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Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

FILED
May 21 2012, 9:18 am
of the supreme court, court of appeals and tax court

CLERK

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JANE H. CONLEY Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: GREGORY F. ZOELLER Attorney General of Indiana MICHELLE BUMGARNER Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JOHNATHON GREGG, Appellant-Defendant, vs. STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee-Plaintiff. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

No. 49A05-1111-CR-566

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Lisa F. Borges, Judge Cause No. 49G04-1103-FB-17943

May 21, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

NAJAM, Judge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE Jonathon Gregg appeals his conviction for burglary, as a Class B felony, following a bench trial. He presents a single issue for review, namely, whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction for burglary.1 We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On the morning of February 14, 2011, Carol Douglas left her home in Indianapolis around 8:45 a.m., and her husband James left for work a short while later. The front and back doors of the home were locked. When James returned home around 2:45 p.m. to get his lunch, he found the glass in the back door had been shattered and the house had been "ransacked." Transcript at 9. Several items were missing, including Colts helmets, a Terry Bradshaw football, Wii gaming systems, laptop computers, Longaberger baskets, and a set of golf clubs. At 4:33 p.m. the same day, Gregg pawned items at Jackpotts LLC in Indianapolis, including two sets of golf clubs. James reported the break-in to police. Officers recovered fingerprints on a

television inside the house that had been partially removed from a wall. The prints belonged to Gary Miller.2 Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department ("IMPD")

Detective Larry Craciunoiu interviewed Miller, who implicated Gregg in the break-in and theft. Officers later recovered the golf clubs from the pawn shop. Gregg's signature and thumbprint were on the pawn ticket.
Gregg does not appeal his conviction for theft, as a Class B felony, or the adjudication that he is an habitual offender. Miller had pleaded guilty to burglary and, as part of that plea, had agreed to testify as a State's witness at Gregg's trial.
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The State charged Gregg with burglary, as a Class B felony, and theft, as a class B felony, and with being an habitual offender. Gregg waived a jury trial and, following a bench trial, the court convicted him on both counts as charged and, following Gregg's admission, found him to be an habitual offender. The court sentenced Gregg to fifteen years for burglary, enhanced by ten years for being an habitual offender, and to 901 days for theft, to run concurrently but with sixteen years executed and nine years suspended to probation. Gregg now appeals. DISCUSSION AND DECISION Gregg contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for burglary. When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is challenged, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the crime from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904, 905-06 (Ind. 2005). It is the job of the fact-finder to determine whether the evidence in a particular case sufficiently proves each element of an offense, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Id. at 906. Gregg argues that the "sole evidence of burglary against [him] was the testimony of Gary Miller[, which was] vacillating, required frequent prompting, and contradicted itself." Appellant's Brief at 5. He contends that there is no direct evidence linking him to the break-in at the Douglas home aside from Miller's "contradictory and wavering" testimony. Appellant's Brief at 10. But Gregg forgets that, under the accomplice theory
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of liability, a person who aids another person in committing an offense is guilty of the offense as if he were the principal. See Ind. Code

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