Wood River Township (the township) and Gregory G. Kuehnel, Nancy A. Harris,Vincent B. Milazzo, Sr., Bill Stewart, and Tom McRae (individual taxpayers) (collectivelyreferred to as plaintiffs) appeal the trial court's order granting a motion to dismiss and forinjunctive relief that had been filed by Wood River Township Hospital (the hospital),Bradford L. Pulaski, Margaret K. Edel, Max Emery, Gary D. Kessler, Kenneth Miller, andPeggy L. Rucker (the board of directors), Nuveen Premier Municipal Income Fund, Inc.(Nuveen), Cincinnati Insurance Company (Cincinnati), Amalgamated Bank of Chicago(Amalgamated), Mark Von Nida, and Fred Bathon (collectively referred to as defendants). On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred when it dismissed plaintiffs' causes ofaction. The court found that the township lacked the standing to sue and that the individualtaxpayers could not sustain a cause of action in equity because the individual taxpayers hadan adequate remedy at law, i.e., they could proceed in a taxpayer's objection proceeding. Weaffirm.

The hospital was organized in 1948 and operated under Article 170 of the TownshipCode (60 ILCS 1/170-5 et seq. (West 2000)). The hospital is a body corporate and politicseparate and distinct from the township, and it is governed by a board of directors appointedby the township's board of trustees. The hospital is authorized to levy ad valorem taxes onreal property in the township for the purpose of "maintaining and operating the publichospital and for the purpose of repairing, improving, extending, and equipping the publichospital." 60 ILCS 1/170-30 (West 2000). The hospital also has the authority to issuebonds for "the purpose of acquiring by purchase, constructing, improving, extending,repairing, or equipping" the hospital (60 ILCS 1/170-35(a) (West 2000)) and for "thepurpose of (i) constructing, reconstructing, repairing, remodeling, extending, equipping,improving, and acquiring a site or sites for a hospital building or buildings or (ii) refundingany revenue bonds previously issued from time to time in relation to the operation of thehospital when deemed necessary or advantageous in the public interest" (60 ILCS 1/170-50(a) (West 2000)). Section 170-35 requires that the resolution for issuing the bonds besubmitted to a referendum of the electors of the township. 60 ILCS 1/170-35(d) (West2000). Bonds issued under section 170-50, entitled "revenue bonds," can be authorized bya resolution that is not submitted to the electors of the township. 60 ILCS 1/170-50(a) (West2000).

Both sections 170-35 and 170-50 include a paragraph that incorporates the OmnibusBond Acts (5 ILCS 70/8 (West 2000)). 60 ILCS 1/170-35(e), 170-50(b) (West 2000). Under the Omnibus Bond Acts, governmental entities, such as the hospital, are givensupplemental grants of power pursuant to various acts enumerated in the Omnibus BondActs for the purpose of giving the governmental entities "equal access to the municipal bondmarket." 5 ILCS 70/8(b) (West 2000). The Local Government Debt Reform Act (30 ILCS350/1 et seq. (West 2000)) is one of the acts listed in the Omnibus Bond Acts. 5 ILCS70/8(a) (West 2000).

Under the Local Government Debt Reform Act, a governmental unit can issuegeneral obligation bonds, also referred to as "alternate bonds," that are issued in lieu ofrevenue bonds and that are payable from any revenue source of the governmental unit,including ad valorem real estate property taxes. 30 ILCS 350/15 (West 2000). The alternatebonds issued under the Local Government Debt Reform Act are authorized through abackdoor referendum procedure. 30 ILCS 350/15(b) (West 2000). The backdoorreferendum procedure is set out both in section 15(b) and in section 5 (30 ILCS 350/5, 15(b)(West 2000)). Section 15(b) provides that a notice of the bond resolution is to be publishedin a newspaper of general circulation in the governmental unit, and it sets out theinformation that is to be included in the published notice, which includes the number ofvoters required to sign a petition requesting that the issuance of the alternate bonds besubmitted to a referendum of voters, the time for filing the petition, the date of theprospective referendum, and a statement that identifies any revenue source that will be usedto pay the principal and interest on the alternate bonds. 30 ILCS 350/15(b) (West 2000).

