United Methodist Village Retirement Communities, Inc. (petitioner), is a not-for-profit corporation formed for the purpose of operating housing facilities for "seniors." In1996, petitioner purchased three parcels of real estate located in Madison County for thepurpose of constructing its housing facilities. On August 7, 1998, the Madison Countysupervisor of assessments issued to petitioner a "Notice to Taxpayer of Assessment Change"as to the three parcels, indicating that the assessment of each parcel was increased from $0to values of $235,690, $531,370, and $1,288,410, respectively.

On September 8, 1998, pursuant to section 16-55 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS200/16-55 (West 1998)), petitioner filed a written complaint as to each parcel with theMadison County Board of Review (Board of Review). Petitioner asserted that the changein assessment from $0 was improper because the property was exempt from taxation. At thesame time, in accordance with the provisions of section 15-5 of the Property Tax Code (35ILCS 200/15-5 (West 1998)), petitioner filed with the Board of Review applications forexemption as to each parcel. Petitioner did not otherwise challenge the amount of theassessment.

On April 15, 1999, the Board of Review issued its final decision confirming theassessment made by the supervisor of assessments and indicating that the application forexemption would be filed with the Department of Revenue in accordance with section 16-70of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/16-70 (West 1998)). The Board of Review's finaldecision states, "[Petitioner] may appeal this decision to the Property Tax Appeal Boardwithin 30 days ***."

On May 13, 1999, pursuant to section 16-160 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS200/16-160 (West 1998)), petitioner filed appeals to the Property Tax Appeal Board (AppealBoard) with respect to each parcel, alleging a contention of law with respect to theapplications for exemption. The Board of Review filed with the Appeal Board its "Noteson Appeal," which include the property record cards on each parcel. On July 30, 1999,Alton Community Unit School District No. 11 filed requests to intervene as a taxing districthaving a revenue interest in the subject property. On August 16, 1999, the Village ofGodfrey filed similar requests to intervene.

On January 7, 2000, the Appeal Board entered its final decision, reciting, "The basisof [petitioner]'s appeal is a contention of law in which it argues the subject property isexempt from real estate assessment and taxation." The decision indicates that the issue ofthe exempt status of the property was also before the Department of Revenue. The decisionstates that the Board of Review had filed its "Notes on Appeal" containing the totalassessments and had submitted copies of the property record cards with respect to eachparcel. The decision further states that each of the intervenors had filed a brief on appeal. The Appeal Board concluded that it had jurisdiction over the parties but that it did not havesubject matter jurisdiction over the issue raised-whether the subject property should beexempt from real estate taxation and have an assessment of $0. The Appeal Boardconcluded that, under the Property Tax Code, the Appeal Board plays no part in determiningwhether property is exempt from taxation; only the Department of Revenue can make thatdetermination. The Appeal Board found that it had no authority to rule on petitioner's claimthat the subject property is exempt from taxation. Because petitioner did not otherwisecontest the assessments and because the Board of Review had submitted the appropriatedocumentation, the Appeal Board affirmed the Board of Review's assessments.

On February 4, 2000, petitioner filed in this court, pursuant to section 16-195 of theProperty Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/16-195 (West 1998)), its petition for review ofadministrative decision, naming as respondents the Appeal Board, its members, AltonCommunity Unit School District No. 11, and the Village of Godfrey. The Board of Reviewwas not made a party respondent to this appeal.

On April 26, 2000, petitioner filed in this court a motion for leave to amend itspetition for review of administrative decision to join the Board of Review as an additionalparty respondent. We ordered that the motion be taken with the case, and we address it now.

The appeal of the decision of the Appeal Board in this case has been taken directlyto this court pursuant to section 16-195 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/16-195(West 1998)), because the change in the assessed valuation of petitioner's property exceeded$300,000. The procedure for bringing such an appeal before this court is set forth in section3-113 of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-113 (West 1998)) and SupremeCourt Rule 335 (155 Ill. 2d R. 335). Section 3-113(a) provides that an action for the directreview of a final administrative decision of an administrative agency by the appellate courtshall be commenced by the filing of a petition for review in the appellate court within 35days from the date a copy of the administrative decision was served upon the party affectedby the decision. 735 ILCS 5/3-113(a) (West 1998). Section 3-113(b) requires that "[t]heagency and all other parties of record shall be named respondents." 735 ILCS 5/3-113(b)(West 1998). However, section 3-113(b) states as follows:

"If, during the course of a review action, the court determines that a party of recordto the administrative proceedings was not made a defendant as required by thepreceding paragraph, and only if that party was not named by the administrativeagency in its final order as a party of record, then the court shall grant the plaintiff 21days from the date of the determination in which to name and serve the unnamedparty as a defendant. The court shall permit the newly served defendant to participatein the proceedings to the extent the interests of justice may require." 735 ILCS 5/3-113(b) (West 1998).

