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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA No. 8-873 / 07-2026 Filed December 31, 2008

CITY OF LAKE VIEW, IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PATRICK L. HOUSTON, Defendant-Appellant, MILTON D. MEYER, BEVERLY MEYER and JOAN W. CRAIG, Defendants. ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Sac County, William C. Ostlund, Judge.

Patrick L. Houston appeals from the district courts adverse ruling in a quiet title action. REVERSED AND DISMISSED.

Charles L. Corbett of Corbett, Anderson, Corbett, & Vellinga, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellant. Erin E. McCullough of Law Firm of Erin E. McCullough, Lake View, for appellee.

Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Eisenhauer and Doyle, JJ.

2 DOYLE, J. This dispute centers on a 33-foot by 110-foot strip of undeveloped land that abuts Black Hawk Lake in Sac County, Iowa (disputed property). Patrick L. Houston appeals from the district courts adverse ruling quieting title to the disputed property in the City of Lake View, Iowa (Lake View). Houston contends Lake Views action to quiet title is barred by Iowas Marketable Record Title Act, Iowa Code sections 614.29-.38 (2007), among other things. Additionally,

Houston contends Lake Views experts testimony should not have been received as evidence of title to the property in question. Upon our de novo review, we reverse the judgment of the district court and dismiss Lake Views petition to quiet title. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. In 1874 Sac County ordered that numerous county roads be established on certain section lines in Wall Lake Township. Relevant here is a roadway described to run north and south. The north end of the roadway begins at the northwest corner of Section Three, runs south on the section lines, and ends at Black Hawk Lake (formerly known as Wall Lake) in Sections Thirty-three and Thirty-four.1 The centerline of the roadway is on the section lines and the

roadway (right-of-way) extends 33 feet into each adjacent section, thus making the roadway 66 feet wide. At some point, a road was built on the roadway. However, the road ends approximately 120 feet from the lakes shore. At issue in this case is the eastern

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Section Thirty-four abuts Section Thirty-three to the east, so, its western border is Section Thirty-threes eastern border.

3 half of the roadway (33 feet), located in Section Thirty-four, beginning at the lake shore and extending 110 feet north towards the road. It is undisputed that the disputed property is included in the roadway established by Sac County in 1874, but was never used as a road. Lake View is located in Sac County on the north and west sides of Black Hawk Lake. It presently includes portions of Sections Thirty-two, Thirty-three, and Thirty-four in Wall Lake Township. On October 29, 1964, Houston was conveyed by warranty deed a one-half interest to certain property located in Sac County, Iowa, including the disputed property.2 The warranty deed sets forth the legal description of the property conveyed as follows: All of government lots 1 & 2 in Section 34-[Township 87-Range 36] lying south of the Iowa State Conservation Commission Road as said road was platted and staked across the southwest quarter . . . of said Section by said Conservation Commission in 1936, excepting . . . [certain described tracts and parcels]. Although Houstons deed encompasses the disputed property, Houston was not assessed property taxes on the disputed property by Sac County until approximately 1998, after the Sac County Assessor received a title opinion from the Sac County Attorney opining that the disputed property was owned by Houston.3 Houston acknowledged that he never really made a claim to the

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At some point Houston purchased the other one-half interest in the property from his co-owner. We therefore only refer to Houston as the owner of the land set out in the 1964 deed. 3 The title opinion was admitted into evidence at the trial without any objection by the parties and without any testimony concerning it. Although the title opinion states it was performed by the Sac County Attorney for "Erin McCullough, P.C.," it is unknown as to why McCullough requested the title opinion as there was no testimony concerning the title opinion offered at trial. Furthermore, although McCullough is presently Lake Views attorney, there is no reference in the title opinion or testimony here to establish that

