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Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE: RICHARD DODD Pendleton, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: STEVE CARTER Attorney General of Indiana J.T. WHITEHEAD Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
RICHARD DODD, Appellant-Petitioner, vs. STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee-Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

No. 71A05-0605-PC-234

APPEAL FROM THE ST. JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable John M. Marnocha, Judge Cause No. 71D02-9712-CF-550

May 9, 2007

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

NAJAM, Judge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE Richard Dodd, pro se, appeals from the denial of his motion to correct erroneous sentence. On appeal, Dodd raises two issues, which we consolidate and restate as

whether the trial court erred when it denied Dodd's motion. We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On December 10, 1997, Dodd and another man broke and entered a gas station on U.S. 20 in northern Indiana. When a police officer responded to a burglar alarm from that location, Dodd fired at the officer. The shot hit the officer in the chest but did not pierce his bullet-proof vest. After a chase, officers arrested Dodd and his companion. The State charged Dodd with Attempted Murder, as a Class A felony, and Burglary, as a Class C felony. After a jury trial, the court entered judgment convicting Dodd on both counts. The trial court sentenced Dodd to fifty years on the attempted murder count, which was to run consecutive to eight years on the burglary count, for an aggregate sentence of fifty-eight years. Dodd appealed his conviction and sentence. This court affirmed in an unpublished opinion, Dodd v. State, No. 71A03-9809-CR-394 (Ind. Ct. App. July 23, 1999), and the supreme court denied transfer on July 25, 2000. On August 23, 2000, Dodd filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, and the trial court appointed a public defender to represent him. The State filed a response to that petition on October 23, 2002. On September 3, 2003, the trial court granted the public defender's motion to withdraw, and, on March 24, 2004, Dodd filed a pro se amended petition for post-conviction relief. On April 2, 2004, the State filed its response.
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On January 4, 2005, Dodd filed a second amended petition for post-conviction relief, to which the State filed its response on March 2, 2005. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on May 19, 2005, and, after taking the matter under advisement, denied Dodd's petition on August 12, 2005. On March 17, 2006, Dodd filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence. In that motion, Dodd alleged for the first time that the imposition of consecutive sentences is not authorized by statute. The trial court denied that motion without a hearing. Dodd now appeals. DISCUSSION AND DECISION Dodd contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to correct erroneous sentence because Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2 mandates that his sentence cannot exceed fifty-five years. At the time of the offenses, 1 Indiana Code Section 35-501-2(c) (1997) ("former Section 35-50-1-2") provided in relevant part: [E]xcept for crimes of violence, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment . . . to which the defendant is sentenced for felony convictions arising out of an episode of criminal conduct shall not exceed the presumptive sentence for a felony which is one (1) class of felony higher than the most serious of the felonies for which the person has been convicted. Dodd was convicted of one Class A felony and one Class C felony. He contends that under former Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2(c), his aggregate sentence may not exceed fifty-five years, the presumptive sentence for the next higher class felony, because (1) the offenses for which he was sentenced constituted a single episode of criminal conduct and
The law that was in effect at the time of the commission of the crime controls the resolution of sentencing issues. Peace v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1261, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. Thus, we analyze the sentencing issues using the presumptive sentencing scheme in effect in 1997.
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(2) attempted murder was not a crime of violence as contemplated in that statute. We address each argument in turn. Dodd first argues that the burglary and attempted murder offenses were part of a single episode of criminal conduct and, therefore, that under former Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2(c) his aggregate sentence may not exceed the fifty-five-year presumptive sentence for the next higher class felony, murder. See Ind. Code

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