislatorsencouraged SWIDA to exercise its powers, including the power of eminent domain, "topromote industrial, commercial, residential, service, transportation[,] and recreationalactivities and facilities ***." (Emphasis added.) 70 ILCS 520/2(g) (West 1998). The statedpublic purpose of the Act is to reduce "the evils attendant upon unemployment" and toenhance "he public health, safety, morals, happiness[,] and general welfare of this State." 70 ILCS 520/2(g) (West 1998).

SWIDA advertises that it will condemn land at the request of private developers inorder to advance its legislative mandate, provided that those developers pay certain fees anddefray certain expenses.

The Mosque is a not-for-profit religious corporation, with its temporary place ofworship located at 1823 Baugh Avenue in East St. Louis, Illinois. It purchased several run-down properties adjacent to and near this temporary place of worship, for the purpose ofdeveloping the area for the Muslim community. Its expectations included the constructionof a new place of worship, a cultural center, parking facilities, a recreational center, andsome commercial developments. However, SWIDA filed its quick-take petition before theMosque had taken any action to implement these intentions. The properties acquired werein a state of blight when purchased by the Mosque and had deteriorated further during theMosque's ownership.

The Parsons Place limited partnership, a private entity, engaged in a course of landacquisition for a residential mixed-income development called the Parsons Place Project. The main developers of the Parsons Place Project are McCormack Baron and the EmersonPark Development Corporation. The Parsons Place Project developers acquired numerousproperties surrounding the Mosque's land. The Mosque properties were needed to fulfill thedevelopment's design. The developers asked SWIDA to exercise its quick-take powers totake this land from the Mosque and convey it to the Parsons Place Project in order toproceed with their plans. Initially, SWIDA encouraged the Parsons Place Project developersto negotiate directly with the Mosque. Several meetings took place between Parsons PlaceProject developers and the Mosque regarding an open market sale of the property. Noagreement could be reached.

On March 25, 1999, SWIDA passed a resolution authorizing the use of its eminent-domain powers to take the Mosque's land for the Parsons Place Project. The resolutionstated that one of the purposes of the taking would be to eliminate slums and urban blight.On May 20, 1999, SWIDA filed a quick-take proceeding.

On June 18, 1999, the Mosque filed a traverse and motion to dismiss. The traverseand motion to dismiss alleged that the parcels targeted for condemnation were not properlythe subject of eminent-domain proceedings and that SWIDA lacked the constitutionalauthority to exercise the power of eminent domain.

On July 14, 1999, the circuit court entered an order setting preliminary justcompensation. On July 15, 1999, the circuit court denied the defendants' traverse andmotion to dismiss and entered an order that vested SWIDA with title to the land. The circuitcourt found that the property in question was blighted and that SWIDA had the authority toexercise the right of eminent domain. On August, 13, 1999, the erstwhile owners filednotice of this appeal.

The questions presented in this case require us to apply a mixed standard of review.On the one hand, the trial court's finding that the property in question was blighted is afinding that we will not disturb unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. See Zeitz v. Village of Glenview, 304 Ill. App. 3d 586, 590, 710 N.E.2d 849, 854 (1999);Village of Round Lake v. Amann, 311 Ill. App. 3d 705, 712, 725 N.E.2d 35, 43 (2000). However, the overriding question of whether an eminent-domain action is constitutionallysound is a matter for de novo review. Lake Louise Improvement Ass'n v. MultimediaCablevision of Oak Lawn, Inc., 157 Ill. App. 3d 713, 716, 510 N.E.2d 982, 984 (1987); Inre Department of Transportation, 173 Ill. App. 3d 730, 734, 527 N.E.2d 958, 961 (1988). In challenging the constitutionality of SWIDA's eminent-domain power, the Mosquerelies heavily upon a special concurring opinion filed with this court's decision inSouthwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environmental, L.L.C., 304Ill. App. 3d 542, 554, 710 N.E.2d 896, 904 (1999) (Kuehn, J., specially concurring), appealallowed, 185 Ill. 2d 667, 720 N.E.2d 1106 (1999). Its reliance upon the words and ideasexpressed in that special concurrence is misplaced. Obviously, those words and ideas do notspeak for this court. The majority in National City Environmental, L.L.C. refused to addressthe constitutionality of SWIDA's eminent-domain powers, abiding by a self-imposedconstraint established by this court in Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v.Vollman, 235 Ill. App. 3d 32, 600 N.E.2d 926 (1992). The majority adhered to precedentthat set the timing for any constitutional challenge to a condemnation action and, in sodoing, underscored the limits of an interlocutory appeal of this nature. Those limits remainuntouched by the special concurring opinion and call for a constitutional challenge to awaita conclusion of the eminent-domain proceedings. Vollman, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 37, 600N.E.2d at 929.

