Preview:

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Thomas J. Lantz Ryan W. Redmon Montgomery, Elsner & Pardieck, LLP Seymour, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Steve Carter Attorney General of Indiana Christopher L. Lafuse Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

______________________________________________________________________________

In the

Indiana Supreme Court
_________________________________ No. 72S01-0406-CR-249 JOHN P. MYERS, v. STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee (Plaintiff below). _________________________________ Appellant (Defendant below),

Interlocutory Appeal from the Scott Superior Court, No. 72D01-0212-FD-326 The Honorable Nicholas South, Judge _________________________________ On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 72A01-0306-CR-217 _________________________________

December 21, 2005

Dickson, Justice.

In this interlocutory appeal, the defendant, high school student John P. Meyers, challenges the trial court's order denying his motion to suppress evidence resulting from a search of his vehicle in the school parking lot. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Myers v. State, 806 N.E.2d 350 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We granted transfer and likewise affirm the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress.

1

Charged with possession of a firearm on school property, a class D felony, 1 the defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of his vehicle. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion with a detailed order that included specific findings of fact, among which were the following: 1. This matter arises from a narcotic drug dog sweep conducted at the Austin High School on December 12, 2002. As a result of the sweep the Defendant's automobile was searched and a firearm was seized from the vehicle . . . . .... 3. . . . The Defendant clearly did not consent to the search of his vehicle. 4. . . . [T]he evidence was that the Austin High School was a closed campus, and therefore Defendant was not free to leave school at any time he desired. The facts, herein, show that . . . the vehicle [was] no longer "inherently mobile" and that to require that a Police Officer obtain a search warrant would not have been unreasonable. 5. The actual search of the vehicle was made herein not by a Police Officer but by a School Official . . . . The evidence, while indicating that the Police participated in the sweep, the record does not contain evidence that the police coerced, dominated or directed the actions of the School. Rather it was the School who determined that the sweep would take place, where the sweep was to be conducted, and the range of time in which the sweep was to be conducted, further it was the School who did any search after the dog had alerted to a locker or vehicle. . . . 6. Having determined that the School Officials herein did not act as agents of the Police, . . . [t]he Court, here, finds that the action of the School Officials in conducting the search of the Defendant's vehicle was not unreasonable under the circumstances . . . . Appellant's App'x. 4-6. Upon the defendant's motion, the trial court certified its decision for interlocutory appeal.

Acknowledging that school officials are subject to a less demanding constitutional standard for student searches and seizures than that applied to law enforcement officials, the defendant contends that such relaxed standards should not apply here due to substantial police involvement. He urges that the challenged actions were a police search, not a school search; that the use of police narcotic drug dogs at his particular vehicle was not supported by reasonable particularized suspicion; and that the resulting warrantless search of his vehicle was not justified by his consent or by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Each of the defendant's contentions asserts a violation of both the state and federal constitutions.

The defendant separately identifies the Search and Seizure Clause of the Indiana Consti1

Indiana Code

Download John P. Myers v. State of Indiana.pdf

Indiana Law