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Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE: SHELLY M. PHIPPS Bloomington, Indiana

FILED
Apr 09 2009, 9:06 am
of the supreme court, court of appeals and tax court

CLERK

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
SHELLY M. PHIPPS, Appellant-Respondent, vs. KEEVIN J. GRAY, Appellee-Petitioner. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

No. 53A01-0809-CV-413

APPEAL FROM THE MONROE CIRCUIT COURT DIVISION IV The Honorable Frances G. Hill, Judge Cause No. 53C04-0806-PO-1410

April 9, 2009 MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

RILEY, Judge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant-Respondent, Shelly M. Phipps (Phipps), acting pro se, appeals the trial court's grant of a protective order against her and in favor of Appellee-Petitioner, Keevin J. Gray (Gray). We affirm. ISSUE Phipps presents three issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as: Whether the trial court erred in granting the protective order. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On June 26, 2008, Gray filed a petition seeking a protective order against Phipps, claiming that Phipps had been stalking him. Gray is a minister, and Phipps is a former member of his church. On July 31, 2008, the trial court held a hearing and entered a protective order against Phipps, which, in part, ordered Phipps to stay away from the church. The order was set to expire on January 31, 2009. On August 6, 2008, Phipps filed a Motion to Re-Open, Re-Hear and Re-Consider. Phipps' motion included two-and-a-half pages of additional "testimony" that was prefaced as follows: At the July 31st hearing, upon instruction of my attorney it was stated that "The Judge doesn't want to hear everything that has happened the last two years." I, the Respondent sat with three pages of testimony and didn't present it because I didn't think it would be allowed. This testimony is vital to this case. (Appellant's Br. p. *).1 On August 20, 2008, the trial court, finding no grounds to re-open the case for additional testimony, denied Phipps' motion.

1

Phipps' August 6, 2008, motion is attached to the end of her brief, but the pages are not numbered.

2

Phipps now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary. DISCUSSION AND DECISION Phipps argues that the trial court erred by granting the protective order. Because the order expired on January 31, 2009, an argument could be made that this appeal is moot. However, Gray did not file a brief or otherwise argue mootness, so we decline to dismiss the appeal on that basis. Moreover, because Gray failed to file a brief, Phipps need only show prima facie error in order to prevail on appeal. See Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006). "Prima facie error" in this context is defined as at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it. Id. Where an appellant is unable to meet this burden, we will affirm. Id. In Indiana, a person who is or has been a victim of stalking may file a petition for an order for protection against the person who did the stalking. Ind. Code

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