JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the Opinion of the Court:

William Woodrum filed an application for adjustment of claimagainst his employer, Bunn-O-Matic, alleging that he sustained aninjury to his right knee arising out of and in the course of hisemployment while playing basketball at a company picnic onSeptember 18, 1998. The matter proceeded to a hearing where anarbitrator found that claimant's injury did not arise out of andin the course of his employment and denied benefits. Thearbitrator reasoned that claimant's decision to play basketballwhile at the picnic was voluntary and thus his injuries were notcompensable. Claimant appealed the arbitrator's decision to theIllinois Industrial Commission (Commission). The Commissionaffirmed the decision but upon a different rationale. TheCommission held that, under section 11 of the Workers'Compensation Act (the Act)(820 ILCS 305/11 (West 1998)), ifclaimant's attendance at the picnic was mandatory, then hisinjuries were compensable, regardless of whether hisparticipation in the basketball game was voluntary. TheCommission then determined that claimant's attendance at thepicnic was not mandatory, and thus any injury incurred at thepicnic did not arise out of and in the course of his employment.

Claimant appealed to the Sangamon County circuit court whichconfirmed the Commission's decision. Claimant then filed thisappeal. We reverse and hold that where an employee must chosebetween forgoing pay or benefits and attending a companysponsored recreational program, the employee is, as a matter oflaw, assigned to attend the function. Any injuries incurred whileat the function will be said to arise out of and in the course ofemployment.

The facts herein are undisputed. Claimant, a 30 year oldfactory laborer, attended a company sponsored picnic on September18, 1998, which had been designated "Zero Defects Day" by theemployer. On that day the company held a picnic on companypremises. It was a regular work day. The employees wereinformed that they could attend the picnic or take a personal orvacation day if they chose not to attend. Employees who chosenot to attend the picnic were not subject to discipline. Duringthe picnic, the employer provided areas in which the employeescould participate in a variety of activities, includingvolleyball, touch football, basketball, horseshoes, wallclimbing, and simulated sumo wrestling.

Basketball was played on an outdoor parking lot. Claimanttestified that he was playing basketball when his right footlanded on a rock, causing his right knee to twist and pop. Hesubsequently sought medical treatment and underwent kneereconstruction surgery. He returned to work after approximatelythree weeks. His claim for benefits involved approximately$29,000.00 for medical care.

Scott Lee, safety manager for the employer, testified that some departments of Bunn remained in operation during the picnic.Employees in those departments could report to work or attend thepicnic. Those employees whose departments were closed, such asthe claimant, were required to either attend the picnic, take apersonal/vacation day, or go without pay for that day. Leetestified that an unspecified number of employees chose to taketime off rather than attend the picnic.

With regard to the employer's purpose in sponsoring thepicnic, Lee testified that the employer hoped to build upemployee morale and increase productivity by rewarding theemployees with a picnic.

Compensability in this matter is controlled by section 11 ofthe Act, which states in pertinent part: "Accidental injuriesincurred while participating in voluntary recreational programsincluding but not limited to athletic events, parties and picnicsdo not arise out of and in the course of the employment eventhough the employer pays some or all of the cost thereof. Thisexclusion shall not apply in the event that the injured employeewas ordered or assigned by his employer to participate in theprogram." (Emphasis added.) (820 ILCS 305/11 (West 1998)).

Here, the Commission was correct in finding that thearbitrator had erred in focusing upon the nature of claimant'sparticipation in the basketball game while at the picnic. TheAct specifically lists a picnic as a "program" covered by section11. The case law is clear that "[e]xcept to the extent that anemployee is ordered or assigned by the employer to participate inthe program, injuries occurring during the course of recreationalevents are simply not compensable irrespective of whether it maybe said they arise out of and in the course of employment." Kozak v. Industrial Comm'n, 219 Ill. App. 3d 630, 633 (1991).

The pivotal issue which determines whether a recreationalactivity, such as the picnic in the instant matter, is within thecoverage of the Act is whether the employee is "ordered orassigned" to participate in the activity. Pickett v. IndustrialComm'n., 252 Ill. App. 3d 355, 358 (1993). If claimant was"ordered or assigned" to attend the picnic, injuries incurredwhile at the picnic are said to arise out of claimant'semployment. Conversely, if he was not so ordered or assigned toattend the picnic, injuries incurred while at the picnic do notarise out of claimant's employment.

Whether an employee has been ordered or assigned toparticipate in an activity is usually a question of fact to bedetermined by the Commission, and the Commission's finding will not be set aside upon review, unless it is contrary to themanifest weight of the evidence. Pickett, 252 Ill. App. 3d at357. Even where the facts are undisputed, as in the instantmatter, if such facts permit more than one reasonable inference,then a question of fact is presented, and the conclusion of theCommission will not be disturbed by a reviewing court unless itis against the manifest weight of the evidence. Pickett, 252Ill. App. 3d at 357. However, if the undisputed facts aresusceptible to but a single inference, the issue becomes aquestion of law subject to de novo review. Fischer v. IndustrialComm'n, 142 Ill. App. 3d 298 (1986).

