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Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

FILED
Dec 30 2008, 8:40 am
of the supreme court, court of appeals and tax court

CLERK

APPELLANT PRO SE: ALLEN E. VAUGHN, JR. Pendleton, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: STEVE CARTER Attorney General of Indiana NICOLE M. SCHUSTER Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
ALLEN E. VAUGHN, JR., Appellant-Petitioner, vs. STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee-Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

No. 49A05-0712-PC-727

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable William E. Young, Judge Cause No. 49G20-0201-PC-011526

December 30, 2008 MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BROWN, Judge

Allen E. Vaughn, Jr., appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Vaughn raises two issues, which we restate as: I. II. We affirm. The relevant facts as discussed in Vaughn's direct appeal follow. In January 2002, Indianapolis Police Department Detective Mark Campbell was working an undercover drug investigation of Vaughn. Vaughn v. State, No. 49A02-0304-CR-335, slip op. at 2 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003), trans. denied. Detective Campbell twice purchased crack cocaine from Vaughn while Detective Campbell was wearing a concealed recording device. Id. at 3. After the second purchase, other officers executed a search warrant of Vaughn's apartment and discovered crack cocaine, marijuana, and the drug purchase money used by Detective Campbell. Id. at 3-4. The State charged Vaughn with: (1) Count I, dealing in cocaine as a class A felony; (2) Count II, possession of cocaine as a class C felony; (3) Count III, possession of cocaine and a firearm as a class C felony; (4) Count IV, dealing in cocaine as a class A felony; (5) Count V, dealing in cocaine as a class A felony; (6) Count VI, possession of cocaine as a class C felony; (7) Count VII, possession of cocaine and a firearm as a class Whether Vaughn has waived his freestanding claims of error; and Whether Vaughn received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.1

Vaughn also argues that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, but does not develop the argument. Consequently, the argument is waived. See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 834 n.1 (Ind. 2006) (holding that the defendant's contention was waived because it was not supported by cogent argument or citation to authority); see also Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).

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C felony; and (8) Count VIII, possession of marijuana as a class A misdemeanor. A jury found Vaughn guilty of all charges except for Count III. The trial court sentenced Vaughn on Counts I, IV, VII, and VIII to an aggregate term of forty years in the Indiana Department of Correction. Vaughn filed a direct appeal and raised two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in its determination of a juror's proposed question to a witness during the trial; and (2) whether the trial court failed to instruct the jury as to the applicable standard of proof in the case. Id. at 2. We affirmed Vaughn's convictions. Id. Vaughn then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was later amended.2 According to the post-conviction court's findings, Vaughn's initial pro se petition alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel, fabrication of evidence, and abuse of judicial discretion. The pro se amended petition added claims for "violation of Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control Safe Streets Act of 1968," "violation of Ind. Code 35-33.5-1-5," and "violation of Ind. Code 35-33-5-1(a)." After an evidentiary hearing, the post-

conviction court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law denying Vaughn's claim. Specifically, the post-conviction court rejected Vaughn's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, his claim of prosecutorial misconduct in the use of fabricated evidence, his

Vaughn did not provide a copy of the full chronological case summary, the initial petition for post-conviction relief, the amended petition for post-conviction relief, or the post-conviction court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in his appellant's appendix. We located the amended petition in other documents that Vaughn filed with this court. We remind Vaughn that Ind. Appellate Rule 50 requires that an appellant's appendix contain the chronological case summary, the appealed order, and pleadings necessary for consideration of the appeal.

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claim of abuse of judicial discretion due to the use of fabricated evidence, and his claim of the use of illegal wiretap evidence in the trial. Before discussing Vaughn's allegations of error, we note the general standard under which we review a post-conviction court's denial of a petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding bears the burden of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004); Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5). When appealing from the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner stands in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment. 810 N.E.2d at 679. On review, we will not reverse the judgment unless the evidence as a whole unerringly and unmistakably leads to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Id. Further, the post-conviction court in this case entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon in accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(6). Id. "A post-conviction court's findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error

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