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FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JOSEPH G. STRIEWE Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE MIKE SCHELLENBERGER: MARK S. GRAY Doyle Legal Corporation, P.C. Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION: MARY A. SLADE Plunkett Cooney, P.C. Indianapolis, Indiana

FILED
Apr 04 2012, 9:15 am
of the supreme court, court of appeals and tax court

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
CALVIN HAIR, Appellant/Defendant/Crossclaimant/ Counterclaimant, vs. MIKE SCHELLENBERGER, Appellee/Plaintiff, and LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION, WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., FELIX ADEJARE, and SHARON ADEJARE, Appellees/Third-Party Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

CLERK

No. 49A02-1107-PL-685

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Theodore M. Sosin, Judge Cause No. 49D02-0811-PL-50556

April 4, 2012 OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION CRONE, Judge

Case Summary This is a dispute over who has superior title to a piece of property on Talbott Street in Indianapolis ("the Talbott Street Property"). When Mike Schellenberger purchased the Talbott Street Property at a foreclosure sale, the title search did not show a money judgment that Calvin Hair had obtained against former owners Felix and Sharon Adejare (collectively, "the Adejares"). The judgment had never been indexed in the county records, and Schellenberger was unaware of it until a year later, when Hair sent him a letter claiming that he had a judgment lien on the Talbott Street Property. Schellenberger subsequently filed an action against Hair to remove the cloud on the title. Schellenberger, his lender, and his title company (collectively, "the Appellees") sought summary judgment on the basis that Schellenberger was a bona fide purchaser ("BFP") as a matter of law. Hair filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Adejares had fraudulently conveyed the Talbott Street Property and that he had a judgment lien giving him superior title. The trial court denied Hair's motion for partial summary judgment and granted the Appellees' motions for summary judgment. Hair appeals, claiming that the Adejares
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fraudulently conveyed the Talbott Street Property and that his judgment against the Adejares constituted a valid judicial lien of which the Appellees should have been aware. Finding that Hair's judgment was outside the chain of title and that Schellenberger was a BFP as a matter of law, we affirm the trial court's decision in all respects.1 Facts and Procedural History In December 2003, Sharon Adejare purchased the Talbott Street Property. On January 5, 2004, she and her husband Felix Adejare gave a mortgage on the property to Argent Mortgage Company, LLC ("Argent"), and Argent recorded the mortgage on January 28, 2004. On August 16, 2005, Argent assigned the mortgage to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company ("Deutsche Bank"). On November 25, 2005, Sharon transferred the Talbott Street Property and three other parcels to the Aaron et Mosley Land Trust (the "Land Trust") via quitclaim deed, and the deed was recorded on July 28, 2006. On April 24, 2006, Homecomings Financial Network, Inc. ("Homecomings"), obtained a foreclosure judgment against Sharon Adejare on a parcel located at 1512 North Alabama Street ("the Alabama Street Property"). As a crossclaimant in that action, Hair obtained a money judgment against the Adejares for $139,800.89. Although Homecomings' judgment was indexed on the county docket, the clerk of the court did not separately index Hair's judgment at that time.

Hair has filed a motion for oral argument, which we deny in an order issued contemporaneously with this decision.

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On December 21, 2006, Deutsche Bank foreclosed on the Talbott Street Property and obtained a default judgment against the Adejares, the Land Trust, Homecomings, and "ALL OCCUPANTS AND/OR TENANTS WHOSE NAMES ARE UNKNOWN."

Schellenberger's App. at 46. Deutsche Bank took ownership of the property via sheriff's deed. On September 26, 2007, after hiring Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation ("Lawyers Title") to conduct a title search on the Talbott Street Property, Schellenberger purchased the foreclosed property from Deutsche Bank. Schellenberger recorded the special corporate warranty deed on October 25, 2007. Schellenberger financed the purchase with a mortgage given to Provident Financial, LLP ("Provident Funding"), and subsequently assigned to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo"). Also in 2007, Sharon Adejare filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition. In a letter to Schellenberger dated October 6, 2008, Hair claimed that he had a judgment lien against the Talbott Street Property. On November 7, 2008, Schellenberger filed an action to remove the cloud on the title to the Talbott Street Property, naming Hair, Lawyers Title, and Deutsche Bank as defendants. On February 5, 2009, Sharon Adejare received a general discharge in her Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. On July 31, 2009, Hair's 2006 judgment against the Adejares was indexed in the county records. In May 2010, Hair filed a crossclaim against the Adejares and a counterclaim against Schellenberger and mortgage lender Provident Funding. He also added as a counterclaim defendant Wells Fargo, the assignee of Schellenberger's mortgage. After numerous motions and a change of judge, Schellenberger, Wells Fargo, and Lawyers Title filed motions for

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summary judgment against Hair, and Hair filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether the Adejares fraudulently conveyed the Talbott Street Property to the Land Trust. On May 27, 2011, following a hearing on the motions, the trial court granted the Appellees' motions for summary judgment, finding that Schellenberger was a BFP as a matter of law, that Hair's lien was nullified, and that Wells Fargo's mortgage was therefore not subject to Hair's lien claim. The trial court simultaneously denied Hair's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of fraudulent conveyance. Hair filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied on June 30, 2011. As part of that order, the trial court dismissed Hair's claims against Deutsche Bank by stipulation. This appeal ensued.2 Additional facts will be provided as necessary. Discussion and Decision Standard of Review3 We review the trial court's decision to grant or deny summary judgment using the same standard as the trial court. Woman Enters., Inc. v. Boone County Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist., 805 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. 2004). A motion for summary judgment is properly granted only when the pleadings and designated evidence reveal that there is no genuine issue of

The Adejares, Wells Fargo, and Provident Funding have not filed appellate briefs and are not participating in this appeal. It is unclear whether Hair is challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to correct error or the trial court's decision to grant the Appellees' motions for summary judgment and to deny his partial motion for summary judgment. However, because his motion to correct error was based on the trial court's summary judgment rulings, we review this appeal using the standard applicable to summary judgment rulings.
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material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Bank of New York v. Nally, 820 N.E.2d 644, 648 (Ind. 2005). In determining whether issues of material fact exist, we must accept as true those facts established by evidence favoring the nonmoving party and resolve all doubts against the moving party. Id. A trial court's decision to grant summary judgment is clothed with a presumption of validity, and the appellant bears the burden of proving that the trial court erred. Alexander v. Marion County Sheriff, 891 N.E.2d 87, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied (2009). Where, as here, parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, we apply the same standard and consider each motion separately to determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. I. Hair's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Hair first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of the Adejares' alleged fraudulent conveyance.4 At the outset, we address Lawyers Title's argument that Hair's fraudulent conveyance claim is time-barred. Indiana's Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act ("UFTA") sets a statute of limitations at the later of four years after the transfer was made or one year after the transfer was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant. Ind. Code

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