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FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JEFFREY L. SANFORD South Bend, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: STEVE CARTER Attorney General of Indiana GARY DAMON SECREST Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JEANNINE POROD, Appellant-Defendant, vs. STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee-Plaintiff. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

No. 71A03-0705-CR-212

APPEAL FROM THE ST. JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable R. W. Chamblee, Jr., Judge Cause No. 71D01-0502-FD-197

December 27, 2007

OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION

NAJAM, Judge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE Jeannine Porod appeals her conviction for Acquiring Possession of a Legend Drug by Fraud, a Class D felony, following a jury trial. She presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support her conviction. We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On January 18, 2005, Porod altered a prescription for Ritalin that her physician had written for her. Porod changed the dosage from "10" milligrams to "20" milligrams. Porod then submitted the altered prescription to be filled at a CVS pharmacy. Porod did not wait for the prescription to be filled, but left with the intent to return later for it. The pharmacist suspected that the dosage had been altered and telephoned Porod's physician to discuss the matter. Her physician confirmed that the dosage had been altered. The pharmacist telephoned police to report the incident. When Porod returned to pick up the prescription, the pharmacist completed the sale, but recorded her license plate number and reported the sale to a police officer. Police later contacted Porod and asked her to come to the police station for questioning. Porod complied, and she admitted to altering the prescription from "10" to "20" milligrams of Ritalin. The State charged her with acquiring possession of a legend drug by fraud. Following trial, a jury found her guilty as charged. The trial court entered judgment accordingly. This appeal ensued.

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DISCUSSION AND DECISION Porod's sole contention on appeal is that the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove that Ritalin is a legend drug as defined by statute. When reviewing the claim of sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Jones v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1132, 1139 (Ind. 2003). We look only to the probative evidence supporting the judgment and the reasonable inferences therein to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the conviction, it will not be set aside. Id. It is a well-settled principle of criminal law that a conviction will be reversed as a matter of law if the State fails to prove an essential element of the crime. Barnett v. State, 579 N.E.2d 84, 86 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied. By example, with respect to offenses involving controlled substances, the State must prove, as an essential element, the proscribed drug falls within the applicable statutory provision. Id. If a drug is identified in court by a name specifically designated as a controlled substance by the Indiana Code, then the State has proven as a matter of law the drug is a controlled substance. Id. If the substance is not specifically enumerated by the Code as a controlled substance, the State must offer extrinsic evidence to prove the substance falls within the Code's definition. Id. Here, the State charged Porod under Indiana Code Section 16-42-19-16, which prohibits obtaining a legend drug by fraud. Indiana Code Section 16-18-2-199 defines a legend drug as:
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a drug that is: (1) subject to 21 U.S.C. [

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