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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 116 / 04-1986 Filed April 20, 2007 ALLIANT ENERGY-INTERSTATE POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, INTERSTATE POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, INTERSTATE POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, f/k/a IES UTILITIES, INC., and/or ALLIANT ENERGY CORPORATION, Appellees, vs. BO DUCKETT, a/k/a MARY DUCKETT, f/k/a MARY E. JEAMBEY, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Dale E. Ruigh, Judge.

Appeal from summary judgment on a claim for indemnification. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Merrill C. Swartz and John B. Grier of Cartwright, Druker & Ryden, Marshalltown, for appellant.

David R. Schlee and Truman K. Eldridge, Jr., of Schlee, Huber, McMullen & Krause, P.C., Kansas City, Missouri, and Stephen J. Powell and Jim D. DeKoster of Swisher & Cohrt, P.L.C., Waterloo, for appellees.

2 CADY, Justice. In this appeal, we must construe a natural gas utility's tariff that provides for indemnity. The district court granted summary judgment

for the utility, and awarded it indemnity from the customer. We reverse and remand. I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Alex Saunders died from a natural gas explosion that occurred in his apartment on April 9, 2001. The apartment was located in Ames, and was part of a three-plex unit created from an old two-story singlefamily dwelling. Bo Duckett (Duckett) purchased the apartment building in 1984, and maintained it until the time of the explosion. Duckett

generally performed the light-duty maintenance on the building, but contracted out most of the electrical, plumbing and furnace work. One contractor was Ames Heating and Cooling, which inspected and maintained the wall furnace in Alex Saunders's living room. The furnace received natural gas through a connector pipe, which served as the connection between the furnace and the home's natural gas distribution pipe. The explosion was the result of a natural gas leak from the

connector pipe, but the specific reason for its failure remains unknown. The connector pipe was manufactured and installed some thirty-six years earlier. Alliant Energy Corporation (Alliant) 1 supplied natural gas to the multi-family residence, but did not design, manufacture, sell, supply or otherwise handle the connector responsible for the leak.

is the parent company of another named defendant, Interstate Power & Light Company. As the trial court and parties have done throughout these proceedings, we will refer to both companies as Alliant. Alliant, of course, was also formerly known as IES Utilities.

1Alliant

3 In July of 2002, the Estate of Saunders (Saunders) sued Alliant for Alex Saunders's death. The theories of liability included negligence

(relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor), and breach of express and implied warranty. Alliant denied the claims in its answer. Alliant also filed a cross-claim against Duckett, alleging it was entitled to

indemnification or contribution from Duckett if it paid a claim to Saunders for any amount. Saunders then amended the petition to assert claims against Alliant, Duckett, and Ames Heating and Cooling for wrongful death under theories of negligence, breach of contract, breaches of express and implied warranties, and loss of spousal consortium. Alliant answered the amended petition and expressly denied any liability, but sought indemnity from Duckett if it was in fact deemed liable to Saunders for any amount. Duckett also filed answers to Saunders'

petition and Alliant's cross-claim, and denied liability, claiming the decedent and other defendants were at fault. The case never went to trial. Saunders settled the claims against Alliant, Duckett, and Ames Heating and Cooling for $325,000. 2 Alliant's cross-claim against Duckett, however, survived. 3 Thereafter, Duckett

and Alliant filed motions for summary judgment regarding the crossclaim. Alliant ultimately relied on section 5.12 of a tariff filed with the Iowa Utilities Board (IUB) to support its claim for indemnity from Duckett. In her first motion for summary judgment, Duckett claimed

Alliant's settlement was based solely on its own fault, and the tariff did not specifically allow Alliant to be indemnified for its own fault. Alliant's

settled for $25,000 and Alliant and Ames Heating and Cooling settled for $150,000 each.
3The Settlement Agreement with Alliant specifically reserved the claim of indemnification against Duckett.

2Duckett

4 motion for summary judgment alleged there was no genuine issue of material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Duckett filed a second motion for summary judgment and argued Alliant had no right to indemnity because Alliant must prove it was liable to Saunders and it had failed to do so. Based on the record, the district court denied Duckett's motions for summary judgment, and granted judgment for Alliant. The district court interpreted the tariff to entitle Alliant to indemnification regardless of who was at fault. The district court noted there was no genuine claim that Alliant was at fault for the explosion because "the existing record contains no evidence of Alliant's negligence or fault in causing the April 9, 2001, explosion and resulting damages." The district court also held the settlement was reasonable. Duckett then filed an Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) motion and a motion to dismiss. She argued the district court lacked the

authority to hear the case, and reiterated that Alliant had to prove it was liable because it could not be indemnified if it was not at fault. district court denied the motions. On appeal, Duckett claims the district court erroneously granted Alliant's motion for summary judgment because Iowa law and public policy considerations forbid indemnification in this case, and even if indemnification is allowed under the terms of the tariff, Alliant cannot be indemnified because Alliant did not prove it was liable to Saunders. Duckett additionally argues that if Alliant did not have to prove it was liable, then we should remand the case to the district court to allow her to prove that Alliant was liable to Saunders. Finally, Duckett claims the district court should have granted her motion to dismiss because the The

