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Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: HUGH N. TAYLOR Hugh N. Taylor, P.C. Auburn, Indiana

FILED
Jun 12 2012, 9:12 am
of the supreme court, court of appeals and tax court

CLERK

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: GREGORY F. ZOELLER Attorney General of Indiana RYAN D. JOHANNINGSMEIER Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
MICHAEL J. MAURER, Appellant-Defendant, vs. STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee-Plaintiff. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

No. 17A03-1112-CR-552

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM THE DeKALB SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Kevin P. Wallace, Judge Cause No. 17D01-1107-FD-114

June 12, 2012 MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BRADFORD, Judge

Appellant-Defendant Michael J. Maurer brings this interlocutory appeal, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress. Maurer argues that the evidence stemming from the investigatory traffic stop should be suppressed because the investigating officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. Concluding that the investigating officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Maurer's vehicle, we affirm the trial court's order denying Maurer's motion to suppress. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Because this is an interlocutory appeal, the facts have not yet been established through a trial. The alleged facts as presented during the suppression hearing are as follows: During the late afternoon or evening hours on July 4, 2011, DeKalb County Sheriff's Department Sergeant Michael Keesler received communication from dispatch that two unrelated identified concerned citizens had reported that a blue, grey, or silver Honda Accord was "traveling all over the roadway" near the 134-mile marker of southbound I-69. Supp. Hr. Tr. p. 5. Sergeant Keesler positioned himself near the 129-southbound exit ramp at State Road 8 in DeKalb County. Sergeant Keesler observed a Honda Accord matching the description given by dispatch exit the interstate on the 129-southbound exit ramp. The vehicle was traveling "pretty fast" and "abruptly stopped because there was a vehicle settin' at the intersection at the red light." Supp. Hr. Tr. p. 7. Once the light turned green, the vehicle that was stopped in front of the Honda Accord proceeded through the intersection. The Honda Accord, however, "sat there for awhile, up until a yellow light. And then decided to turn right." Supp. Hr. Tr. p. 7. As the Honda Accord turned, the vehicle made a wide-right turn 2

and crossed the yellow line. Based on the information received from dispatch and his observations, Sergeant Keesler activated his emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop. On July 8, 2011, the State charged Maurer, by information, with Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated, Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an unlawful alcohol concentration in blood or breath, and Class D felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated or with an unlawful alcohol concentration in blood or breath while having a previous conviction. On September 6, 2011, Maurer filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Maurer's motion on October 19, 2011. At Maurer's request, the trial court certified its October 19, 2011 order for interlocutory appeal. On January 20, 2012, this court issued an order accepting jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal. DISCUSSION AND DECISION Maurer contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress certain evidence at trial because Sergeant Keesler lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. We review the denial of a motion to suppress in a manner similar to other sufficiency matters. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling. However, unlike the typical sufficiency of the evidence case where only the evidence favorable to the judgment is considered, we must also consider the uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. Bentley v. State, 779 N.E.2d 70, 73 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted). "Although we generally review a trial court's decision to admit evidence despite a motion to suppress under

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an abuse-of-discretion standard, the ultimate determination of whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop is reviewed de novo." Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 241, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Burkes v. State, 842 N.E.2d 426, 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. The Fourth Amendment regulates nonconsensual encounters between citizens and law enforcement officials and does not deal with situations in which a person voluntarily interacts with a police officer. A full-blown arrest or a detention that lasts for more than a short period of time must be justified by probable cause. A brief investigative stop may be justified by reasonable suspicion that the person detained is involved in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Finger v. State, 799 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ind. 2003) Thus, "[b]ecause a traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, police may not initiate a stop for any conceivable reason, but must possess at least reasonable suspicion that a traffic law has been violated or that other criminal activity is taking place." Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 869 (Ind. 2009). Reasonable suspicion exists where the facts known to the officer at the moment of the stop, together with the reasonable inferences arising therefrom, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur. Burkes, 842 N.E.2d at 429-30. In deciding whether there was reasonable suspicion for a stop, we look to the totality of the circumstances of a given case. Id. at 430. "An officer's decision to stop a vehicle is valid so long as his on-the-spot evaluation reasonably suggests that lawbreaking occurred." Meredith, 906 N.E.2d at 870. 4

Police officers may stop a vehicle when they observe minor traffic violations. Smith v. State, 713 N.E.2d 338, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied; see also Ind.Code

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