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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Richard P. Busse Valparaiso, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Michael D. Sears Jacquelyn S. Pillar King Singleton, Crist, Austgen & Sears, LLP Munster, Indiana

______________________________________________________________________________

In the

Indiana Supreme Court
_________________________________ No. 45S05-1002-CV-121 _________________________________ CHRISTINE DUGAN, v.

FILED
Jun 17 2010, 3:02 pm
of the supreme court, court of appeals and tax court

CLERK

Appellant (Plaintiff below),

MITTAL STEEL USA INC., AND JAY KOMOROWSKI, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES, Appellees (Defendants below). _________________________________ Appeal from the Lake Superior Court, No. 45D05-0609-CT-180 The Honorable William E. Davis, Judge The Honorable Noah Holcomb, Judge pro tem _________________________________ On Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 45A05-0902-CV-69 _________________________________ June 17, 2010 Dickson, Justice.

In this action for defamation per se and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff appeals from the grant of summary judgment for the defendants. The Court of Appeals reversed in part. Dugan v. Mittal Steel USA, Inc., 911 N.E.2d 692 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). We granted transfer and now affirm the grant of summary judgment, concluding that the material facts are not in dispute and that a qualified privilege applies to preclude the defamation action.

The plaintiff, Christine Dugan, was working for Mittal Steel in 2004 when the defendant Jay Komorowski, a supervisor at Mittal Steel, made statements about the plaintiff to other Mittal Steel employees. Mittal Steel eventually discharged the plaintiff, and she then filed a grievance. In the ensuing arbitration, Mittal Steel was ordered to reinstate her with back pay. Appellant's App'x at 77. After her reinstatement, the plaintiff instituted this action against Komorowski and Mittal Steel. The defendants sought summary judgment, which the trial court granted, finding (a) that neither statement constituted defamation per se, (b) that both statements were protected by a qualified privilege and there was no evidence of abuse of privilege, and (c) that the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress was not supported. The plaintiff appealed only as to the defamation claims.

A party is entitled to summary judgment upon demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue unless the non-moving party comes forward with contrary evidence showing an issue of fact for trial. Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761

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Indiana Law