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FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: WILLIAM R. GROTH Fillenwarth Dennerline Groth & Towe Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: STEVE CARTER Attorney General of Indiana ANITA WYLIE Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
ANDREW W. MILLER, Appellant-Claimant, vs. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE REVIEW BOARD and UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., Appellees. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

No. 93A02-0704-EX-316

APPEAL FROM THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE REVIEW BOARD Cause No. 07-00118 07-R-00576

December 21, 2007

OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION ROBB, Judge

Case Summary and Issues Andrew Miller appeals from the decision of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development Review Board (the "Board") affirming the decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), who found Miller ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Miller raises two issues, which we restate as whether Miller was denied due process based on inadequate notice of the issues to be decided at his hearing before the ALJ and whether the Board's decision was unsupported by its findings. Concluding that Miller was denied due process and that the Board's findings do not support its decision, we reverse. Facts and Procedural History On December 1, 2006, Miller, who had been working for United Parcel Service, Inc., ("UPS") since 1994, was involved in an accident while driving his UPS truck. Miller stopped at a stop sign and proceeded into an intersection, not seeing a car approaching from his right side. The vehicles collided, and both occupants of the other car were injured and required medical attention. The estimated damage caused by the accident was between $5,000 and $10,000. Following the accident, Miller was taken out of service and eventually terminated on December 29, 2006. UPS based the termination on its claim that Miller violated Article 17(d) of the Labor Agreement between UPS and Teamsters Local 135 (the "Agreement"). Article 17(d) indicates that an employee may be suspended or discharged without prior warning for: gross negligence, resulting in a serious accident. A serious accident is defined as one in which there is a fatality, a bodily injury to a person who, as a result of the injury, receives immediate medical treatment away from the scene of the 2

accident, or $4,400.00 or more in damages. Appellant's Appendix at 16-17. Following his suspension, Miller filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Indiana Department of Workforce Development (the "Department"). On December 21, 2006, a Claims Director from the Department approved Miller's claim, finding that UPS had failed to carry its burden of establishing willful misconduct on Miller's part. On January 2, 2007, UPS appealed this determination and requested a hearing before an ALJ. On January 11, 2007, a Notice of Hearing (the "Notice") was sent to Miller. The Notice indicated that the issue at the hearing would be: "Whether the Claimant was able, available, and making an effort to secure full-time work. Ind. Code 22-2-14-3." Appellant's App. at 27. On January 25, 2007, the ALJ held a hearing at which the matter argued was whether UPS had just cause to terminate Miller. At the hearing, after UPS presented its case and the ALJ asked Miller questions regarding the accident, the following exchange took place between Miller (the Claimant) and the ALJ: Claimant: . . . I was under the impression that this hearing was under the fact that I wasn't able to find a job. That I was supposed to be looking for a job, not the accident. Judge: Well, that's what this is about, the suspension for misconduct. It has nothing to do with the work search. Claimant: Oh. I, I received a letter . . . I'm sorry, sir. Judge: That's not . . . uh, people are getting confused. That's what the issue is listed but if you read the little box it says, "Suspended for misconduct in connection with the work."1 Claimant: I've had it. Judge: Right there on the second page you're holding in your left hand. Claimant: Yeah, but I . . . Judge: That's what we're talking about at this point.
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We have been unable to find this notation on any document in the record.

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Claimant: Okay, so that's what you guys had filled out. Okay, I'm sorry because I was under the, um . . . that this was cleared up by the, uh, claims adjuster (inaudible). Judge: No. Claimant: It said that it was, uh . . . determination that it was not misconduct. That's what I thought right there. Judge: They appealed and now it's at my decision. Claimant: Okay. I'm sorry. I didn't fully . . . didn't understand it. Judge: Anything else? Claimant: No, sir. Transcript at 7-8. The ALJ then reversed the claims adjuster's determination pursuant to the following findings and conclusions: FINDINGS OF FACT: . . . The claimant was discharged for negligence resulting in a serious accident. A serious accident is defined as one where there is a fatality, bodily injury to a person who, as a result of injury, receives immediate medical treatment away from the scene of the accident, or results in more than $4,400.00 in damages. Violation of the rule results in discharge on the first occurrence. The employer's rule exists. This rule exists as part of a collective bargaining agreement between the Teamster's Local 135 and the employer. As a negotiated rule it is reasonable. No employee has been allowed to remain employed with this employer after violating the rule. The rule is uniformly enforced. The claimant was a member of the union. The claimant had knowledge of the employer's rule. On December 1, 2006 at approximately 4:00 pm the claimant came to an intersection. The claimant's road had a stop sign. The claimant states that he stopped and looked both ways. The claimant proceeded into the intersection and struck another vehicle. The intersecting road did not have a stop sign. The claimant did not know where the car came from and felt that it must have been in a blind spot. The car flipped more than once. The driver of the car was seriously injured and had to be taken to the hospital from the accident scene for treatment. The damage for the accident was estimated to be between $5,000.00 and $10,000.00. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: *** The employer has established that its rule exists, serves a reasonable purpose and is uniformly enforced. The claimant had knowledge of the employer's rule. The claimant has knowingly violated the rule. While the claimant's actions may not have been intentional they meet the definition of a serious accident as defined by the collective bargaining agreement. If the claimant had a blind spot he should have taken more care in looking both ways before he 4

proceeded into the intersection. . . . Appellant's App. at 4-5. Miller then appealed the ALJ's decision to the Board, which affirmed, adopting the ALJ"s findings and conclusions. Miller now appeals.2 Discussion and Decision I. Due Process "The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." NOW Courier, Inc. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dept. of Workforce Dev., 871 N.E.2d 384, 387 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Whether a party was denied due process is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. Parties to a disputed claim for unemployment benefits are required to be afforded "a reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing." Ind. Code

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