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ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS Michael B. Langford Indianapolis, Indiana Douglas D. Small South Bend, Indiana Patrick A. Elward Karl L. Mulvaney Nana Quay-Smith Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES Mark D. Gerth Indianapolis, Indiana

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Indiana Supreme Court
_________________________________ No. 29S04-1102-CT-118 SARAH HAAG, GORDON HAAG AND CATHY HAAG; MOLLY KRUGER, WILLIAM KRUGER, III, AND KATHERINE F. KRUGER; ANGIE MUIR, EDWARD MUIR AND LYNN MUIR; JULIA M. WELCH, BRIAN W. WELCH AND SUSAN A. WELCH; SUSAN M. PINNICK, PATRICK PINNICK AND JANE PINNICK; MEGAN REINHARDT, CRAIG REINHARDT AND PAMALA REINHARDT; JAMIE STOUT, MARK STOUT AND CAROL STOUT; CRYSTAL WRIGHT, DENNY WRIGHT AND FINA WRIGHT,

In the

FILED
of the supreme court, court of appeals and tax court

Jan 10 2012, 10:54 am

CLERK

Appellants (Plaintiffs below), v. MARK CASTRO, THE INDIANA YOUTH SOCCER ASSOCIATION, VIRGINIA SURETY COMPANY, INC., HARTFORD LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, AND K & K INSURANCE GROUP D/B/A K & K INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., Appellees (Defendants below).

_________________________________ Appeal from the Hamilton Circuit Court, No. 29C01-0606-CT-576 The Honorable Paul Felix, Judge _________________________________ On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 29A04-1001-CT-10 _________________________________ January 10, 2012 Sullivan, Justice.

Players on a local youth soccer team seek to recover under the state youth soccer governing association's business auto-insurance policy for injuries sustained when the van in which they were riding was involved in an accident. Because the van was not being used in the business of the association, a condition for coverage under the insurance policy at issue, the injured players may not recover. Background

The plaintiffs in this case were players (or parents of players) on a soccer team called Carmel Commotion. Carmel Commotion was one of a number of teams fielded by the Carmel United Soccer Club in 2004. The Carmel United Soccer Club is an affiliated member in good standing of the Indiana Youth Soccer Association ("IYSA"). The IYSA is a not-for-profit corporation that governs youth soccer in Indiana; it is charged with developing and promoting youth soccer in Indiana in conjunction with various national organizations. In June, 2004, Carmel Commotion traveled with the IYSA's approval to Colorado to participate in a youth soccer tournament. Mark Castro, the team's IYSA -certified coach, organized the trip.

On June 12, 2004, while attending the soccer tournament in Colorado, the team decided to go on a white-water rafting trip as a "team-building" activity. Castro transported the players

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to the rafting activity in a passenger van that he had rented for the team's use during the trip. While en route, the van collided with another vehicle, resulting in injuries to several players. The injured players, by their parents (referred to collectively as "Players"), sued Castro and the IYSA's insurance carrier, Virginia Surety Co., Inc. (The IYSA itself and another party were also named as defendants but were later dismissed by stipulation.) The Players sought a declaration that the IYSA's insurance policy through Virginia Surety provided coverage while Castro drove them to the white-water rafting activity. Both Virginia Surety and the Players moved for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Virginia Surety.

A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed, the majority holding under the relevant insurance policy language that Castro was not using the rented van "in the business of" the IYSA at the time of the accident. Haag v. Castro, 934 N.E.2d 189, 195-96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

The Players sought, and we granted, transfer, Haag v. Castro, 950 N.E.2d 1200 (Ind. 2011) (table), thereby vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). Discussion

I

Virginia Surety issued a commercial lines policy to the IYSA that provided business auto coverage in certain circumstances. At issue in this case is an endorsement for "hired" (rented) vehicles that reads as follows:

With respect to hired auto and employers non-ownership liability, the insured means the named insured, member associations and its clubs, leagues teams, employees, volunteers, executive officers, directors, stockholders, therein, but only while the automobile is being used in the business of the Named Insured. Coverage is not provided on behalf of the parents, managers, coaches, umpires, officials, referees, of the insured or volunteers using any automobile (personally owned, leased, borrowed or employer furnished) in the transportation of youth or

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adult participants to and from athletic games or athletic events, including but not limited to practices, exhibitions, post season and scheduled events. Appellants' App. 101 (emphasis added).

The Players make three arguments about this endorsement.

First, they contend that under the first sentence of the endorsement, the rented van in which they were riding was being used in the business of the IYSA.

Second, they contend that the second sentence of the endorsement does not apply because they were not traveling to an athletic game or event; rather, they were traveling to a "team building" event.

Third, they contend that the endorsement must be construed to provide coverage in these circumstances because if it is not, coverage would not be available under any reasonably expected set of circumstances and, therefore, would be "illusory."

II As the Court of Appeals recognized, Castro may well be an "insured" under the policy. Haag, 934 N.E.2d at 193. But the dispositive issue is whether Castro was using the rented van "in the business of" the IYSA at the time of the accident. The policy does not define "in the business of" and the Players argue that this creates an ambiguity that should be construed against the insurer. Of course, that a policy does not define a term does not necessarily make the term ambiguous. Wagner v. Yates, 912 N.E.2d 805, 810 (Ind. 2009). Furthermore, "an ambiguity is not affirmatively established simply because controversy exists and one party asserts an interpretation contrary to that asserted by the opposing party." Id. (citing Beam v. Wausau Ins. Co., 765 N.E.2d 524, 528 (Ind. 2002)). We find that the IYSA's organizational documents combined with widespread general familiarity with the business of sports governing bodies render the term unambiguous here. To the extent that Lea v. St.

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Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 306 So. 2d 740, 743 (La. 1975), cited by the Players, holds to the contrary, we respectfully disagree with our Louisiana colleagues. And in fact, the Players as well as Virginia Surety direct us to the IYSA's organizational documents for insight into its "business." The IYSA's Articles of Incorporation declare its relevant purposes as follows: SECTION 1. To develop, promote and administer the game of soccer among Youth under 19 years of age residing within the State of Indiana. SECTION 2. To encourage and assist in the development and growth of community leagues, associations, organizations, programs and teams so that soccer is made available to more Indiana residents in all levels of competition. SECTION 3. To develop and encourage sportsmanship and playing proficiency by all players and persons involved in soccer in the State of Indiana. SECTION 4. To affiliate with USYSA and to encourage registration of all Indiana Youth teams with the USYSA. SECTION 5. To conduct tournaments of Youth team competition and to sanction said teams to enter and participate in said tournaments. SECTION 6. To do any and all other acts necessary or desirable in the furtherance of the foregoing purposes and for the good of Youth soccer. Appellants' App. 815. The IYSA also has a set of "Playing Rules" that "are intended to provide a uniform set of guidelines governing: player eligibility, registration, team formation, player assignments, playing rules, and standards of Sportsmanship and conduct for all Member Organizations." Id. at 820, 825. We read these organizational documents to identify three lines of endeavor or "business" for the IYSA: (1) "promoting" soccer; (2) "regulating" competition, leagues, teams, and players (e.g., registering teams, certifying coaches and referees, sanctioning participation in tournaments, etc.); and (3) "conducting" specific events. Thus, when the Virginia Surety policy requires that the automobile be "used in the business of the [IYSA]" for there to be coverage, the policy re-

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quires that the automobile be used in one of these three lines of business

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