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JUSTICE WELCH delivered the opinion of the court:

On July 8, 1998, a vehicle driven by Shelley Wilson (the plaintiff) was struck in therear by a vehicle driven by James Adams, an employee of F.B. McAfoos & Company. OnSeptember 15, 1999, the plaintiff filed suit in the circuit court of Williamson County againstAdams and his employer to recover for personal injuries she suffered in the accident. Thislawsuit was settled for the sum of $18,000, and on May 25, 2001, a stipulation for adismissal with prejudice was filed in the circuit court of Williamson County.

The plaintiff had sought chiropractic care for her injuries from Dr. Todd Hamilton,who had billed the plaintiff $12,995 for that treatment. The plaintiff's automobile insurer hadalready paid Dr. Hamilton $3,000. On May 22, 2001, prior to the dismissal of the underlyinglawsuit, the plaintiff filed a petition to adjudicate Dr. Hamilton's statutory physician's lienon the proceeds of the lawsuit. This petition to adjudicate the lien was served on AmericanHealth Care Financial Services (the intervenor), which had notified the plaintiff that it hadpurchased the first $5,000 of the plaintiff's outstanding account from Dr. Hamilton and hadrequested the payment of that $5,000 from the plaintiff. Dr. Hamilton had died in themeantime.

In her petition to adjudicate the lien, the plaintiff asserted that the intervenor couldnot be an assignee of the statutory physician's lien and that Dr. Hamilton's charges wereexcessive, unreasonable, and unrelated to the injuries incurred in the motor vehicle accident. The petition prayed that the court adjudicate Dr. Hamilton's medical bill and lien to be zero.

On July 3, 2001, the intervenor filed a petition to intervene in this cause, which wasgranted by the circuit court of Williamson County on July 23, 2001. The intervenor alsofiled a response to the plaintiff's petition to adjudicate the lien. The response includedcounterclaims against the plaintiff for breach of contract and equitable estoppel. The breachof contract claim was founded upon a contract entered into between the plaintiff and Dr.Hamilton in which the plaintiff (1) agreed to assign to Dr. Hamilton the direct payment ofany sum received in the underlying lawsuit or from any insurance company for the injuriesincurred in the accident, (2) granted to Dr. Hamilton a lien against any proceeds of theunderlying lawsuit, and (3) agreed that she was personally liable for any amounts owedwhich were not collected from third parties. The equitable estoppel claim was based on theintervenor's allegations that the plaintiff, acting through her attorney, had induced theintervenor to purchase Dr. Hamilton's account receivable relating to the plaintiff by tellingthe intervenor that there was clear liability, that the plaintiff had been injured to a sufficientextent to justify the chiropractor's bills, and that Dr. Hamilton did not overcharge for hisservices. According to the intervenor, the plaintiff should now be estopped from claimingthat Dr. Hamilton's bill is excessive, unreasonable, or unrelated to the motor vehicle accidentor that the account could not be assigned.

On December 10, 2001, the intervenor filed a motion pursuant to Illinois SupremeCourt Rule 219 (166 Ill. 2d R. 219) to compel the plaintiff's deposition and to compel her topay reasonable expenses relating to her failure to appear for her previously scheduleddeposition. On the same date, the intervenor filed a motion pursuant to Supreme Court Rule219 to compel the plaintiff's attorney to answer certain questions propounded to him at hisprevious deposition relating to an accounting of the settlement proceeds received in theunderlying lawsuit and the disbursement of those funds. The motion also sought to compelhim to pay associated expenses.

On April 3, 2002, the plaintiff filed a motion for a summary judgment declaring thatthe intervenor is not entitled to a lien on the settlement proceeds from the underlying lawsuitbecause a physician's lien is not assignable as a matter of law. The intervenor opposed thismotion for a summary judgment and, on April 10, 2002, filed its own motion for a summaryjudgment. This motion sought the following relief:

"1.) a partial summary judgment that [the plaintiff] is liable to [the intervenor]for breaching her contract to pay Dr. Hamilton's outstanding bill for chiropractictreatment provided her out of the settlement proceeds she received from thedefendants in this case;

2.) a partial summary judgment that [the plaintiff] is liable to [the intervenor]pursuant to the Physician's [sic] Lien Act for the first $5,000 of Dr. Hamilton's billor alternatively that [the plaintiff] is liable to [the intervenor] pursuant to thePhysician's [sic] Lien Act for the amount of Dr. Hamilton's charges the courtdetermines are reasonable and do not, in conjunction with other liens, exceed onethird (1/3) of the sum paid her in settlement of her personal injury action by thedefendants;

3.) a partial summary judgment that [the plaintiff] is liable to [the intervenor]for payment of the first $5,000 of Dr. Hamilton's health care account receivable fromthe settlement proceeds of her case pursuant to the equitable lien created by thecontract between Dr. Hamilton and [the plaintiff]."

