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Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

FILED
Dec 29 2010, 9:04 am
of the supreme court, court of appeals and tax court

CLERK

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MATTHEW JON MCGOVERN Evansville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: GREGORY F. ZOELLER Attorney General of Indiana ANDREW R. FALK Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
WILLIAM ROBERTS, Appellant-Defendant, vs. STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee-Plaintiff. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

No. 22A05-1002-CR-119

APPEAL FROM THE FLOYD SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Maria D. Granger, Judge Cause No. 22D03-0904-FA-966

December 29, 2010

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

NAJAM, Judge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE William Roberts appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to set aside his guilty plea. He presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether the withdrawal of his plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On April 20, 2009, Roberts went to Tyson Brownlee's house in Floyd County to purchase "pills and perhaps marijuana[.]" Transcript at 48. Earlier, Roberts had

discussed with Brandon Spalding that Roberts would let Spalding know when Roberts arrived at Brownlee's house. Roberts agreed to that arrangement knowing that Spalding planned to go to Brownlee's house with a group of men who intended to "beat up" Brownlee. Id. at 49. Roberts was present when Spalding and the others arrived and kicked in the door to Brownlee's house. Brownlee and Roberts were upstairs at the time. As Brownlee went downstairs to confront the intruders, Roberts struck Brownlee on the head and pushed him down the stairs. Once Brownlee was on the ground floor, Spalding and the other men attacked Brownlee. Roberts left Brownlee's house while the other men continued to beat Brownlee. After Roberts left, Brownlee also fled the scene, and the other men chased him and fired guns at him, but Brownlee evaded the bullets. The State charged Roberts with attempted murder, a Class A felony, and criminal confinement, as a Class C felony. On October 14, 2009, Roberts entered into a plea agreement whereby he pleaded guilty to attempted aggravated battery, a Class B felony, with a ten-year executed sentencing cap, in exchange for the State dismissing the other
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charges. The trial court held a guilty plea hearing and accepted Roberts' guilty plea. Shortly thereafter, Roberts changed his mind about his plea and wrote the trial court a letter, which was filed with the court on October 23. In that letter, Roberts maintained his innocence, stated that his attorney had pressured him into pleading guilty, and asked that new counsel be assigned. The trial court ordered that substitute counsel be appointed prior to sentencing. On December 11, Roberts filed his motion to set aside his plea agreement in which he asserted his innocence and alleged that his mother and his guilty plea trial counsel had pressured him into pleading guilty. Following a hearing, the trial court denied that motion, entered judgment of conviction, and sentenced Roberts accordingly. This appeal ensued. DISCUSSION AND DECISION Roberts contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to set aside his guilty plea. In particular, Roberts maintains that withdrawal of his plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. We cannot agree. In Fletcher v. State, 649 N.E.2d 1022, 1023 (Ind. 1995), our supreme court set out the applicable law as follows: Pursuant to Indiana Code

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