On April 28, 1993, the board of directors of the hospital passed "Resolution No.1993-1" under the backdoor referendum procedure provided in sections 5 and 15(b) of theLocal Government Debt Reform Act (30 ILCS 350/5, 15(b) (West 2000)). The resolutionstated that the hospital would issue alternate bonds totalling $13.5 million pursuant tosection 15 of the Local Government Debt Reform Act (the resolution called it the "AlternateBond Act"), for the purpose of refunding already existing revenue bonds and for thepurposes of reconstructing, repairing, remodeling, extending, equipping, and improving thehospital. Resolution 1993-1 also provided for notice to be published in accordance withsection 15(b) of the Local Government Debt Reform Act, and it set out the contents of thenotice. The notice allowed 30 days for the filing of any petitions requesting that theproposed bond issuance be submitted to a referendum of the voters. The notice waspublished, but no petitions requesting a submission to a referendum of voters were filedduring the 30-day period allowed under the published notice. Resolution 1993-1 wasadopted by the hospital's board of directors on December 22, 1993. Additionally, resolution93-9, which levied ad valorem real estate taxes for the years 1994 through 2012 for thepayment of the principal and interest on the bonds issued under resolution 1993-1, was alsoadopted by the hospital's board of directors on this same date.

The hospital's board of directors also adopted resolution 93-8 on December 22, 1993. Resolution 93-8 authorized the issuance of $11.225 million in bonds pursuant to section 9-105 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS10/9-105 (West 2000)) (the tort bonds) and levied ad valorem real estate taxes for the years1995 through 2013 pursuant to section 9-107 of the Local Governmental and GovernmentalEmployees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/9-107 (West 2000)). Section 9-105 allows forthe issuance of bonds by the "board of a local taxing entity" without the bond resolutionbeing submitted to a referendum of voters.

Bonds were issued under the hospital's board of directors' two resolutions. Nuveenand Cincinnati were the purchasers of the bonds issued under the hospital's resolutions. Amalgamated is the escrow agent for the receipt of the pledged taxes for the payment of thebonds and is also the holder of the insurance reserve fund created by the issuance of the tortbonds. The resolutions levying the taxes under the two resolutions were filed with thecounty clerk on December 30, 1993. The hospital closed and discontinued services on July21, 2000.

Plaintiffs filed their complaint for a declaratory judgment and for injunctive reliefagainst defendants on July 3, 2000. Plaintiffs asked that the trial court declare the alternatebonds and the tort bonds issued by the hospital void and that the ad valorem real estate taxesfor 1999 be declared void because they were levied under the void bond issues. Plaintiffsclaimed that the bond issues are void because they were not authorized by a referendum ofvoters as required by section 170-35 (60 ILCS 1/170-35 (West 2000)), that the noticepublished for the backdoor referendum did not conform to the requirements of section 15(b)(30 ILCS 350/15(b) (West 2000)), that the pledge of taxes through 2012 is not authorizedunder Article 170 of the Township Code and that the hospital's board of directors' authorityto levy future taxes terminated upon the closing of the hospital, that the pledged taxes arean illegal attempt to bind future boards of directors of the hospital, that the taxes levied onthe tort bonds exceed the rate limitation imposed by law on taxes levied for generalcorporate purposes by the hospital (i.e., three mills on each dollar of assessed value oftaxable township property as provided in section 170-30(a) of the Township Hospitals Act(60 ILCS 1/170-30(a) (West 2000)), and that the proceeds from the tort bonds have beenused for an unauthorized purpose. Plaintiffs also asked that the court enter a preliminaryinjunction directing the county treasurer and/or the escrow agent (Amalgamated) to hold all1999 ad valorem real estate taxes collected from the alternate bonds and tort bonds until thecourt entered a final ruling as to the bonds' validity, that the court issue a preliminaryinjunction directing Amalgamated to hold the balance of the insurance reserve fund createdby the proceeds of the tort bonds, and that the county clerk and the county treasurer beenjoined from taking any further action in future years to extend, collect, or disburseextended ad valorem real estate taxes levied by the alternate bonds and the tort bonds.