Here, we find that the undisputed facts are susceptible tobut one inference, i.e., that claimant was assigned the task ofattending the ZDD picnic on the day in question and was thus, asa matter of law, entitled to benefits. Where an employee musteither go without pay or give up personal/vacation time in orderto opt out of attending a company picnic, there is only onesingle inference that can be drawn from that fact, i.e. theemployee was ordered or assigned the task of attending the picnicthat day. It was as if the claimant's job assignment for thatday was to attend the picnic. Just as on any normal work day,claimant had a choice. He could either report to his assignedduties for the day, e.g., assembly line worker, or if he did notwish to work that day, he could take a personal/vacation day toreceive pay for that day, or he could receive no pay for thatday. By forcing claimant to choose between a personal/vacationday or no pay if he did not wish to attend the picnic, theemployer forced him to either attend or give up pay or a benefit,i.e., a day of paid time-off at his choosing. By forcing anemployee to choose between attending the company picnic or givingup a benefit, the employer essentially ordered attendance. Wefind that requiring the claimant to forego pay or to lose abenefit (vacation/personal day) by not attending the picnic, aswith any normal work day, is sufficient indicia that the employerordered or assigned claimant's attendance at the picnic.

Lybrand,Ross & Montgomery v. Ind. Comm'n 36 Ill. 2d 410(1967) a case that predates section 11 is instructive. InLybrand, the court found substantial evidence that the injuredemployee was mandated to attend a company sponsored golf outingfrom the fact that the outing was held on a work day andemployees who did not attend the outing were required to work attheir regular duties. Lybrand, 36 Ill. 2d at 418. While theholding in Lybrand is not controlling, it does provide usguidance on the question of whether requiring employees to takepersonal/vacation time to miss the company sponsored eventconstitutes ordering attendance.

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court ofSangamon County confirming the Commission's decision is reversedand the cause is remanded to the Commission for furtherproceeding consistent with this disposition.

Reversed and remanded with direction.

HOFFMAN, O'MALLEY, Jack, and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.

MCCULLOUGH, P.J., dissents.

PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting:

The circuit court's order confirming the Commission'sdecision should be affirmed.

The parties agree that the proper standard of review iswhether the Commission's decision is against the manifest weightof the evidence. Claimant takes issue with the inferences theCommission made in determining that claimant was not ordered toattend the picnic, while the employer maintains that theCommission's inferences were supported by the manifest weight ofthe evidence.

Claimant suggests that Auto-Trol Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n,189 Ill. App. 3d 1065 (1989) supports his position that theCommission erred in denying benefits. In Auto-Trol, an employeewas injured at a company picnic. The Commission determined theinjury was compensable under section 11 of the Act. (820 ILCS305/11 (West 1998). On the pivotal issue of whether the employeewas ordered or assigned to attend the picnic, the Commissionnoted that when informed of the picnic, the claimant thereininquired whether attendance at the picnic was mandatory. Hissupervisor responded "that it would serve his career very well ifhe attended [the] function." Auto-Trol, 189 Ill. App. 3d at1067. The Commission also noted testimony from a co-worker that,when he informed his supervisor the picnic conflicted with hisprevious plans, the supervisor responded, "[N]o, you will bethere." Auto-Trol, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 1067. The Commissionalso found significant that the only two employees who wereexcused from attending the picnic were one whose wife wasexpecting a baby and another who was in a family wedding. Auto-Trol, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 1067-1068.

In affirming the Commission, the appellate court in Auto-Trol found this record was sufficient to allow the Commission todetermine that attendance at the picnic was ordered and assigned. Auto-Trol, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 1070. The statement thatattendance would "serve his career very well" and the unequivocalorder to the co-worker, along with the fact that only the mostextreme of family events (child-birth and being a member of awedding party) would excuse attendance, allowed the Commission toinfer that attendance at the picnic was mandatory. The courtalso noted the clear business purpose of the company picnic wherebusiness was discussed between sales staff and engineering stafffurther supported a finding that attendance at the picnic wasordered. Auto-Trol, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 1070.

In Auto-Trol the clear business purpose of the picnic, alongwith other evidence concerning the employer's desire thatemployees attend the picnic, supported an inference that theclaimant therein was ordered to attend the picnic. Here, incontrast, only a vague statement that it was hoped by theemployer the picnic might somehow improve overall morale, and thefact that if an employee chose not to attend the picnic he wouldhave to use a personal/vacation day in order to be paid wouldsupport a finding that attendance was ordered. But a findingthat claimant was not ordered to attend the picnic can also beinferred from the lack of a clear business purpose to the picnicand the fact that employees could opt out of attendance by simplytaking the day off, without the imposition of any form ofdiscipline. Under a manifest weight of the evidence standard ofreview, it would appear, as in Auto-Trol, that more than oneinference can be made from the record, and that the Commission'sinferences that claimant was not ordered to attend the picnic issupported by the manifest weight of the evidence.

The order of the circuit court should be affirmed.