Additionally, the Mosque misapprehends the scope of what was said in the specialconcurring opinion. The special concurring opinion points out that the Act empowersSWIDA to do what it did in that case-exercise eminent domain without a stated publicpurpose other than the SWIDA's preference for how a given piece of land should bedeveloped and who should develop it. National City Environmental, L.L.C., 304 Ill. App.3d at 555, 710 N.E.2d at 905-06. The singular facts of that case were essential to theconstitutional analysis. SWIDA used its eminent-domain power to convey its favor upona racetrack developer who needed someone else's land in order to build a cheaper parkinglot. National City Environmental, L.L.C., 304 Ill. App. 3d at 545, 710 N.E.2d at 899. Thedeveloper had more expensive ways to provide for additional parking, but it utilizedgovernmental power to hold down its costs by taking land that it could not otherwise haveobtained. National City Environmental, L.L.C., 304 Ill. App. 3d at 552, 710 N.E.2d at 903. SWIDA took a valuable piece of private property, located in a boom area already teemingwith economic prospect and potential for private development, and conveyed it to a thirdparty. The taking benefitted that party at the previous landowner's expense. The key to thecase lies in the fact that SWIDA exercised its eminent-domain power purely in the name offurther economic development of the area. Such use of eminent domain, a use clearlysanctioned under the Act, exceeds those public purposes normally associated with takingprivate property and conveying it to a private third party. As the special concurrence noted,"While this legislation offers unquestionable potential for the kind of social and economicadvancement that follows capital investment, it exceeds sacred parameters when it empowersSWIDA to lure private investors with the promise of any prime land those investors wantto take." (Emphasis added.) National City Environmental, L.L.C., 304 Ill. App. 3d at 556,710 N.E.2d at 906.

Here, the question presented would be far different. The property taken in this caseis located in the heart of a blighted area. The property includes unoccupied and unattendedslums. The properties are virtually uninhabitable and, from their look, are no doubt rat-infested. The public purpose that underlies this condemnation has a much sounder footing,which brings us to the issue at hand-whether SWIDA's exercise of the eminent-domainpowers granted it by the legislature was proper in this case.

SWIDA filed a petition that set forth its reasons for the quick-take. One of the statedpurposes for the taking was the elimination of slums and blight. Having examined thephotographic exhibits in support of this claim, we cannot accept the Mosque's argument thatthe land in question was not in a blighted state when SWIDA initiated the condemnation. In fact, the resident imam of the Mosque identified the photographs of those parcels targetedfor condemnation and acknowledged that the area was "still blighted." His acknowledgmentwas understandable. The buildings depicted in the photographs are in a total state of ruinand decay. The grounds surrounding the buildings are strewn with rusted junk, discardedcans, bottles, and garbage bags. It appears that the derelict buildings were so dilapidatedthat certain uncaring people, rightfully concluding that they could not house humanoccupants, treated their unkept grounds as a fit place to dump trash.

Contrary to the Mosque's argument, the fact that these properties adjoin a place ofworship does not change the basic character of the surroundings. The basic character of thelocale is still one of ruin and urban decay. The area is blighted. The exercise of eminent-domain powers for the purpose of eliminating slums or blighted property is a proper use fora valid public purpose. See City of Chicago v. Walker, 50 Ill. 2d 69, 277 N.E.2d 129 (1971).

The Mosque seems to imply that the taking is still infirm because the propertiescondemned were conveyed to another private party intent on turning a profit from the land. However, if a public purpose is served, it makes no difference that the condemning bodychooses to transfer title, use, or possession of the acquired property to a private, for-profitentity to carry out that purpose. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm'n v. Eden CemeteryAss'n, 16 Ill. 2d 539, 546, 158 N.E.2d 766, 769-70 (1959); Hawaii Housing Authority v.Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243-44, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186, 199, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2331 (1984). Weare quite sure that the legislature did not expect SWIDA to build houses.

Here, the condemnation and transfer to the Parsons Place Project will effectuate thekind of positive change that was clearly contemplated by the Act. It will turn a blighted areainto a vast private housing complex, something of great need to the residents of East St.Louis. A clear public good supports SWIDA's action. New housing raises further prospectof additional development of decayed areas that lie at its parameters.

We agree with the circuit court's finding that the properties targeted for condemnationwere in a blighted area. We further agree with SWIDA that the quick-take action andconveyance to the Parsons Place Project will serve to eliminate slums and blight. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's decision.