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Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

FILED
Jun 14 2010, 8:56 am
of the supreme court, court of appeals and tax court

CLERK

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ELIZABETH E. TOOLE Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: GREGORY F. ZOELLER Attorney General of Indiana JAMES E. PORTER Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
DIOSHA L. LAMB, Appellant-Defendant, vs. STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee-Plaintiff. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

No. 02A03-0912-CR-591

APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Marcia L. Linsky, Magistrate Cause No. 02D04-0904-CM-2542

June 14, 2010

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

NAJAM, Judge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE Diosha L. Lamb appeals her conviction for invasion of privacy, as a Class A misdemeanor, following a bench trial. Lamb raises two issues for our review, which we restate as the following dispositive issue: whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support her conviction. We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On July 25, 2007, Ondrayco Greene, the father of two children with Lamb, obtained an ex parte protective order against Lamb after she had threatened him. The protective order stated, in relevant part, as follows: 1. [Lamb] is hereby enjoined from threatening to commit or committing acts of domestic or family violence, stalking, or a sex offense against [Greene] . . . . 2. [Lamb] is prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting, or directly or indirectly communicating with [Greene]. *** 4. [Lamb] is ordered to stay away from the residence, school, and/or place of employment of [Greene]. This Order does not prohibit either party from attending work and/or school if the parties are employed by the same employer and/or attend the same school. The Order simply prohibits direct contact by [Lamb] while the parties are at work and/or school or elsewhere. . . . Appellant's App. at 16-17. A police officer served Lamb with the protective order the day after it was issued. In October of 2008, a friend of Lamb's moved next door to Greene. The

following March, Greene was sitting on his front porch when he saw Lamb park across
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the street from his house. Lamb exited her car with their children and walked across the street toward Greene. Lamb "called [Greene] a bitch, flipped [him] off, and walked past" him to her friend's house. Transcript at 10. Greene went inside his home and called the police. On April 30, 2009, the State charged Lamb with invasion of privacy, as a Class A misdemeanor. At the ensuing bench trial, the State called Greene as a witness, and he recounted the above-stated facts. The State also called a neighbor of Greene's, Loretta Dansby, who corroborated Greene's testimony. Lamb testified in her own defense and denied interacting with Greene. The court found Lamb guilty as charged and sentenced her accordingly. This appeal ensued. DISCUSSION AND DECISION On appeal, Lamb contends that the State did not present sufficient evidence to show that she violated the protective order. In particular, she asserts that the word "contact" implies something "more than mere presence," and that the State's only evidence shows that she only happened to be physically near Greene on the date in question. See Appellant's Br. at 7. In the alternative, Lamb argues that the protective order, and the statute on which it is based, is unconstitutionally vague because it allegedly does not "specify that mere presence alone, without any form of interaction, is prohibited conduct." Id. at 13. When reviewing a claim of sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Jones v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1132, 1139 (Ind. 2003). We look only to the probative evidence supporting the judgment and the
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reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the conviction, it will not be set aside. Id. In order to convict Lamb of invasion of privacy, the trial court had to determine that she knowingly or intentionally violated the protective order. See Ind. Code

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