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ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Robert W. Hammerle Joseph M. Cleary Hammerle & Allen Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Steve Carter Attorney General of Indiana George P. Sherman Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

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In the

Indiana Supreme Court
_________________________________ No. 49S04-0510-CR-475 JERRY REYES, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. STATE OF INDIANA Appellee (Defendant below). _________________________________ Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, Criminal Division Room 4 No. 49G04-0207-MR-193968 The Honorable Patricia J. Gifford, Judge _________________________________ On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A04-0406-CR-351 _________________________________ June 14, 2006 Rucker, Justice.

Jerry Reyes seeks transfer from an opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming his sentence for voluntary manslaughter as a Class B felony. He pleaded guilty to this offense and in exchange the State dismissed a murder charge. The plea agreement provided in pertinent part

that, "[t]he sentence shall be within the range of ten to twenty years and will be determined by the court at the sentencing hearing." App. at 203. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Reyes to twenty years--the maximum allowed under the agreement. On review Reyes raised three related issues including whether his sentence was inappropriate within the meaning of Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court but declined to address this latter issue. Citing Gist v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), and Mann v. State, 742 N.E.2d 1025, 1026 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), the court held, "when a defendant's plea provides for a specific sentencing range, implicit in the defendant's agreement is his concession that a sentence within that range is appropriate." Reyes v. State, 828 N.E.2d 420, 426 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). In an opinion handed down today we disagreed with this proposition and held instead that Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) articulates a standard of review designed as guidance for appellate courts. . . . Of course a defendant must persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met this inappropriateness standard of review. But to say that a defendant has acquiesced in his or her sentence or has implicitly agreed that the sentence is appropriate undermines in our view the scope of authority set forth in Article VII, Section 4 of the Indiana Constitution. We thus disapprove of language in Gist, Mann, and their progeny providing otherwise. Childress v. State, No. 61S01-0510-CR-484, ___N.E.2d___, ___, slip op. at 9 (Ind. June 14, 2006). Accordingly, we proceed to address Reyes' inappropriateness claim. Otherwise, we summarily affirm the Court of Appeals' opinion.

Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides, "The Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." Regarding the nature of the offense, the presumptive sentence 1 is the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Ruiz v. State, 818 N.E.2d 927, 929 (Ind. 2004); Lander v. State, 762 N.E.2d 1208, 1214-15 (Ind. 2002). The presumptive sentence
Subsequent to the date Reyes was sentenced the Legislature amended Indiana's sentencing statutes to provide for "advisory sentences" rather than "presumptive sentences." See Pub. L. No. 71-2005,

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Indiana Law