Plaintiffs also sought the recovery of the money paid and received by Nuveen andCincinnati on the principal and interest of the alternate bonds and the tort bonds from 1993to 1999. Likewise, plaintiffs sought the recovery of costs and attorney fees expended forthis cause of action.

Defendants filed motions to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint under both section 2-615and section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2000)). Defendants raised affirmative defenses alleging that plaintiffs had no standing to sue andthat the individual plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law. Defendants concluded,therefore, that the individual plaintiffs could not maintain a cause of action in equity.

Following a hearing, the trial court held that the township lacked the standing to suebecause the township is not a taxpayer and is not injured in its corporate capacity. The trialcourt further held that the basis for the individual taxpayers' cause of action is that thehospital has allegedly illegally passed a tax through its two bond issues. The courtdetermined that the essence of the individual taxpayers' claim is an objection to real estatetaxes but that the individual taxpayers seek declaratory and injunctive relief, which areequitable remedies. Because the individual taxpayers had an adequate remedy at law fortheir tax claims, by pursuing a tax-objection claim, the court determined that it had nojurisdiction to consider the individual taxpayers' equity claims. Therefore, the trial courtgranted defendants' motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs appeal.

The granting of a motion to dismiss for a lack of standing under section 2-619(a)(9)(735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2000)) is reviewed de novo. Glisson v. City of Marion, 188Ill. 2d 211 (1999). The lack of standing is an affirmative matter that negates a cause ofaction completely; therefore, a de novo review requires this court to consider whether thedismissal was proper as a matter of law. Glisson, 188 Ill. 2d at 220-21. Where a cause ofaction is dismissed during the hearing of a section 2-619 motion on the pleadings andaffidavits, a reviewing court must determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact andwhether a defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Nichol v. Stass, 192 Ill. 2d233 (2000).

Plaintiffs first contend that the trial court's finding that the township lacked thestanding to sue is erroneous. Having standing to sue in Illinois requires that there be someinjury in fact to a legally cognizable interest. Greer v. Illinois Housing DevelopmentAuthority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 492 (1988). A claimed injury, whether actual or threatened, mustbe distinct and palpable, fairly traceable to the defendant's actions, and substantially likelyto be prevented or redressed by the requested relief. Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 492-93. In adeclaratory judgment action, there must be an actual controversy between the parties, withthe party requesting the declaration possessing some personal claim, status, or right that iscapable of being affected by such relief. Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 493. The lack of standing isan affirmative defense, to be pleaded and proved by the party asserting it. Greer, 122 Ill. 2dat 494.

Plaintiffs assert that the affidavit of Kuehnel, the township supervisor, establishes thetownship's injury in fact. Kuehnel states in his affidavit that the township will suffer aninjury in fact because defendants' actions in issuing the bonds "substantially, directly, andadversely" affect the township in its corporate capacity. Kuehnel also stated: "AsSupervisor, I hear regularly from voters and from taxpayers in the Township[,] and the mostcommon complaint is that real estate taxes are too high, particularly for person[s] on a fixedincome. Elderly residents on social security comprise [sic] a large portion [sic] of theresidents within the Township." Plaintiffs argue that because the bonds issued bydefendants have imposed excessive taxes on the residents of the township, the residents willbe reluctant to file a petition to request a referendum to approve a tax increase over themaximum rate allowed for a township by statute. Thus, the township claims it is injured inits corporate capacity because it will be unable to impose more taxes and, in turn, will beunable to provide adequate services for its residents. Plaintiffs assert that the township doeshave the standing to sue.

