Preview:

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Amy Karozos Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Marjorie A. Millman Seymour, Indiana

______________________________________________________________________________

Indiana Supreme Court
_________________________________ No. 49S02-0902-JV-091

In the

FILED
Apr 24 2009, 1:50 pm
of the supreme court, court of appeals and tax court

CLERK

IN THE MATTER OF THE INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF G.Y., MINOR CHILD, AND HIS MOTHER, R.Y., AND HIS FATHER G.Y. R.Y. (MOTHER), Appellant (Respondent below), v.

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, Appellee (Petitioner below)
AND

CHILD ADVOCATES, INC. Co-Appellee (Guardian Ad Litem) _________________________________ Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49D09-0705-JT-020577 The Honorable Marilyn Moores, Judge The Honorable Larry Bradley, Magistrate _________________________________ On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-0804-JV-394 _________________________________ April 24, 2009

Sullivan, Justice. The trial court terminated R.Y.s parental rights on grounds that the conditions which resulted in her son G.Y.s removal will not be remedied and that termination is in G.Y.s best interests. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Concluding that the evidence does not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that R.Y.s parental rights should be terminated, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. Background R.Y. ("Mother") gave birth to G.Y. on April 23, 2004. Mother had been G.Y.s sole

caretaker during the first 20 months of his life and there are no allegations that she engaged in any criminal behavior during this period of time or that she was an unfit parent in any way. But in April, 2003, a year before G.Y.s birth, Mother had delivered cocaine to a police informant. She was arrested and incarcerated for this offense in December, 2005, i.e., 32 months after the offense and when G.Y. was 20 months old. On January 4, 2006, after Mothers multiple attempts to place G.Y. with relatives and friends during her incarceration failed, the Marion County Division of the Indiana Department of Child Services ("State") filed a petition alleging that G.Y. was a Child in Need of Services ("CHINS") because Mother had been unable to make the appropriate arrangements for his care. G.Y. was placed in foster care.

In March, 2006, Mother pled guilty to Dealing in Cocaine as a Class B felony. The Jay Circuit Court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced her to 12 years, with four years suspended to probation, i.e., eight years of executed time. In May, 2006, with Mothers consent, the Marion Superior Court, Juvenile Division, found G.Y. to be a CHINS. The court ordered continued placement in foster care and "Reunification with parent(s)" as "The Plan for permanency." (Vol. of Exs. at 11.) In July, 2006, the court held a dispositional hearing and thereafter issued a dispositional order directing that G.Y. continue in foster care and that Mother comply with the courts "Participation Decree." Id. at 13-17. The dispositional order again provided "Reunification with parent(s)" as "The Plan for Permanency." Id. at 14. Under the Participation Decree, Mother was ordered, in part, to obtain a source of income and suitable

2

housing, complete home-based counseling, a parenting assessment, parenting classes, and a drug and alcohol assessment. Id. at 16-17. She was also ordered to "[v]isit on a consistent, regular basis as recommended by counselor or caseworker." Id. at 17. On May 18, 2007, the State filed a "Petition for Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship" between Mother and G.Y. (Appellants App. 16-17.) The court held fact-finding hearings in January and February, 2008, at which time Mothers date of release from prison was May 30, 2010. (Tr. 6.) On March 26, 2008, the court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ordering Mothers parental rights involuntarily terminated. Mother appealed,

contending that there was insufficient evidence to terminate her parental rights and that the State violated her due process rights when it failed to comply with statutory requirements during the termination process. In an unpublished memorandum decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed. R.Y. v. Marion County Dept of Child Servs., No. 49A02-0804-JV-394, slip op., 895 N.E.2d 741 (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2008). Mother seeks, and we grant, transfer. Discussion

I The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. Bester v. Lake County Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005) (citing Pierce v. Socy of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). A parents interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests." Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). Indeed the parent-child relationship is "one of the most valued relationships in our culture." Id. (quoting Neal v. DeKalb County Div. of Family and Children, 796 N.E.2d 280, 285 (Ind. 2003)). We recognize, however, that parental interests are not absolute and must be subordinated to the childs interests in determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147 (citation omitted). Thus, "[p]arental rights may be terminated when the parents are unable

3

or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities." Id. (quoting In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)).

When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147 (citation omitted). We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. (citation

omitted). Here, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting the States petition to terminate Mothers parental rights. When reviewing findings of fact and conclusions of law entered in a case involving a termination of parental rights, we apply a twotiered standard of review. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. (citation omitted). We will set aside the trial courts judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. (citing In re Wardship of B.C., 441 N.E.2d 208, 211 (Ind. 1982)). A judgment is "clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial courts conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment." Id. (quoting In re Matter of R.J., 829 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)).

Indiana Code

Download Term. of Parent-Child Rel. of G.Y.; R.Y. v. IDCS.pdf

Indiana Law