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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA No. 2-366 / 11-1242 Filed June 13, 2012

GILBERT JOHN HART and DONNA FLOWERS, Plaintiffs-Appellees, vs. CARSON CUSICK d/b/a A GOOD PLUMBER, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Fremont County, Kathleen A. Kilnoski, Judge.

Carson Cusick appeals the district court's denial of his postjudgment application for trial attorney fees and other motions, as well as the interest calculated on the judgment by the district court. AFFIRMED.

Alan H. Kirshen, Red Oak, for appellant. Edward E. (Gene) Eaton of Eaton Law Firm, Sidney, for appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Danilson, JJ.

2 DOYLE, J. Carson Cusick appeals the district court's denial of his post -judgment application for trial attorney fees and other motions. He also asserts

prejudgment interest should be calculated on a compound rather than a simple basis. We affirm. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. On June 2, 2009, Carson Cusick filed a mechanic's lien against Gilbert Hart and his daughter Donna Flowers (collectively the plaintiffs) for labor he performed and materials he furnished at the plaintiffs' residence pursuant to a contract between the parties. The lien stated $6281.31 was owed by the

plaintiffs, "together with interest as provided in the . . . Contract at 1.5% per month (18%) from and after March 27, 2009 for which sum and interest, costs and attorneys fees as provided by law . . . ." An invoice for the labor and

materials was attached, stating the total due was $6281.31. It further stated, "1.5% interest per month will be accrued if no payment is received. 18% per annum. Legal fees may be applied to the customer's bill if necessary." The contract was signed by Hart. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a petition in district court, later amended, to cancel the mechanic's lien and to request damages for alleged defective work by Cusick in 2007. Cusick answered and filed a counterclaim seeking, among other things, foreclosure of the mechanic's lien plus interest, costs, and attorney fees. The plaintiffs filed their answer in response to Cusick's counterclaims, generally denying Cusick's claims.

3 Following a trial1 on the matter, the district court on June 1, 2011, entered its findings, conclusions, and judgment ruling in Cusick's favor. The court

dismissed the plaintiffs' petition to cancel the lien and to request damages, an d it ordered that Cusick's lien be foreclosed. The court's order stated: "[J]udgment is entered in the amount of $6281.31, with accruing interest at the rate of 1.5% per month from June 2, 2009, through May 27, 2011; and post-judgment interest at the rate of 2.26%." The court ordered that court costs be assessed against the plaintiffs. The ruling did not address Cusick's request for attorney fees. Cusick did not file a 1.904(2) motion to amend or enlarge the court's ruling to address his request for attorney fees. The plaintiffs did not appeal the court's ruling and judgment. On June 28, 2011, Cusick filed an "application for order to permit inspection and entry upon [the plaintiffs'] property and other relief." The

application stated the plaintiffs owed a total of $8954.20 plus post-judgment interest at a rate of 2.26% from the date of the court's ruling. The plaintiffs resisted. Attached to their resistance was a letter from the plaintiffs' attorney dated June 27, 2011, sent to Cusick's attorney. The letter stated, in relevant part: We are willing to offer in full settlement of the judgment interest and costs the sum of $8624.28 which according to our calculations would be the amount required to fully discharge the judgment, interest and costs. That amount has been deposited by Heartland Community Bank into my trust accountant [sic] and will be first applied to court costs, with balance being remitted to your client upon his agreement to accept same and to execute a release and satisfaction of judgment and release of the mechanic's lien to be filed with the clerk of court.
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We do not have the benefit of a trial transcript.

4 Referring to your letter, your calculation of the pre-judgment interest is incorrect according to my calculations and the [bank's]. I don't know how you calculated it but there would be no compounding, either monthly or annually. The [bank] and I both agreed that the prejudgment interest would be $2242.69. The post judgment interest accrues at the daily per diem rate of $0.52. On that basis, the [post-judgment] interest accrual . . . would be $20.28. . . . [T]he only court costs to be paid are $80.00 . . . . The court did not allow attorney's fee and Section 572.32 which you cited in your letter makes such allowances permissive, not mandatory. . . . [W]e are tendering this amount in full payment of the judgment, interest and costs and request that your client agree to accept this . . . . I will then pay the court costs and send you a check for the balance payable to both you and your client. On July 11, 2011, Cusick filed an "application for assessment of attorney's fees." Attached to the application was an affidavit of Cusick's attorney and an itemized statement showing 122 hours of work at a rate of $110 dollars per hour plus a previous balance of $2165.90, for a total amount due of $15,585.90. The application asserted that attorney fees were "required by Iowa Code Sections 572.32 and 625.22 [(2009)].2 Cusick also filed a "Bill of Costs and Attorney's Fees," which set forth several amounts he claimed were du e as costs, including attorney fees, postage, copying, and deposition costs. Additionally, Cusick filed a "praecipe for special execution" requesting the sheriff be instructed to sell the plaintiffs' residence to satisfy the judgment. The plaintiffs resisted all of Cusick's motions and filed a motion to quash Cusick's praecipe for special execution.

The application also asserted that the plaintiffs' claims about defective work performed by Cusick in 2007 were spurious, frivolous, and in bad faith bordering on fraud intended to delay the trial, and as a result required a large additional amount of Cusick's attorney's time and efforts, both prior to and at trial. However, Cusick abandoned this claim on appeal. We accordingly do not address it.

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5 An unreported hearing on Cusick's motions was held July 18, 2011. That same day, the district court entered its order dismissing Cusick's motions. Concerning attorney fees, the court's ruling stated: [The court's] judgment . . . was filed on June 1, 2011. No appeal was taken from that judgment. No motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904 was timely made. The judgment was final before [Cusick] filed his application for attorney fees. The court declines to award attorney fees for this reason. The court further found: Even if [Cusick's] claim for attorney fees was timely, . . . the attorney fees [requested] of $15,585.90 are not reasonable in this counterclaim to enforce a mechanic's lien totaling $6281.31. This was not a case of first impression. It was not legally complicated. The claim for attorney fees is unreasonable. The court also denied Cusick's application to inspect the plaintiffs' premises and stated: "[The plaintiffs] are willing and able to satisfy the judgment. [Cusick] has chosen not to be satisfied." The court specifically ordered that Cusick's

"application for attorney fees and his bill of costs are denied," and it quashed Cusick's praecipe for special execution and dictation to sheriff. assessed court costs against the plaintiffs. Cusick now appeals. II. Scope and Standards of Review. We review the district court's decision that it was not authorized to award attorney fees for errors at law. FNBC Iowa, Inc. v. Jennessey Group, L.L.C., 759 N.W.2d 808, 810 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008). "Our review of the interest issues is for error at law." Opperman v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 652 N.W.2d 139, 142 (Iowa 2002). The court

6 III. Discussion. On appeal, Cusick contends the district court erred in not awarding him attorney fees, in calculating the amount of interest due on the judgment, and in quashing Cusick's praecipe for special execution. We address his arguments in turn. A. Trial Attorney Fees. Attorney fees are generally not allowable in the absence of statute or an agreement by the party to be charged. Van Sloun v. Agans Bros., Inc., 778 N.W.2d 174, 182 (Iowa 2010). Cusick submits he is entitled to attorney fees under one, or both, of two statutes. The mechanic's lien statute provides: "In a court action to enforce a mechanic's lien, if the plaintiff furnished materials directly to the defendant, a prevailing plaintiff may be awarded reasonable attorney fees." Iowa Code

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