4 disputed property until he began paying taxes on the property. Nevertheless, Houston asserted he maintained the property over the years.4 Over time, he sold off all of the property he purchased in 1964 except for the disputed property.5 On July 17, 2006, Lake View filed a petition to quiet title to the disputed property. Lake View claimed it was the absolute owner of the disputed property and that its rights in the disputed property were superior to any interest held by Houston. Houston denied Lake Views claim, and asserted that he was the true and lawful owner of the real estate. Houston later amended his answer to assert that Lake Views claim was barred by Iowas Marketable Record Title Act and that Lake View was equitably estopped from maintaining its quiet title action against him. The matter proceeded to trial. Lake View defended its title to the disputed property based primarily upon two recorded plats. The first was the Denison Beach plat. In 1916 the "Plat of the Denison Beach" was recorded. The land designated in this plat is located just north of Black Hawk Lake in Section Thirtythree, west of the disputed property. This plat included lines depicting the

roadway, and the roadway is expressly identified in the plat as the "North [and] south highway." The platted area does not include the disputed property. In 1932 Denison Beach was re-platted, and the "Lake View, Iowa. Official Plat of

McCullough in requesting the opinion was acting in her capacity as Lake Views attorney. Consequently, based upon the record before us, we cannot conclude that Lake View had notice of this title opinion. 4 He testified he mowed the property every year until he sold the other properties and thereafter mowed it when he thought it needed it until 2003. He also used the property to store a pontoon boat lift in the late 1990s or the early 2000s. He fenced the property twice. 5 He sold part of the property in the late 1960s, part in 1972, and the remainder soon thereafter.

5 Denison Beach as Re-Platted from Survey 1932" was recorded in 1933. Although this plat also includes lines depicting the roadway, the re-platted area does not include the disputed property. The second plat relied on by Lake View was the Lakewood Park plat. In 1937 Lake View annexed a certain parcel of land designated as "Lakewood Park" upon application of the parcels landowners. This parcel of land is just north of Black Hawk Lake in Section Thirty-four, immediately east of the Denison Beach plat, and north and east of the disputed property. The landowners application sets out the parcels legal description, which among other things describes the parcel as being a part of Government Lot 1. Attached to the landowners

application were plats of their parcel in Lakewood Park dated March 1933 and May 1933. Both plats reference Government Lot 1 and also include lines Lake View

depicting the roadway and identifying the lines as a highway.

approved the landowners application in 1937, and the land described in the application was subsequently annexed to Lake View and the plats recorded. From the evidence presented, it does not appear that the disputed property is a part of the platted area of Lakewood Park. Additionally, over Houstons objection, Lake View presented expert testimony regarding ownership of the disputed property. Lake Views expert

opined that Lake View was the owner of the disputed property, based upon his examination of Houstons abstract for the disputed property.6 The expert testified that because Houstons deed referred to Government Lots 1 and 2, a title examiner was obliged to consider plats relating to Government Lots 1 and 2.
6

Houstons abstract was not offered into evidence.

6 The expert further testified that in examining Houstons abstract, he found "a plat on file that showed up in the chain of title setting forth Government Lots 1 and 2, and that particular plat did show the [roadway] on the [disputed property]."7 On cross-examination, the expert explained that this plat was a fourth plat, and not the 1916 and 1932 Denison Beach plats or the 1933 Lakewood Park plat admitted into evidence. The expert further testified that the "Lakewood Park plat" was in Houstons chain of title.8 Lake Views expert acknowledged that

Houstons deed did not specifically refer to the Denison Beach plats or the 1933 Lakewood Park plat recorded in 1937.9 On November 5, 2007, the district court entered its ruling, concluding that title of the disputed property rested with Lake View. The court determined that "the recorded plats clearly identify the road and all plats involved were recorded

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This plat was not offered into evidence. We do not know when the plat was created or what it depicts. 8 It is unclear from the record and the experts testimony how the expert concluded th at the 1933 Lakewood Park plat was part of Houstons record chain of title. 9 The experts testimony was at times confusing and conflicting. He testified the roadway was referenced on the 1916 and 1932 Denison Beach plats and the 1933 Lakewood Park plat. He admitted the Denison Beach plats are not referred to in Houstons deed and are not in the chain of title to the disputed property. (Denison Beach is in Section Thirty-three, not Thirty-four.) He also admitted Houstons deed made no reference by name to the 1933 Lakewood Park plat filed in 1937. Then the attorneys and the expert appeared to refer to the Lakewood Park and the Lakewood Park Addition plats interchangeably. The "Lake Wood Park Addition" (platted in 1955), referenced in an exclusion in Houstons deed, is not a part of the record. The expert was asked: "And [the disputed property is] not in the Lakewood Park Addition[?]" He answered: Not in the addition, no. But its in the Lakewood Park addition is [sic] and that chain of title because its--in Section thirty-four and government lots 1 and 2, I think the Lakewood Addition is out of those particular lots, so I mean it is in the chain of title. The expert testified earlier that: And then the Lakewood plat which was filed in 1937, and, as I recall, also shows government lot 1 in part and also shows . . . the road. So the reason that I believe title is in the City of Lake View is I think the 1964 deed to Houston . . . is subject to whats shown on that plat.