On June 11, 2002, the circuit court of Williamson County entered its order, which weset forth in its entirety:

"Several pending motions are under advisement-The Court rules as follows:

The resolution of the summary judgment motions will resolve most of thepending issues in this case. [The intervenor] seeks to enforce a physician lien in thename of Dr. Hamilton, based upon the purchase of part of Dr. Hamilton's accountsreceivable. The debts owed to Dr. Hamilton may be purchased by a third party-andthat 3rd party-[the intervenor]-may attempt collection of any sums they havepurchased. Doctor's [sic] bills are assignable.

A doctor's physician lien is a creature of statute[] that was not recognizedunder common law. As such the physician lien statute must be read restrictively. 777[sic] ILCS 80/0.01 et seq.

Nothing in that act[]specifically grants to a subsequent 3rd party-such as [theintervenor]-the right to purchase and enforce a doctor's lien from the proceeds of thesettlement of the patient's underlying cause of action against a negligent 3rd party.

If the legislature wanted to provide this protection under the Act-thelegislature could have done so.

As such[,] this court finds [the intervenor] does have the right to attempt tocollect from [the plaintiff] that portion of the debt owed to Dr. Hamilton-that [theintervenor] purchased from Dr. Hamilton-and [the intervenor] does not have any rightto enforce a physician lien in the proceeds of settlement received by [the plaintiff]from the defendants-F.B. McAfoos & Co. and James Adams-in this case [No.] 99-L-135.

As such[,] the motion for summary judgment filed by [the intervenor] on April10, 2002[,] is denied.

The summary judgment motion filed by plaintiff on April 3, 2002[,] is grantedto the extent that this court finds physician liens are not assignable as a matter of law.

This renders the depositions of [the plaintiff] and [the plaintiff's attorney] tobe moot, so each motion to compel is therefore denied in this action.

There is no just reason for delaying appeal of these matters pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 304 [(155 Ill. 2d R. 304)]." (Emphasis added.)

The intervenor appeals.

The first issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in holding that liensunder the Physicians Lien Act (the Act) (770 ILCS 80/0.01 (West 2002)) are not assignableas a matter of law. The propriety of the remainder of the trial court's order hinges upon theanswer to this question. Because this issue involves the interpretation of a statute and theinterpretation of a statute is a question of law, we review the issue de novo. Branson v.Department of Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247, 254 (1995).

For a physician who renders treatment to an injured person, the Act provides thephysician with a lien upon all claims and causes of action of that injured person for theamount of the physician's reasonable charges up to the date of the payment of damages. 770ILCS 80/1 (West 2002). The Act imposes certain requirements on the physician seeking toimpose a lien: give notice of the lien to the injured person and the party against whom aclaim or right of action exists (770 ILCS 80/1 (West 2002)), allow access to the physician'srecords relating to the injured person for any party who might be liable for damages in apending court action (770 ILCS 80/3 (West 2002)) or against whom a claim may be asserted(770 ILCS 80/4 (West 2002)), and upon the request of a party to a court action for damagesor a party against whom a claim may be asserted, furnish a written statement relating to theinjuries and treatment and the patient's history (770 ILCS 80/3, 4 (West 2002)). The failureto fulfill these requirements results in the lien becoming null and void. 770 ILCS 80/5 (West2002).

A physician's lien did not exist at common law but is a creature of statute. Gaskill v.Robert E. Sanders Disposal Hauling, 249 Ill. App. 3d 673, 676 (1993). A lien created bystatute is limited in operation and extent by the terms of the statute. Gaskill, 249 Ill. App.3d at 676; Meier v. Olivero, 279 Ill. App. 3d 630, 632-33 (1996). Nevertheless, lien lawsare liberally construed to effect the purpose intended by the legislature. Gaskill, 249 Ill.App. 3d at 677; Meier, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 632-33.

We note that the Act does not provide for the assignment of the lien or of theconcomitant duties of the physician seeking to impose the lien. We also note that thelegislature has enacted numerous statutes, similar to the Act, that provide for liens againstthe recovery of damages for personal injuries, in favor of those providing services to theinjured person: the Clinical Psychologists Lien Act (770 ILCS 10/0.01 et seq. (West 2002)),the Dentists Lien Act (770 ILCS 20/0.01 et seq. (West 2002)), the Home Health Agency LienAct (770 ILCS 25/1 et seq. (West 2002)), the Hospital Lien Act (770 ILCS 35/0.01 et seq.(West 2002)), the Optometrists Lien Act (770 ILCS 72/1 et seq. (West 2002)), the PhysicalTherapist Lien Act (770 ILCS 75/1 et seq. (West 2002)), and the Emergency MedicalServices Personnel Lien Act (770 ILCS 22/1 et seq. (West 2002)). None of these statutesprovide for the assignability of these liens. On the other hand, the legislature has seen fit toprovide for the assignability of other sorts of statutory liens. For example, the MechanicsLien Act expressly provides that all liens thereunder shall be assignable and that all actionsto enforce liens thereunder may be maintained by and in the name of the assignee. 770 ILCS60/8 (West 2002). The Oil and Gas Lien Act of 1989 also expressly provides for theassignability of liens thereunder and the enforcement by the assignee. 770 ILCS 70/20 (West2002). The Self-Service Storage Facility Act also expressly provides that the lien allowedthereunder is assignable. 770 ILCS 95/3 (West 2002).

