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Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JAMES B. ORGAN Organ Law Offices, P.C. Terre Haute, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: TRACY M. WEBER Wilkinson Goeller Modesitt Wilkinson & Drummy, LLP Terre Haute, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

IN RE: THE MARRIAGE OF LAUREN and BART TAYLOR, BART TAYLOR, Appellant-Respondent, vs. LAUREN J. TAYLOR Appellee-Petitioner,

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No. 84A05-0611-CV-634

APPEAL FROM THE VIGO SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Phillip Adler, Judge Cause No. 84D03-0411-DR-10785

June 15, 2007 MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BARNES, Judge

Case Summary Bart Taylor appeals the trial court's distribution of marital property, the calculation of child support, and the refusal to sanction his ex-wife, Lauren Taylor. We affirm. Issue Bart raises three issues. We address one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court properly divided the marital estate. 1 Facts On September 21, 2002, Bart and Lauren were married, and their son was born on February 27, 2003. On November 18, 2004, Lauren petitioned for dissolution. On July 20, 2006, the trial court granted Lauren's petition, awarded each party half of the marital estate, and ordered Bart to pay $105 per week in child support. Bart now appeals.

Bart argues that the trial court improperly ordered him to pay child support in the amount of $105 per week when the provisional order only required him to pay $100 per week and the child support worksheet would have required him to pay $102.25 per week with the parenting time credit or $134.02 without the parenting time credit. Bart, however, does not support this argument with any citation to authority. His failure to do so waives this argument. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a); Hartley v. Hartley, 862 N.E.2d 274, 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) ("A party generally waives any issue for which it fails to develop a cognizable argument or support with adequate citation to authority and portions of the record."). Bart also argues that the trial court erred in not sanctioning Lauren for the alleged denial of parenting time. Again, however, he failed to support this argument with citation to authority. This argument also is waived. See Hartley, 862 N.E.2d at 274.

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Analysis Bart argues that the trial court improperly distributed the marital estate equally because the short duration of the marriage and his financial contributions during the marriage required that he receive more than 50% of the estate. The division of marital assets is a matter within the trial court's sound discretion. Smith v. Smith, 854 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). On appeal, the party challenging the trial court's property division must overcome a strong presumption that the trial court complied with the statute and considered the evidence on each of the statutory factors. Id. at 5-6. We will reverse a trial court's property distribution only if there is no rational basis for the award. Id. at 6. Further, we may not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses, and we will consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's decision. Woods v. Woods, 788 N.E.2d 897, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). "Although the facts and reasonable inferences might allow for a different conclusion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court." Id. Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-5 controls the distribution of marital property and requires a trial court to presume that an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable. However, this presumption may be rebutted with evidence that equal division would not be just and reasonable. Ind. Code

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