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ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE: STEVE CARTER ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA JENNIFER E. GAUGER DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL Indianapolis, IN

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT: DAVID E. PRICE MIRIAM R. PRICE PRICE & ASSOCIATES, LLC Santa Claus, IN

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Dec 05 2008, 3:41 pm

FILED
of the supreme court, court of appeals and tax court

IN THE INDIANA TAX COURT
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVENUE, INHERITANCE TAX DIVISION,

CLERK

_____________________________________________________________________ ) ) ) ) Appellant/Cross-Appellee, ) ) Cause No. 82T10-0606-TA-64 v. ) ) THE ESTATE OF VIRGIL J. MILLER, ) ) Appellee/Cross-Appellant. ) ____________________________________________________________________ ORDER ON APPEALLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE'S PETITION FOR REHEARING FOR PUBLICATION December 5, 2008 FISHER, J. On October 6, 2008, this Court issued an opinion on the above-captioned matter holding that "the probate court abused its discretion in granting the Department an extension of time to file its notice of appeal under Trial Rule 72(E) because the Department had actual knowledge of the final judgment prior to requesting an extension of time to perfect its appeal." Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, Inheritance Tax Div. v.

Estate of Miller, 894 N.E.2d 286, 291 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2008) (citations omitted). As a result, the Court dismissed the Department's appeal. Id. On November 5, 2008, the Department filed a petition for rehearing claiming, as it did in its initial appeal, that it did not have actual knowledge of the probate court's judgment because the probate court's oral denial of its petition for redetermination of inheritance tax was not a judgment, given that it was not reduced to writing or dated and signed by the judge. (Cf. Br. in Supp. of Pet. for Reh'g (hereinafter, Pet. for Reh'g) at 29 with Estate of Miller, 894 N.E.2d at 289.) The Department has also claimed that the Court's opinion not only alters the manner in which appeals were commenced but also conflicts with Collins v. Covenant Mutual Insurance Company, 644 N.E.2d 116 (Ind. 1994). (See Pet. for Reh'g at 2-5, 11.) The Estate filed a response thereto on

November 21, 2008. "A petition for rehearing is a vehicle that affords the reviewing court the `opportunity to correct its own omissions or errors.'" Griffin v. State, 763 N.E.2d 450, 450-51 (Ind. 2002) (citation omitted). Accordingly, "[a] proper petition does not simply ask the court `generally to re-examine all the questions . . . decided against the party filing it.'" Id. (citation omitted). This, however, is exactly what the Department's first claim invites this Court to do. See Estate of Miller, 894 N.E.2d at 290 n.6 (explaining why the oral denial of the Department's petition for redetermination constituted a judgment). As a result, the Court denies the Department's petition with respect to its first claim. The Court, however, grants the Department's petition with respect to its remaining claims for the sole purpose of clarifying its opinion.

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1. Alteration of the period for filing a notice of appeal The Department contends that the Court's opinion improperly alters the manner by which the appellate time clock commences. More specifically, the Department

claims that under the Court's reasoning, the oral rendition of a judgment, rather than "the issuance" of a written judgment, would trigger the appellate time clock. (Pet. for Reh'g at 2-3, 7, 9.) The Department, however, has read too much into this Court's opinion. The Department's argument suggests that this Court either is unaware of, or ignored the import of, Indiana Appellate Rule 9(A)(1) which controls when the period for filing an appeal commences. Appellate Rule 9(A)(1), in relevant part, provides that "[a] party initiates an appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the trial court clerk within thirty (30) days after the entry of a Final Judgment." Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A)(1) (emphasis added). In turn, the Indiana Court of Appeals has explained that for purposes of Indiana Appellate Rule 9(A)(1), the word "entry" refers to the date that an order, ruling, or judgment is entered into the court's Record of Judgments and Orders (RJO). See Smith v. Deem, 834 N.E.2d 1100, 1109-10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Accordingly, the time to initiate an appeal usually commences when the ruling, order, or judgment is entered into the RJO. Id. In this case, the Department's period for filing its notice of appeal commenced on May 3, 2006

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