Supreme Court Rule 335 sets forth similar requirements. 155 Ill. 2d R. 335.

In Villa Retirement Apartments, Inc. v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 302 Ill. App. 3d745, 751 (1999), this court held that the board of review is always a party of record whenthe taxpayer has unsuccessfully sought a review before it of the supervisor of assessments'sassessment and the taxpayer is appealing the board of review's decision to the Appeal Board. Thus, in the instant case, the Board of Review was a party of record to the proceedingsbefore the Appeal Board, and petitioner was required to name the Board of Review in itspetition for review before this court, but it failed to do so. Petitioner now seeks leave toamend its petition for review to name the Board of Review as a party respondent, a motionthat we may grant only if the Board of Review was not named by the Appeal Board as aparty of record in its final decision.

In Villa Retirement Apartments, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 3d at 751-52, this court held thatin order to bar an amendment of the petition for review to add the unnamed party as a partyrespondent, the final order of the administrative agency must not merely mention theunnamed party of record but must explicitly state that the party is a party of record. In theinstant case, the final decision of the Appeal Board did not explicitly state that the Board ofReview was a party of record. Accordingly, we grant petitioner leave to amend its petitionfor review to add the Board of Review as a party respondent. However, because theinterests of the Board of Review are adequately protected by the participation of the AppealBoard and the intervenors in this appeal, we find that justice does not require that the Boardof Review be allowed to participate in these proceedings. We turn now to the merits ofpetitioner's appeal.

An agency's findings of law are reviewed by this court de novo, as are questionsregarding the interpretation of a statute. Geneva Community Unit School District No. 304v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 296 Ill. App. 3d 630, 633 (1998). The Appeal Board heldthat, under the Property Tax Code, it did not have authority to determine whether the subjectproperty was exempt from taxation. We agree. The Property Tax Code makes it clear thatonly the Department of Revenue has authority to determine if a property is exempt fromtaxation. Section 15-5 of the Property Tax Code provides that any person wishing to claiman exemption for the first time shall file an application with the county board of review. 35ILCS 200/15-5 (West 1998). Section 16-70 of the Property Tax Code provides thefollowing:

"The board of review shall hear and determine the application of any personwho is assessed on property claimed to be exempt from taxation. However, thedecision of the board shall not be final, except as to homestead exemptions. *** Theclerk of the board in all cases other than homestead exemptions, under the directionof the board, shall make out and forward to the Department [of Revenue][] a full andcomplete statement of all the facts in the case. The Department [of Revenue] shalldetermine whether the property is legally liable to taxation. It shall notify the boardof review of its decision, and the board shall correct the assessment if necessary. Thedecision of the Department [of Revenue] is subject to review under Sections 8-35 and8-40." 35 ILCS 200/16-70 (West 1998).

Sections 8-35 and 8-40 of the Property Tax Code provide for the administrative review ofa final decision of the Department of Revenue in the circuit court for the county in whichthe property is located. 35 ILCS 200/8-35, 8-40 (West 1998). The Property Tax Code doesnot provide for the Appeal Board's review of decisions relating to exempt status, whetherthe decision was made by the county's board of review or the Department of Revenue.

It is fundamental that an administrative body has only such powers as are granted inthe statute creating it. Geneva Community Unit School District No. 304, 296 Ill. App. 3dat 634. While the Property Tax Code does give the Appeal Board authority to receiveappeals from decisions of the boards of review, the only types of appeal provided for in thestatute are those by a taxpayer dissatisfied with the assessment of property. 35 ILCS 200/16-160 (West 1998); see also Geneva Community Unit School District No. 304, 296 Ill. App.3d at 634. The Property Tax Code does not give the Appeal Board authority to reviewdecisions of the boards of review with respect to exemptions of property from taxation. SeeMead v. Board of Review, 143 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1096 (1986); Geneva Community UnitSchool District No. 304, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 634-35. This is reflected in the "Statement ofPolicy" of the Appeal Board, which states, "The Property Tax Appeal Board is withoutjurisdiction to determine the tax rate, the amount of a tax bill, or the exemption of realproperty from taxation." 86 Ill. Adm. Code