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Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: DAVID W. STONE, IV Anderson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: STEVE CARTER Attorney General of Indiana MONIKA PREKOPA TALBOT Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
MAURICE D. BOATMAN, Appellant-Defendant, vs. STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee-Plaintiff. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

No. 48A05-0606-CR-339

APPEAL FROM THE MADISON CIRCUIT COURT The Honorable Fredrick R. Spencer, Judge Cause Nos. 48C01-0504-FB-165 and 48C01-0511-FB-460

December 27, 2006

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

NAJAM, Judge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE Maurice Boatman appeals his sentence following his conviction for Possession of Cocaine, as a Class D felony, pursuant to a plea agreement. He presents a single dispositive issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed an enhanced sentence. We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On November 18, 2005, an Indiana State Trooper initiated a traffic stop after he observed Boatman speeding. Because the officer smelled a strong odor of marijuana emanating from Boatman's vehicle, he asked Boatman to exit the vehicle and submit to a pat-down search. The officer found what was later determined to be six grams of cocaine in Boatman's shoes and $160 in cash in his pants' pocket. The State charged Boatman with dealing in cocaine, as a Class B felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State amended the charge to possession of cocaine, as a Class D felony, and Boatman pleaded guilty to that charge. The plea agreement left sentencing open to the trial court's discretion. At sentencing, the trial court imposed the maximum sentence of three years, stating that it "justifies the maximum sentence based on the amount of the cocaine that was in [Boatman's] possession." Transcript at 52. This appeal ensued. 1

Boatman also pleaded guilty to two convictions in another cause number, but he does not challenge those sentences on appeal. See Brief of Appellant at 17 ("The advisory sentence should be imposed on the cocaine offense.").

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DISCUSSION AND DECISION Boatman contends that the trial court improperly identified the amount of cocaine he possessed as an aggravator when it imposed an enhanced sentence. We note initially that the standard of reviewing a sentence imposed under the advisory sentencing scheme, when the trial court has identified an aggravating factor, is far from clear. As this court recently noted: [The] after-effects [of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004),] are still felt because the new [advisory sentencing] statutes raise a new set of questions as to the respective roles of trial and appellate courts in sentencing, the necessity of a trial court continuing to issue sentencing statements, and appellate review of a trial court's finding of aggravators and mitigators under a scheme where the trial court does not have to find aggravators or mitigators to impose any sentence within the statutory range for an offense, including the maximum sentence. The continued validity or relevance of well-established case law developed under the old "presumptive" sentencing scheme is unclear. We attempted to address these questions in Anglemyer v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1087 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. granted. We observed that under the current version of Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-7.1(d), trial courts may impose any sentence that is statutorily and constitutionally permissible "regardless of the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances." [Anglemeyer, 845 N.E.2d] at 1090. We also noted, however, that Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-3(3) still requires "a statement of the court's reasons for selecting the sentence that it imposes" if a trial court finds aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Id. In attempting to reconcile this language, we concluded that any possible error in a trial court's sentencing statement under the new "advisory" sentencing scheme necessarily would be harmless. Id. at 1091. Therefore, we declined to review Anglemyer's challenges to the correctness of the trial court's sentencing statement. Id. Nevertheless, we stated, "oftentimes a detailed sentencing statement provides us with a great deal of insight regarding the nature of the offense and the character of the offender from the trial court judge who crafted a particular sentence" and encouraged trial courts to continue issuing detailed sentencing statements to aid in our review of sentences under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Id. Our attempt in Anglemyer to analyze how appellate review of
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sentences imposed under the "advisory" scheme should proceed was met with a swift grant of transfer by our supreme court. Until that court issues an opinion in Anglemyer, we will assume that it is necessary to assess the accuracy of a trial court's sentencing statement if, as here, the trial court issued one, according to the standards developed under the "presumptive" sentencing system, while keeping in mind that the trial court had "discretion" to impose any sentence within the statutory range for [the felony level of each conviction] "regardless of the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances." See Ind. Code

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