5 IUB, not the district court, had jurisdiction and authority over the indemnity claim. II. Standard of Review.

A district court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed for the correction of errors at law. Kistler v. City of Perry, 719 N.W.2d 804, 805 (Iowa 2006) (citing Campbell v. Delbridge, 670 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Iowa 2003)). "Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no

genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. Our review of a district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is also for errors at law. Ritz v. Wapello County Bd. of Supervisors, 595 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Iowa 1999) (citing Iowa R. App. P. 4; McCormick v. Meyer, 582 N.W.2d 141, 144 (Iowa 1998)). "Ultimately, `our decision to overrule or sustain a motion to dismiss must rest on legal grounds.' " Trobaugh v. Sondag, 668 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Iowa 2003) (quoting Haupt v. Miller, 514 N.W.2d 905, 907 (Iowa 1994)). III. Duckett's Jurisdictional Challenge.

Alliant claims we need not address Duckett's challenge to the jurisdiction of the court to hear the cross-claim because Duckett waived the challenge. We have stated previously: When a party claims a jurisdictional challenge has been waived, it is often necessary to determine whether the specific challenge to jurisdiction targets subject matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction of a particular case. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the authority of the court to hear and determine the general class of cases to which the proceeding belongs. It cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, or estoppel. This is because parties to a lawsuit cannot establish jurisdiction where it has not been first conferred by the constitution or legislation. On the other hand, the failure to properly invoke the authority of the court in a particular case can be obviated by consent, waiver, or estoppel.

6 Keokuk County v. H.B., 593 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Iowa 1999). Based on

Duckett's arguments, it is difficult to determine whether her objection "targets subject matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction of a particular case." 4 In her motion to dismiss, 5 Duckett argued the IUB had "exclusive jurisdiction" of Alliant's cross-claim and a party could raise "subject matter jurisdiction" at any time. She also argued the IUB retained Accordingly, Duckett

"primary enforcement authority" of the matter.

argued the summary judgment against her should be void. 6 The district court properly noted Duckett's motion to dismiss referred to separate jurisdictional concepts that are not identical. Duckett still refers to her argument In her appellate brief, as one based on

"jurisdiction/authority." Thus, we find it once again "helpful at this juncture to point out the difference between a court's subject matter jurisdiction and its authority." State v. Emery, 636 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Iowa 2001). "Subject matter jurisdiction refers to `the authority of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong, not merely the particular case then occupying the court's
the sentence implies, "jurisdiction of a particular case" does not mean subject matter jurisdiction. See Christie v. Rolscreen, 448 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Iowa 1989) ("Sometimes we have referred to `lack of authority to hear the particular case' as lack of jurisdiction of the case." (Citation omitted.)). Instead, jurisdiction of the case refers to the court's authority to hear the specific or particular case. See State v. Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d 538, 540 (Iowa 2006) (noting " `lack of jurisdiction of the case[]' occurs when the court has subject matter jurisdiction but may not be able to act in a particular case for some reason" (citing Christie, 448 N.W.2d at 450)). also filed a rule 1.904(2) motion that argued the district court lacked jurisdiction/authority. argument that a judgment is void is an argument based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, not authority. See In re Estate of Falck, 672 N.W.2d 785, 791 (Iowa 2003) (noting the lack of subject matter jurisdiction renders a judgment void and subject to collateral attack, whereas lack of authority simply makes the judgment voidable).
6An 5Duckett 4As

7 attention.' " Christie, 448 N.W.2d at 450 (emphasis added) (quoting "A court may

Wederath v. Brant, 287 N.W.2d 591, 594 (Iowa 1980)).

have subject matter jurisdiction but for one reason or another may not be able to entertain a particular case. In such a situation we say the court lacks authority to hear that particular case." Emery, 636 N.W.2d at 119. Importantly, "[a] court may lack authority to hear a particular case `where a party fails to follow the statutory procedures for invoking the court's authority.' " Id. (quoting Shrier v. State, 573 N.W.2d 242, 244

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