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FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: RONALD C. SMITH PETER S. KOVACS MARY F. SCHMID DAVID I. RUBIN Stewart & Irwin, P.C. Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: JOHN JOSEPH TANNER RYAN M. HURLEY Baker & Daniels, LLP Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
KAHLO JEEP CHRYSLER DODGE OF KNIGHTSTOWN, INC., et al, Appellants-Plaintiffs, vs. DAIMLERCHRYSLER MOTORS COMPANY, LLC, Appellee-Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

No. 49A02-0412-CV-1086

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable John L. Price, Senior Judge Pro Tem Cause No. 49D07-0406-PL-1202

October 12, 2005

OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION BARNES, Judge

Case Summary Kahlo Jeep Chrysler Dodge of Knightstown, Inc., Kahlo Jeep, Inc., Palmer Dodge West, Inc., Palmer Dodge, Inc., Tom O'Brien Northside, Inc., Gene Beltz Shadeland Dodge, Inc., Westgate Chrysler Jeep Dodge, Inc., Eastgate Chrysler Jeep, Inc., Danville Chrysler Dodge Jeep, Inc., Tom O'Brien Co., Dellen & Dellen, LLC, and Paul Goeke, Inc., (collectively "the Dealers") appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of DaimlerChrysler Motors Company, LLC ("DaimlerChrysler"). We affirm. Issue The sole restated issue is whether the Dealers' cause of action against DaimlerChrysler alleging a violation of the Indiana Deceptive Franchise Practice Act ("the Act") was barred by the Act's statute of limitations. Facts Between 1980 and 2001, the Dealers executed franchise agreements with DaimlerChrysler or its predecessor, Chrysler Corporation, to sell Chrysler, Jeep, and/or Dodge vehicles. All of the agreements stated in part, with insignificant variations in one of them, "[DaimlerChrysler] will have the right to amend this Agreement to the extent that [DaimlerChrysler] deems advisable, provided that [DaimlerChrysler] makes the same amendment in [DaimlerChrysler] Sales and Service Agreements generally." App. p. 26. In May 2004, DaimlerChrysler gave notice to the Dealers, and in fact to Chrysler dealers throughout the United States, of an amendment to the franchise agreements concerning dealer sales performance requirements.

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The Dealers, not pleased with the amendment, filed suit against DaimlerChrysler in June 2004. The complaint, which sought class status for all Chrysler dealers in Indiana, contended that the May 2004 amendment represented a substantial change to the franchise agreements, and that it was illegal under the Act for the franchise agreements to have permitted Chrysler to amend the agreements unilaterally. DaimlerChrysler moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Dealers' suit was barred by the Act's two-year statute of limitations for actions based on purported violations of the Act because all of the franchise agreements had been executed more than two years before the suit was filed. On November 30, 2004, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of DaimlerChrysler. The Dealers now appeal. Analysis Summary judgment is appropriate only if the evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Beta Steel v. Rust, 830 N.E.2d 62, 67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). We must construe all facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Beta Steel, 830 N.E.2d at 67. "The review of a summary judgment motion is limited to those materials designated to the trial court and we must carefully review decisions on summary judgment motions to ensure that parties are not improperly denied their day in court." Id. "All trial court rulings should be presumed to be correct, but in the context of summary judgment proceedings we will not hesitate to reverse a trial court's ruling if it has misconstrued or misapplied the law, failed to consider material factual disputes, or improperly considered immaterial factual disputes." Id. at 68. 3

The issue here solely concerns proper statutory interpretation and construction and does not involve any disputed facts. Thus, the case presents a pure question of law for which disposition by summary judgment is appropriate. Medical Assurance of Indiana v. McCarty, 808 N.E.2d 737, 741 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). If a statute is unambiguous, we may not interpret it but must give the statute its clear and plain meaning. Id. If a statute is ambiguous, we must ascertain the legislature's intent and interpret the statute to effectuate that intent. Id. A statute may be ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable and intelligible interpretation. Id. If interpretation is necessary, the express language of the statute controls and we apply the rules of statutory construction. Id. "We are required to determine, give effect to, and implement the legislative intent underlying the statute and to construe the statute in such a way as to prevent absurdity and hardship and to favor public convenience." Id. Section 1 of the Act, labeled "Franchise agreement; unlawful provisions," provides in part: It is unlawful for any franchise agreement entered into between any franchisor and a franchisee who is either a resident of Indiana or a nonresident who will be operating a franchise in Indiana to contain any of the following provisions: ***** (3) Allowing substantial modification of the franchise agreement by the franchisor without the consent in writing of the franchisee. Ind. Code

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