We conclude that where the legislature has intended that a statutory lien beassignable, it has so provided in the statute itself. We further conclude that where thelegislature does not provide for the assignability of a statutory lien, it does not intend for thatlien to be assignable.

In construing a statute, the court is obligated to ascertain and to give effect to theintent of the legislature, and generally, the language of the statute itself is the best indicatorof that intent. Gaskill, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 678. It is not the province of the courts to injectprovisions not found in a statute. Gaskill, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 678. If the legislature hadintended for a physician's lien to be assignable, it could have, and would have, so providedin the Act. It did not. Accordingly, we conclude that a lien under the Act is not assignableand cannot be enforced by a purported assignee.

The intervenor argues that this construction of the Act ignores the public policybehind the Act, which is to lessen the financial burden on those who treat nonpaying accidentvictims. See Cirrincione v. Johnson, 184 Ill. 2d 109, 114 (1998). The intervenor points totwo cases which held that statutory liens were assignable in the absence of any statutoryprovision specifically allowing or prohibiting an assignment: Gonzalez v. Evanston Fuel &Material Co., 265 Ill. App. 3d 520, 523 (1994), and Claudy v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,255 Ill. App. 3d 714, 722 (1993), rev'd on other grounds, 169 Ill. 2d 39 (1995). We findthese cases to be inapposite.

Gonzalez, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 523, held that section 21 of the Workers' CompensationAct (820 ILCS 305/21 (West 2002)), which prohibits the assignment of the employee'saward, does not prohibit the assignment of the employer's lien on any compensation paid tothe plaintiff by a third-party tortfeasor liable in damages for the same injury. The court heldthat section 21 does not relate to whether an employer's lien is assignable but only prohibitsthe assignment of a " 'payment, claim, award[,] or decision' " to the employee. Gonzalez,265 Ill. App. 3d at 523 (quoting 820 ILCS 305/21 (West 1992)). An employer's lien doesnot fall into this category. Because the Workers' Compensation Act was intended to protectthe employee and because the employer's assignment of its lien does not affect theemployee's recovery from a third-party tortfeasor, there is no rationale for prohibiting theassignment of the employer's lien.

Claudy, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 722, held that a cause of action for contribution under theJoint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (now 740 ILCS 100/0.01 et seq. (West 2002)) is assignableeven though the statute neither allows it nor prohibits it. The court held that allowing theassignment of an action for contribution does not violate the rule barring the assignment ofactions for personal injuries because the same public policy arguments do not apply.

The intervenor argues that these cases make it clear that the determining factor inresolving whether statutory rights can be assigned is not whether the statute explicitly allowssuch assignments but whether the assignments are consistent with statutory language andpublic policy. We disagree. When a court interprets a statute, the primary rule, to which allother rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning ofthe legislature. Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). We have ascertained thatthe true intent and meaning of the Act is not to allow the assignment of liens thereunder. Accordingly, we reject the intervenor's argument.

The circuit court of Williamson County did not err in holding that liens under the Actare not assignable as a matter of law or in granting the plaintiff's summary judgment on thisquestion.

The intervenor also appeals from the denial of its motion for a summary judgment onits breach of contract and equitable lien claims and the denial of its motions to compel theplaintiff and her attorney to comply with certain discovery requests. In light of the trialcourt's ruling respecting the assignability of liens under the Act, the trial court had no choicebut to deny these motions of the intervenor. After a finding that Dr. Hamilton's lien couldnot have been effectively assigned to the intervenor and that the intervenor had no legal rightto enforce that lien, any claims of the intervenor relating to that lien fail. As the trial courtpointed out in its order, while the intervenor had a right to sue the plaintiff in a separateaction to recover the debt, whether in breach of contract or otherwise, the intervenor had noright to participate in proceedings to adjudicate the lien. The petition to adjudicate the lienwas the only action before the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denyingthe intervenor's motions for a summary judgment and to compel discovery in the proceedingto adjudicate the lien.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Williamson County ishereby affirmed, and this cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings on thepetition to adjudicate the lien.

Affirmed; cause remanded.

HOPKINS, P.J., and CHAPMAN, J., concur.