We find that the township does not have an injury of fact to establish its standing tosue. The township's claimed injury in fact is its inability to impose additional real estatetaxes because of the high taxes already being collected due to defendants' actions. This isa vague, speculative, and conclusory claim of injury in fact. There is no evidence that thetownship could not impose additional taxes. Further, a common complaint in anygovernmental unit is that the residents believe that their taxes are too high. Even if thetownship unsuccessfully tried to impose higher taxes, the result could not be fairly traceableto defendants' actions. Additionally, even if, arguendo, plaintiffs' request for relief from thetaxes were granted, there is no assurance that the township would be able to impose othertaxes as a result. Thus, there is no conclusive evidence that the relief requested wouldprevent or redress the alleged injury. The township has suffered no injury in fact to give itthe standing to sue, so the trial court's dismissal of the township from the cause of actionbecause of the township's lack of standing was proper as a matter of law.

The trial court also dismissed the individual taxpayers' cause of action. The courtfound that the essence of the individual taxpayers' claims was that the taxes that wereimposed through the bond levies were illegal. The trial court determined that the individualtaxpayers had an adequate remedy at law through the tax-objection process and that,therefore, the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs' equity claim.

Generally, equitable jurisdiction is barred for tax relief when there is an adequateremedy at law. Clarendon Associates v. Korzen, 56 Ill. 2d 101 (1973); Communications &Cable of Chicago, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of the City of Chicago, 275 Ill. App. 3d680 (1995); R.D. Werner Co. v. Leyden Fire Protection District, 91 Ill. App. 3d 587 (1980).The adequate remedy at law is to pay the taxes under protest and file an objection. NorthPier Terminal Co. v. Tully, 62 Ill. 2d 540 (1976). There are two exceptions to this generalrule: (1) when the tax is alleged to be unauthorized by law or (2) when the tax is levied uponproperty exempt from taxation. Communications & Cable of Chicago, Inc., 275 Ill. App.3d at 683. For a tax to be unauthorized by law, the complaining party must allege that thetax itself is invalid. Communications & Cable of Chicago, Inc., 275 Ill. App. 3d at 683. However, equitable relief is not available where a complaint merely alleges procedural errorsor irregularities in the taxing process. See Communications & Cable of Chicago, Inc., 275Ill. App. 3d at 683. A tax is unauthorized when the taxing body has no statutory power totax. R.D. Werner Co., 91 Ill. App. 3d at 592.

Here, the individual taxpayers have alleged that the bonds, and therefore the taxeslevied thereunder, are unauthorized by law. Plaintiffs claim that the bonds were not issuedlegally because the hospital did not publish a complete notice as required by statute. Plaintiffs also claim that the bonds were issued without submitting the bond resolutions toa referendum of voters. We disagree.

A review of the statutory authority that governs the hospital's issuance of bondsestablishes that the hospital had the authority to issue the bonds without a referendum in thecase of the tort bonds and with a backdoor referendum in the case of the alternate bonds. There was no lack of statutory authority, so the bonds were authorized by law. Further, therelevant statutes provided for the levying of taxes to pay for the bonds, so the taxes leviedby the hospital were also authorized by law.

Plaintiffs alleged that the published notice only included two revenue sources but didnot include all of the sources of payment for the bonds. Plaintiffs claim that the notice wastherefore illegal. In all other respects, the published notice met the requirements of thestatute. The claim that the published notice for the bond resolution was defective alleges,at most, a procedural error or irregularity. Thus, plaintiffs did not allege facts to show thatthe bonds, and therefore the taxes, were unauthorized by law. The record reflects that theindividual taxpayers also filed taxpayer objections for their 1999 taxes. Plaintiffs have anadequate remedy at law, which they are pursuing. Therefore, the trial court had no equitablejurisdiction to consider the individual taxpayers' equitable cause of action. There is nogenuine issue of material fact, and defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs' cause of action on this basis.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Madison County isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

MAAG, P.J., and GOLDENHERSH, J., concur.