Vaughn v. Barton

SUPREME COURT CASES

Laws-info.com » Cases » Illinois » 5th District Appellate » 2010 » Vaughn v. Barton

Vaughn v. Barton

State: Illinois

Court: 5th District Appellate

Docket No: 5-09-0213 Rel

Case Date: 07/08/2010

Preview:NO. 5-09-0213
N O T IC E Decision filed 07/08/10. The text of this dec ision m ay b e changed or corrected prior to the P e t i ti o n for filing of a or the

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

Re hea ring

FIFTH DISTRICT ________________________________________________________________________ DEBBIE J. VAUGHN, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant and ) Franklin County. Cross-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 06-L-29 ) JARROD BARTON and WEST FRANKFORT ) RECREATION ASSOCIATION, ) ) Honorable Defendants-Appellees and ) Leo T. Desmond, Cross-Appellants. ) Judge, presiding. ________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE WEXSTTEN delivered the opinion of the court: The plaintiff, Debbie Vaughn, filed a complaint in the circuit court of Franklin County against the West Frankfort Recreation Association (the Recreation Association) and its alleged agent, Jarrod Barton, alleging that she was injured while watching her minor son's organized baseball game when she was hit by a baseball thrown by an 11-year-old player warming up for the next game. After the evidence was presented, the circuit court found the immunity of the Recreational Use of Land and Water Areas Act (the Recreational Use Act) (745 ILCS 65/1 et seq. (West 2002)) applicable and granted a directed verdict in favor of the defendants. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm. BACKGROUND The Recreation Association is a not-for-profit Illinois corporation that organizes approximately 12 summer baseball leagues broken down by age group for approximately 550 to 650 youth. The Recreation Association is composed of an executive committee, a board of directors, league coordinators for each respective league age group, coaches and their 1

disposition of the same.

assistants, and the players. The coordinators for each league select the coaches, set rules for the baseball games, and "basically run their league," doing everything from organizing the teams to maintaining the baseball fields. The coaches, on the other hand, draft their team members and have general supervisory authority over their teams. The executive committee, board of directors, coordinators, and coaches are all unpaid volunteers. In 1997, the Recreation Association entered into an agreement with the Frankfort Community Park District (the Park District) to "formally acquire the sole and exclusive lease to maintain, possess, control[,] and use all of the ten (10) ball diamonds in the Park District *** in an area generally known as the West Frankfort Park." Under the terms of that agreement, the Recreation Association agreed to pay the Park District $100 per year as rent. The Recreation Association also agreed "to pay all costs of electricity needed and used in the conduct of the affairs of the Recreation Association and to hold and maintain the property subject to this lease for recreational purposes as herein stated." The parties also agreed, "That there be no admission charge as such to spectators who desire to see games played during non[]tournament play, provided, however, that voluntary contributions from patrons to help defray expenses will be permissible and acceptable and there can be an admission charge to spectators for tournament play." The testimony at the trial established that the Recreation Association built fences, dugouts, and scorers' booths, installed lights and light poles around the 10 baseball fields in West Frankfort Park, and maintained those fields over the years. The Recreation Association also provided shirts and equipment for the players. The money to pay for these expenses came from the $35 sign-up fee the players paid, candy bar sales, barbeque, and concessions. The Recreation Association does not charge an admission for people to come and watch the games. On May 20, 2005, the plaintiff attended her son's baseball game at one of the ball

2

fields in West Frankfort Park. The plaintiff testified that she was sitting in the bleachers watching the game, "looking straight ahead, and a ball came from the side[] and hit [her] in the eye." She testified that she did not see the ball coming and prior to being hit was not aware that anyone was throwing a ball close to her. She testified that she was not charged an admission to the game and that it was free to the public to come and watch the games. It is undisputed that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of this accident. Cody Barton, Jarrod's 11-year-old son, testified that he and one of his teammates were warming up for the next game, playing catch. He testified that they were playing catch behind the dugout, in between the two sets of bleachers, when he threw the ball that hit off the top of his teammate's glove and hit the plaintiff. Jarrod testified he was a coach for his son Cody's team and that they had arrived at the ball field about 15 to 20 minutes before the accident occurred. He testified that upon arriving he went to the fence along the third-base line and was watching the game and having a conversation with the plaintiff's husband, Keith Vaughn, who happened to be the assistant coach and league coordinator for Cody and the plaintiff's son's league. He testified that he did not see the accident and did not know Cody was playing catch. He testified that he had not yet called his team together and that he was a spectator at the game at the time of the accident. He testified that Cody paid a $35 sign-up fee to play in the league and that he was paid nothing for coaching. Keith testified that when the plaintiff was injured, Jarrod was not coaching. He stated as follows: "He was a spectator. He was a coach, waiting on his team to get there." He testified that until a coach gives his players some direction, the coach is just a coach waiting on his team to show up. It is undisputed that warming up in the area between the bleachers was not a safe or proper area for players to warm up and that there were no signs posted by the Recreation

3

Association informing players not to warm up in the area around the bleachers and dugouts. At the close of the plaintiff's case, Jarrod moved for a directed verdict on count III (negligence) based upon the insufficiency of the evidence when measured against the Sports Volunteer Immunity Act (the Sports Volunteer Act) (745 ILCS 80/0.01 et seq. (West 2002)). The court denied that motion. Jarrod also moved for a directed verdict on count IV (willful and wanton conduct) based upon insufficient proof of willful and wanton conduct. This motion was granted and has not been appealed. The Recreation Association moved for a directed verdict on count IV based upon insufficient proof that Jarrod was acting in the scope of his alleged agency at the time of the occurrence, on count VII based upon insufficient proof of negligence, and on counts VI and VIII based upon insufficient proof of willful and wanton conduct. The court granted the motion on counts VI and VIII (willful and wanton conduct) but denied the motion on counts IV (agency) and VII (negligence). Counts VI and VIII have not been appealed. At that time, the defendants were allowed to present evidence. Jarrod did not present any evidence. The Recreation Association presented the testimony of the president of the Recreation Association. At the close of all the evidence, Jarrod and the Recreation

Association reasserted their motions for a directed verdict on the remaining counts

Download Vaughn v. Barton.pdf