7 prior to the deed transferring this lot to [Houston]. Therefore, [Houston] took title subject to the road," citing Fencl v. City of Harpers Ferry, 620 N.W.2d 808 (Iowa 2000). Additionally, the court explained: [T]his Court is persuaded that . . . [Houston] was on notice that a portion of Government Lot 1 had been platted and a road running to the shore of [Black Hawk] Lake had been dedicated to the City on the plat. The Lakewood Park Plat is part of the chain of title to the property acquired by [Houston]. The deed that transferred to him includes the road shown on that plat. The court also concluded that Lake View did not abandon the disputed property. Based upon its ruling quieting title in Lake View, the court ordered that Lake View reimburse Houston for the property taxes he paid on the disputed property. Houston appeals. Houston contends Lake Views action to quiet title to the disputed property is barred by Iowas Marketable Record Title Act, among other things. Additionally, Houston contends Lake Views experts testimony

should not have been received as evidence of title to the property in question. II. Scope and Standards of Review. Our review of an action to quiet title is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; Garrett v. Huster, 684 N.W.2d 250, 253 (Iowa 2004). "We have the responsibility to examine the facts as well as the law and to decide anew the issues properly presented." City of Marquette v. Gaede, 672 N.W.2d 829, 833 (Iowa 2003). In equity cases, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, we give weight to the fact findings of the district court, but are not bound by them. Id.; Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g). conclusions of law. We are also not bound by the district courts To the extent

City of Marquette, 672 N.W.2d at 833.

Houston claims the district court erred in admitting Lake Views expert testimony,

8 our review is for abuse of discretion. In re Detention of Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002). III. Discussion. A. Expert Testimony. Preliminarily, we address Houstons argument that Lake Views experts testimony should not have been received as evidence of title to the property in question. "The general rule in this jurisdiction is one of liberality in the admission of opinion evidence." State v. Halstead, 362 N.W.2d 504, 506 (Iowa 1985). As stated above, we only reverse when there is a clear abuse of discretion. Id. The defendant must also be prejudiced by the testimony. N.W.2d 30, 32 (Iowa 1991). The rules of evidence permit expert testimony if it will be helpful to the trier of fact. Iowa Rs. Evid. 5.701, 5.702. Furthermore, "[t]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." Iowa R. Evid. 5.704. Nevertheless, "a witness cannot opine on a legal conclusion or whether the facts of the case meet a given legal standard." In re Detention of Palmer, 691 N.W.2d 413, 419 (Iowa 2005) (citing Iowa R. Evid. 5.704 advisory committee comment). Here, there is no question that Lake Views expert, an attorney, opined as to ownership of the property, the ultimate issue to be decided by the court. However, even assuming without deciding that the experts opinion should not have been admitted at trial, we find no prejudice to Houston upon our de novo review. Although the court in its ruling concurred with the experts conclusion, it State v. Brown, 470

9 appears that the court did not base its decision upon the experts conclusions of law. Consequently, we find no reversible error in the admission of the experts testimony. B. Iowa's Marketable Record Title Act. Houston next contends that Lake Views action to quiet title to the disputed property is barred by Iowas Marketable Record Title Act (MRTA), commonly known as the forty-year act. For the following reasons, we agree. "As time passes, longer chains of title are inevitable. Longer chains of title require more extensive examinations and involve more complex appraisals in connection with each transfer." Paul E. Basye, Clearing Land Titles

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