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Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JOHN A. KESLER, II Terre Haute, Indiana

FILED
Nov 17 2008, 9:35 am
of the supreme court, court of appeals and tax court

CLERK

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: STEVE CARTER Attorney General of Indiana JANINE STECK HUFFMAN Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
CHAZ D. NORTON, Appellant-Defendant, vs. STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee-Plaintiff. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

No. 84A05-0804-CR-242

APPEAL FROM THE VIGO SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable David R. Bolk, Judge Cause No. 84D03-0707-FB-2260 84D03-0710-FB-3353

November 17, 2008 MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BARNES, Judge

Case Summary Chaz Norton appeals his ten-year sentence for Class B felony aggravated battery. We affirm. Issues Norton raises two issues, which we restate as: I. whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to ten years executed for Class B felony aggravated battery; and whether his ten-year executed sentence is appropriate in light of his character and the nature of the offense. Facts On July 2, 2007, Norton and three accomplices attacked Joseph McKee, who was riding a bicycle. Norton and the others pushed McKee from the bicycle and beat him-- kicking him repeatedly in the head and stomping his head into the pavement. McKee suffered life-altering injuries including nearly a dozen facial lacerations, a fractured skull, and a severe brain injury that affects his ability to care for himself. Six days later, Norton used a board to threaten Carl Taylor, a pizza deliveryman, and then robbed him. On July 16, 2007, the State charged Norton with Class B felony armed robbery for the incident with Taylor. On October 26, 2007, the State charged Norton with Class B felony aggravated battery for the attack on McKee. Norton was sixteen years old at the time of the crimes, but was waived to adult court. On January 4, 2008, Norton pled guilty to both charges. The plea agreement provided that the sentences were to be

II.

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concurrent, but otherwise determined by the trial court. The trial court held a sentencing hearing on March 24, 2008. The trial court sentenced Norton to six years executed for the armed robbery. This sentence is the statutory minimum and Norton does not contest it on appeal. The trial court imposed a ten-year executed sentence for the aggravated battery, to run concurrently. This appeal followed. Analysis I. Abuse of Discretion Norton's analysis contains numerous references to the abuse of discretion standard, without specifically setting out that standard or pinpointing an abuse of discretion in sentencing as an issue. Our court has recently reminded practitioners that inappropriate sentence and abuse of discretion claims are to be analyzed separately. See King v. State, No. 49A02-0802-CR-162, slip. op. at 1 (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2008). We glean four abuse of discretion arguments by Norton. In reviewing a sentence imposed under the current advisory scheme, we engage in a four-step process. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007). First, a trial court must issue a sentencing statement that includes "reasonably detailed reasons or circumstances for imposing a particular sentence." Id. Second, the reasons or omission of reasons given for choosing a sentence are reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Id. Third, the weight given to those reasons--the aggravators and

mitigators--is not subject to appellate review. Id. Fourth, the merits of a particular

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sentence are reviewable on appeal for appropriateness under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Id. Norton argues that the trial court's sentencing statement is "sketchy at best." Appellant's Br. p. 13. The trial court issued oral and written sentencing statements. The oral statement pronounced at the close of the sentencing hearing did include reasons for imposing the chosen sentence and was not "sketchy" as alleged by Norton. In addition, the written statement lists the victim's injuries as an aggravating factor and Norton's age, lack of criminal history, and admission of guilt as mitigating factors. Because we

examine both statements to discern the findings of the trial court, we conclude the sentencing statements here are sufficiently detailed. See McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ind. 2007) (explaining that an oral statement should be examined alongside a written statement). Norton next argues that the trial court improperly used an element of the crime as an aggravator when it found the seriousness of the injuries to be an aggravating element. The statutory elements of aggravated battery require that a defendant knowingly or intentionally inflict injury that creates a substantial risk of death or causes "serious permanent disfigurement" or "protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ." Ind. Code

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