Preview:

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: SHAWNA D. WEBSTER Webster & Webster, LLC Vincennes, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: JILL DEWIG WESCH Evansville, Indiana

FILED
May 05 2009, 9:46 am
of the supreme court, court of appeals and tax court

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS OF S.S., M.H., and D.C., Minor Children, and SHARON C., Mother, and DAVID S., ALBERT H. and RICK C., Fathers. SHARON C., Appellant-Respondent, vs. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, KNOX COUNTY Appellee-Petitioner. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

CLERK

No. 42A02-0810-JV-876

APPEAL FROM THE KNOX SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable W. Timothy Crowley, Judge Cause Nos. 42D01-0710-JT-10, 42D01-0710-JT-11 and 42D01-0710-JT-12

May 5, 2009

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

CRONE, Judge

Appellant Sharon C. ("Mother") appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to her children S.S., M.H., and D.C. (collectively, "the children"). Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial courts judgment. We affirm. Mother is the biological mother of four children, including S.S., born on August 7, 1996, D.C., born on November 3, 1999, and M.H., born on October 31, 2001.1 On July 26, 2005, S.S., M.H., and D.C. were removed from Mothers care when the Knox County Department of Child Services ("KCDCS") received a report that Mother, who was homeless, had left the children in the care of a friend for several days and the friend could no longer care for them. Mothers whereabouts at the time the children taken into custody were unknown. This incident was not the first time the KCDCS had been involved with Mother and the children. In November 2003, the KCDCS began receiving reports concerning "life and health endangering" due to the cleanliness of the children and lack of supervision. Tr. at 86. The children were removed from Mothers care in February 2004 and later found to be in need of services ("CHINS") after authorities found the children alone at home while both parents were working. At the time, the oldest child, S.S., was seven years old. The parents participated in services, and the CHINS case was successfully closed in January 2005. In February and March of 2005, however, the KCDCS began to receive reports alleging the children were not being appropriately supervised and that there was no heat in the family
Mothers fourth child, R.S., Jr., is not subject to these proceedings. Additionally, we observe that S.S., M.H., and D.C. have different biological fathers. The parental rights of each of the childrens respective biological fathers have been involuntarily terminated, and none of the fathers participate in this appeal. Consequently, we limit our recitation of the facts to those pertinent solely to Mothers appeal.
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home. The KCDCS subsequently entered into an informal adjustment2 with Mother, and services were again provided to assist Mother in caring for the children. This informal adjustment was terminated as unsuccessful, and the current CHINS case was initiated in July 2005. Returning to the facts of the underlying case, following the childrens emergency removal, a detention hearing was held on July 27, 2005. The children were made temporary wards of the KCDCS and were placed in foster care. On August 10, 2005, the KCDCS filed a petition alleging the children were CHINS, and, following a dispositional hearing held on November 16, 2005, the trial court issued an order formally removing the children from Mothers care and ordering her to successfully complete a number of services in order to achieve reunification with the children. Specifically, Mother was ordered to, among other things: (1) obtain and maintain safe and adequate housing; (2) participate in individual and family counseling; (3) cooperate with the KCDCS and follow all recommendations made by KCDCS staff; (4) participate in visitation as directed by the KCDCS; and (5) participate in counseling at the Samaritan Center and comply with all recommendations made by her therapist. Mothers participation in court-ordered services was inconsistent throughout the duration of the CHINS case. Initially, Mother obtained employment and housing with functioning utilities. Additionally, Mother regularly participated in supervised visitation,

An informal adjustment is a negotiated agreement between the family and a county Department of Child Services (here, KCDCS) wherein the family agrees to participate in various services, provided by the county, in an effort to prevent the children from being formally deemed CHINS.

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and, as a result of this progress, her visitation privileges were increased to unsupervised weekend visits. On or about December 16, 2005, visitation reverted to supervised office visits because the gas in Mothers home was shut off. Mother did not visit with the children again until January 20, 2006. During supervised visits, Mothers interactions with the children, at times, would go well. Oftentimes, however, Mother seemed unaware of what was going on around her, and supervisors had to repeatedly prompt Mother to redirect the childrens behavior. Mother was also unable to successfully demonstrate the parenting techniques she had learned during parenting classes without coaxing from the visitation supervisors. Notwithstanding Mothers inconsistencies, by March 2007, Mother had again progressed to unsupervised visits with the children. Visitation privileges reverted to supervised visits in August 2007, however, after the KCDCS received multiple reports from neighbors that the children had been observed roaming around the neighborhood unsupervised and after Mother admitted she had recently taken the children to a nearby gravel pit to swim, even though swimming in the gravel pit was prohibited, neither she nor any of the children could swim, and no one was wearing life vests. Mothers housing, employment, participation in drug screens, and attendance at substance abuse counseling were also inconsistent. Throughout the CHINS case, Mother lived in several residences, including a house, a rented trailer, and in friends homes. Mothers employment included a five-month employment stint with Perdue, four months at Pizza Hut, six months with Excell, three months with Westaff, a temporary job-placement

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agency, as well as several seasonal farm-related jobs. Mother began treatment for substance abuse at Samaritan Center on January 30, 2006, but failed to complete all sessions and was discharged from the program as unsuccessful. Mother also failed to regularly meet with her parent aide and to maintain contact with her KCDCS case manager. Due to Mothers continuing refusal to comply with court-ordered services and to maintain contact with the KCDCS, the KCDCS eventually filed a petition requesting the involuntary termination of Mothers parental rights to the children on October 22, 2007. A factfinding hearing on the termination petition was held on July 31, 2008, after which the trial court took the matter under advisement. On August 29, 2008, the trial court entered judgments terminating Mothers parental rights to S.S., M.H., and D.C. under three separate cause numbers. This appeal ensued. Mother asserts that the trial courts judgments ordering the involuntary termination of her parental rights to S.S., M.H., and D.C. are not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Specifically, Mother claims the KCDCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in the childrens removal will not be remedied and that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the childrens well-being. We begin our review by acknowledging that this Court has long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases concerning the termination of parental rights. In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Thus, when reviewing the termination of parental rights, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the

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witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Here, the trial court made specific findings and conclusions in its judgments terminating Mothers parental rights. Where the trial court enters specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we must first determine whether the evidence supports the findings. Id. Then, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We will not set aside the trial courts judgment terminating parental rights unless it is clearly erroneous. Rowlett v. Vanderburgh County Office of Family & Children, 841 N.E.2d 615, 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. A finding is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom that support it. D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 264. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the findings of fact do not support the trial courts conclusions thereon, or if the conclusions do not support the judgment. Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). "The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution." In re M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. These parental interests, however, are not absolute and must be subordinated to the childrens interests when determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id. Thus, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. K.S., 750 N.E.2d at 836.

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In order to terminate a parent-child relationship, the State is required to allege, among other things, that: (B) there is a reasonable probability that: (i) the conditions that resulted in the childs removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied; or (ii) the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child; termination is in the best interests of the child; and there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

(C) (D)

Ind. Code

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