Preview:

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JEFFREY R. JOHNSON Johnson Law Offices Sullivan, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: JEFF R. HAWKINS Hawkins Law PC Sullivan, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
ROBERT WOODRUFF, Appellant-Plaintiff, vs. JOAN LUCAS, Appellee-Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

No. 77A05-0604-CV-221

APPEAL FROM THE SULLIVAN SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Thomas E. Johnson, Judge Cause No. 77D01-0601-SC-5

May 9, 2007

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

NAJAM, Judge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE Robert Woodruff appeals from the trial court's judgment in favor of Joan Lucas on Woodruff's small claims complaint for ejectment and rent. The court originally entered judgment in favor of Woodruff but, after Lucas filed a motion to correct error, entered a Final Judgment Order granting Lucas' motion. Woodruff presents two issues for review, namely: 1. Whether Lucas proved the common law elements of adverse possession. Whether Lucas proved substantial compliance with the adverse possession tax statute.

2.

We reverse and remand with instructions. 1 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In 1994, Lucas and her late husband purchased a parcel of real estate in Hymera. At the time of the purchase, one mobile home was on the parcel. Lucas subsequently placed two more mobile homes on the parcel, one abutting the southern boundary. Based on what neighbors told her when she purchased the parcel, Lucas believed that an old clothesline pole marked the parcel's southern boundary. On December 7, 2001, Woodruff purchased the parcel abutting the southern boundary of Lucas' property. In 2002, a dispute arose regarding the location of the boundary between the respective parcels. On January 4, 2006, Woodruff filed suit in small claims court, seeking to have Lucas remove property allegedly on his parcel and
In appellee's brief, Lucas raises as an issue for review whether the trial court properly denied Woodruff's motion to correct error, which was filed after the trial court entered its Final Judgment Order. Because we determine that the record does not support the trial court's determination that Lucas substantially complied with the adverse possession tax statute, we need not address whether the trial court erred when it denied Woodruff's motion to correct error.
1

2

asking for back rent from January 1, 2002. The trial court held a hearing on January 17, 2006, at which Woodruff appeared pro se and Lucas was represented by counsel. On February 6, 2006, the court entered judgment in favor of Woodruff. On February 8, 2006, Lucas filed a motion to correct error, arguing that she had proved ownership of the disputed tract by adverse possession. On February 14, 2006, the trial court entered its Final Judgment Order, in which it made special findings and "declare[d] the Defendant [Lucas] owner of the subject parcel of real estate by adverse possession[.]" Appellant's App. at 91. The trial court vacated its judgment of February 6, 2006, and ordered that Woodruff "take nothing by way of his Complaint." Id. On March 14, 2006, Woodruff filed a motion to correct error, attaching as an exhibit a letter that had not been offered into evidence at the small claims hearing. Lucas filed an objection to Woodruff's motion, arguing that the exhibit to Woodruff's motion did not comply with Indiana Trial Rule 59(H). Woodruff filed a response to Lucas's objection, and, thereafter, Lucas filed a response to Woodruff's response. On March 31, 2006, the trial court denied Woodruff's motion to correct error. Woodruff appeals. DISCUSSION AND DECISION Standard of Review In the appellate review of claims tried to the bench without a jury, the reviewing court shall not set aside the judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. City of Dunkirk Water and Sewage Dep't v. Hall, 657 N.E.2d 115, 116 (Ind. 1995) (stating standard of review in appeal from small claims court).
3

In determining whether a

judgment is clearly erroneous, we will not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses but will consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence. Id. Small claims actions are "informal, with the sole objective of dispensing speedy justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive law." Ind. Small Claims Rule 8(A). Although the court here made special findings, the formal entry of special findings is "contrary to the policy announced in Small Claims Rules 8 and 11," which provide that small claims trials are informal and require only that small claims judgments "shall be reduced to writing." Bowman v. Kitchel, 644 N.E.2d 878, 879 (Ind. 1995) (quoting Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(A)). Thus, special findings do not guide our review. Here, because Woodruff appeals from a judgment finding that Lucas had met her burden of proving adverse possession, he appeals from an adverse judgment. See Garling v. Ind. Dep't of Natural Res., 766 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that appeal from judgment based on findings in favor of party with burden of proof is an appeal from an adverse judgment), trans. denied. For reversal of the judgment, Woodruff must show that the judgment was clearly erroneous as defined by Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). Id. When the trial court enters findings in favor of the party bearing the burden of proof, we will hold the findings clearly erroneous if they are not supported by substantial evidence of probative value. Id. Even if the supporting evidence is substantial, we will reverse the judgment if we are left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made. Id. When a question of law is dispositive, we owe no deference to the trial court. Kopetsky v. Crews, 838 N.E.2d 1118, 1123 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
4

Common Law Adverse Possession Woodruff contends that the trial court erred when it entered judgment against him. Specifically, he asserts that Lucas did not prove the common law elements of adverse possession. We cannot agree. In Fraley v. Minger, 829 N.E.2d 476, 486 (Ind. 2005), our supreme court restated the adverse possession doctrine and its elements: [T]he doctrine of adverse possession entitles a person without title to obtain ownership to a parcel of land upon clear and convincing proof of control, intent, notice, and duration, as follows: (1) Control

Download Robert Woodruff v. Joan Lucas.pdf

Indiana Law