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Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: NANCY A. MCCASLIN McCaslin & McCaslin Elkhart, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: STEVE CARTER Attorney General of Indiana MONIKA PREKOPA TALBOT Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
HANNAH L. STONE, Appellant-Defendant, vs. STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee-Plaintiff. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

No. 20A03-0605-CR-217

APPEAL FROM THE ELKHART CIRCUIT COURT The Honorable Terry C. Shewmaker, Judge Cause No. 20C01-0508-MR-149

December 27, 2006

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

NAJAM, Judge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE Hannah Stone appeals her sentence after pleading guilty to Murder, a felony; Conspiracy to Commit Murder, a Class A felony; and Criminal Confinement, a Class B felony. Stone presents two issues for review, namely: 1. 2. Whether the trial court properly sentenced her. Whether the trial judge committed fundamental error when he did not recuse himself.

We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On August 4, 2005, seventeen-year-old Stone and her mother, Barbara Keim, argued about Stone's boyfriend, eighteen-year-old Spenser Krempetz. Keim and Stone eventually agreed that Stone would move out of Keim's house. After the argument, Stone smoked marijuana and went to the home of seventeen-year-old Aaron McDonald. Krempetz arrived at McDonald's house later that day. The three teens created a plan to kill Stone's mother. Later that day, Stone, McDonald, and Krempetz drove to Keim's house to carry out their plan. Stone knocked on Keim's door, knowing that Keim would not answer if she saw Krempetz or McDonald. When Keim opened the door for Stone, Krempetz entered the house and tackled Keim. Krempetz bound Keim's hands and covered her eyes and mouth with duct tape, and McDonald stole money, Keim's debit card, and a check from the home. After Stone and Krempetz put Keim in a car, Krempetz and McDonald drove Keim to a cornfield in nearby Kosciusko County, where Krempetz shot and killed her.
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The State charged Stone with murder, a felony; conspiracy to commit murder, a Class A felony; and criminal confinement, a Class B felony. Stone originally pleaded not guilty, but in March 2006 she entered into a plea agreement, under which she pleaded guilty as charged. The plea agreement provided, in part: "The parties agree to a

stipulated sentence of one hundred years (100). All other terms of the Defendant's sentence shall be determined by the Court." Appellant's App. at 54. The advisory sentences for each of the three offenses, if served consecutively, totals ninety-five years. Thus, in order to impose a 100-year sentence, the trial court had to impose a sentence higher than the advisory on one offense. The trial court enhanced the sentence for criminal confinement by five years, thereby reaching the 100-year term as provided in the plea agreement. In the written order, the court sentenced Stone as follows: The Court finds mitigating circumstances to be the Defendant's age of eighteen (18) years; the fact that she has accepted responsibility for her criminal conduct; and her drug addictions [sic] issues. The Court finds aggravating circumstances to be as follows: The defendant committed a conspiracy to commit murder and then later committed in fact a murder as a result of the conspiracy. Another aggravating circumstance is the fact that the Defendant admits being on probation and learned nothing from being on probation previously in juvenile court. Another aggravating circumstance is that this Defendant involved others in the commission of this crime as a result of it being originally her idea to "get rid of" her mother. The Court also notes that the Defendant consistently broke controlled substance laws of this state by consistently using marijuana which she knew to be illegal. The Court also notes as an aggravating circumstance that the Defendant committed this offense while under the influence of smoking marijuana. The Court also notes as another aggravating circumstance the Defendant's rather minor juvenile history. The Court notes as an extreme aggravating circumstance that the Defendant took advantage of a position of trust with her mother in creating a plan to murder her own mother. The court notes that this involved subterfuge and tricking her mother into opening the door so that co-defendants could enter
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the residence and physically restrain the Defendant's mother, who was ultimately murdered in this case. The Court notes that this involved taking advantage of a position of trust and the Court finds this to be an extreme aggravator. As a result of the aggravating circumstances being weighed against the mitigating circumstances, the Court notes that the aggravating circumstances do in fact outweigh the mitigating circumstances warranting an enhanced sentence of five (5) years on the Criminal Confinement conviction alone for a total sentence of fifteen years. . . . The Court notes that this Court had weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and chose not to enhance the sentence for Murder or Conspiracy to Commit Murder over and above the advisory sentences for each count. The Court notes that the parties and Defendant had agreed to a 100-year sentence and this Court has in fact imposed a 100-year sentence by combining the advisory sentence of 55 years for the murder charge, the advisory sentence of 30 years for the conspiracy to commit murder charge, and an aggravated sentence of 15 years for criminal confinement charge. The Court notes that each of said sentences are consecutive and not concurrent which was also required by the parties' agreement to impose a 100-year sentence and the Court notes that the aggravating circumstances described herein outweigh the mitigating circumstances warranting the imposition of consecutive sentences. Appellant's App. at 58-59. This appeal ensued. DISCUSSION AND DECISION Issue One: Aggravators and Mitigators Stone first argues that the trial court improperly identified and weighed aggravators and mitigators when it imposed an enhanced sentence for criminal confinement. 1 We note initially that the standard of reviewing a sentence imposed under the advisory sentencing scheme, when the trial court has identified aggravating and mitigating factors, is far from clear. As this court recently noted:

In her brief, Stone states that the trial court imposed an advisory sentence for each of her convictions and then characterizes her aggregate sentence as enhanced. But, according to the sentencing order, the trial court imposed the advisory sentence for murder and conspiracy to commit murder and an enhanced sentence for criminal confinement. Thus, we address only the propriety of the enhanced sentence for criminal confinement.

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[The] after-effects [of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004),] are still felt because the new [advisory sentencing] statutes raise a new set of questions as to the respective roles of trial and appellate courts in sentencing, the necessity of a trial court continuing to issue sentencing statements, and appellate review of a trial court's finding of aggravators and mitigators under a scheme where the trial court does not have to find aggravators or mitigators to impose any sentence within the statutory range for an offense, including the maximum sentence. The continued validity or relevance of well-established case law developed under the old "presumptive" sentencing scheme is unclear. We attempted to address these questions in Anglemyer v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1087 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. granted. We observed that under the current version of Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-7.1(d), trial courts may impose any sentence that is statutorily and constitutionally permissible "regardless of the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances." [Anglemeyer, 845 N.E.2d] at 1090. We also noted, however, that Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-3(3) still requires "a statement of the court's reasons for selecting the sentence that it imposes" if a trial court finds aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Id. In attempting to reconcile this language, we concluded that any possible error in a trial court's sentencing statement under the new "advisory" sentencing scheme necessarily would be harmless. Id. at 1091. Therefore, we declined to review Anglemyer's challenges to the correctness of the trial court's sentencing statement. Id. Nevertheless, we stated, "oftentimes a detailed sentencing statement provides us with a great deal of insight regarding the nature of the offense and the character of the offender from the trial court judge who crafted a particular sentence" and encouraged trial courts to continue issuing detailed sentencing statements to aid in our review of sentences under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Id. Our attempt in Anglemyer to analyze how appellate review of sentences imposed under the "advisory" scheme should proceed was met with a swift grant of transfer by our supreme court. Until that court issues an opinion in Anglemyer, we will assume that it is necessary to assess the accuracy of a trial court's sentencing statement if, as here, the trial court issued one, according to the standards developed under the "presumptive" sentencing system, while keeping in mind that the trial court had "discretion" to impose any sentence within the statutory range for [the felony level of each conviction] "regardless of the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances." See Ind. Code

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