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Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

FILED
Feb 20 2008, 8:52 am
of the supreme court, court of appeals and tax court

CLERK

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: DEIDRE L. MONROE Public Defender's Office Gary, Indiana DONALD W. WRUCK III Dyer, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: EUGENE M. VELAZCO Merrillville, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
ANTOINEA BOWMAN, Appellant-Respondent, vs. LAKE COUNTY DIVISION OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN, Appellee-Petitioner. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

No. 45A03-0707-JV-332

APPEAL FROM THE LAKE SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Mary Beth Bonaventura, Judge Cause No. 45D06-0607-JT-71, 45D06-0607-JT-72 and 45D06-0607-JT-73

February 20, 2008

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

NAJAM, Judge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE Antoinea Bowman ("Mother") appeals the trial court's involuntary termination of her parental rights with respect to A.B. ("A.B.1"), A.B. ("A.B.2"), and D.H. (collectively "the children").1 Mother presents two issues for review, which we restate as: 1. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support the order terminating her parental rights. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to appoint counsel to represent Mother.

2.

We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In 2004, Mother resided with her husband, Dansford Bowman; her son D.H., born July 23, 1998; and her daughters, A.B.1, born October 29, 2002, and A.B.2, born June 2, 2004. Bowman is the alleged father of A.B.1 and A.B.2, and Gawaine Johnson is the alleged father of D.H. In late October or early November 2004, D.H. reported to Gary police officers that Mother had choked him. Upon investigation, police officers found scratches on D.H.'s neck, and they also found Mother's home to be in disarray. On November 1, 2004, the police referred the case to the Lake County Department of Child Services ("DCS"). The DCS investigated the referral and found that Mother had bruised D.H.'s arm. And strewn about Mother's home, the DCS found clothes, dirty dishes, dirty diapers, and

1

The children's fathers are not parties to this appeal.

2

other debris. At the time, the DCS also had an open investigation from July 2004 for physical abuse by Mother.2 On November 4, 2004, after a hearing, the trial court ordered the detention of the children and ordered the DCS to provide the following services: psychological

evaluation and recommended treatment for Mother, individual counseling for the children, parenting classes for Mother and Bowman, and home-based services at Mother's home.3 At some point not apparent in the record, the children were placed with Cynthia Hall, the children's maternal grandmother.4 The court held an initial hearing on January 19, 2005, and ordered that the children were children in need of services ("CHINS") effective November 4, 2004. The court also ordered Mother and Bowman to complete anger management classes. On March 20, 2006, the court held a permanency plan review hearing. At the conclusion of that hearing, the court adopted a permanency plan with a goal of "[r]eunification with [M]other or termination of parental rights and adoption by grandmother." Appellant's App. at 10. The court found that Mother had successfully completed a psychiatric evaluation and was to begin family therapy toward the aim of reunification with the children.

The record on appeal does not provide the name of the alleged victim or the nature of that abuse allegation. 3 The detention hearing also addressed a separate CHINS proceeding for another of Mother's children. The record does not contain a Chronological Case Summary, as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 50(A), and the parties do not always agree in their briefs on the dates of particular hearings or events. Because the dates are not relevant to our determination of the issues presented on appeal, we address the merits of the issues presented on appeal. However, we remind Mother's counsel of the requirements of Appellate Rule 50 and the necessity of a complete record to aid our review.
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2

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On July 3, 2006, the DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights with regard to the children.5 On July 5, 2006, the court authorized the filing of the petitions to terminate parental rights as to the children. The trial court convened for a hearing on the termination petitions on September 28, 2006, but continued the hearing to allow the judge presiding over the CHINS hearings to address disagreement by the maternal grandmother regarding the DCS's current goal of placing the children in the grandmother's guardianship. The court convened again for the termination hearing on March 28, 2007, but Mother and Bowman did not appear. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered an order granting the DCS' petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights with regard to the children. Mother now appeals. DISCUSSION AND DECISION Standard of Review In addressing Mother's claims that the DCS failed to meet its burden of proof, we first note that when reviewing termination of parental rights proceedings on appeal, this court neither reweighs the evidence nor judges the credibility of witnesses. See Judy S. v. Noble County Office of Family & Children (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. We consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. Id. In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the

Appellant's Appendix contains a petition to terminate parental rights only as to A.B.1. Presumably, petitions to terminate parental rights with respect to A.B.2 and D.H. were filed the same day.

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judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. If the evidence and inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. Id. The involuntary termination of parental rights is the most extreme sanction that a court can impose. Id. Termination severs all rights of a parent to his or her children. Therefore, termination is intended as a last resort, available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed. Ferbert v. Marion County Office of Family & Children (In re T.F.), 743 N.E.2d 766, 770 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parents, but to protect their children. Id. at 773. Thus, although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. Id. To effect the involuntary termination of a parent-child relationship, the State must present clear and convincing evidence establishing the elements of Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2). Thus, the State must prove: (A) one (1) of the following exists: (i) the child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree; a court has entered a finding under [Indiana Code] 31-34-215.6 that reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are not required, including a description of the court's finding, the date of the finding, and the manner in which the finding was made; or after July 1, 1999, the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a county office of family and children for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months;
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(ii)

(iii)

(B)

there is a reasonable probability that: (i) the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied; or the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child;

(ii)

(C) (D)

termination is in the best interests of the child; and there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code

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