The claimant, Gloria Trunek, filed an application for adjustment of claim under the Workers'Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2000)), seeking benefits for alleged injuriesarising out of and in the course of her employment with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart). Thematter was set for hearing on June 6, 2000, but was dismissed for want of prosecution. On June 7,2000, the parties and the arbitrator made a record which supported the arbitrator's dismissal of thematter.

On July 31, 2000, the claimant filed an amended petition to vacate the dismissal for want ofprosecution, to which Wal-Mart filed an objection. Without explanation, the arbitrator deniedclaimant's motion to vacate on September 6, 2000. Claimant sought review of the arbitrator'sSeptember 6, 2000, decision before the Industrial Commission (Commission). Wal-Mart moved todismiss the claimant's petition for review, arguing that it was untimely. Wal-Mart also argued in itsreply brief that the Commission lacked jurisdiction because the claimant failed to perfect its petitionfor review by timely filing a proper record pursuant to section 19(b) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(b)(West 2000)). The Commission denied Wal-Mart's motion to dismiss, and by separate order, affirmedand adopted the arbitrator's decision denying the claimant's motion to vacate the dismissal.

The claimant sought judicial review of the Commission's decision in the circuit court of CookCounty. On November 20, 2002, the circuit court reversed the Commission's decision and remandedthe case to the Commission with instructions to reinstate the claimant's case and to proceed with ahearing on the merits. Wal-Mart appeals the circuit court's order pursuant to Supreme Court Rules301 and 303.

The claimant contends this court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because the circuit court'sorder reversing and remanding the case to the Commission for further proceedings on the merits isinterlocutory and not a final judgment. For the following reasons, we agree.

It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the appellate court is limited to review of finaljudgments, unless an exception is provided by statute or Supreme Court Rule. In re Marriage ofVerdung, 126 Ill. 2d 542, 553, 535 N.E.2d 818 (1989); accord Pace Bus Company v. IndustrialComm'n, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1068, 787 N.E.2d 234 (2003). "A judgment is final for appealpurposes if it determines the litigation on the merits or some definite part thereof so that, if affirmed,the only thing remaining is to proceed with the execution of the judgment." In re Marriage ofVerdung, 126 Ill. 2d at 553. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, when a circuit courtreverses a decision of the Commission and remands the matter for further proceedings involving theresolution of questions of law or fact, the order is interlocutory and not appealable. A.O. Smith Corp.v. Industrial Comm'n, 109 Ill. 2d 52, 54, 485 N.E.2d 335 (1985); Stockton v. Industrial Comm'n, 69Ill. 2d 120, 124, 370 N.E.2d 548 (1977).

Pursuant to the circuit court's remand, the Commission would have to resolve a variety ofquestions involving fact and/or law. Most notably, the Commission must still determine the thresholdquestions of whether the claimant sustained injuries arising out of and in the course of heremployment. The circuit court's order, therefore, cannot be construed as a final order.

Wal-Mart contends we should entertain this appeal in the interest of judicial economy. Specifically, Wal-Mart argues litigation of this matter will be a waste of time and resources if thecircuit court's judgment is reversed and the dismissal for want of prosecution is affirmed in asubsequent appeal to this court. While Wal-Mart's contention has some merit, this court is withoutauthority to disregard its lack of jurisdiction.

Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(6) (203 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(6)) provides a process by which Wal-Mart could have sought review of the circuit court's order. That rule grants this court the discretionto allow an appeal of an otherwise non-final circuit court order that remands a case for a hearing denovo before an administrative agency. 203 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(6). Wal-mart, however, not only failedto rely on this rule to support its jurisdictional statement, it also failed to follow its requirements forseeking leave to appeal by filing a petition before this court.

For the foregoing reasons, we lack jurisdiction to entertain Wal-Mart's appeal and dismiss thisappeal accordingly.

Appeal dismissed and cause remanded to the Industrial Commission.

McCULLOUGH, P.J., and CALLUM, HOLDRIDGE, and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.