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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA No. 7-652 / 06-2088 Filed September 19, 2007 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF RUSSEL ROY HART AND DEBRA K. HART Upon the Petition of RUSSEL ROY HART, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. And Concerning DEBRA K. HART, Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jackson County, Charles H. Pelton, Judge.

Respondent appeals from the economic provisions of the parties' decree of dissolution of marriage. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

Sean Iske and Bradley Norton of Bradley L. Norton, Attorney at Law, P.L.C., Clarence, for appellant. Robert Sudmeier of Fuerste, Carew, Coyle, Juergens & Sudmeier, P.C., Dubuque, for appellee.

Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Eisenhauer, JJ.

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SACKETT, C.J. Debra K. Hart appeals, challenging the economic provisions of the decree dissolving her ten-year marriage to Russell Roy Hart. We affirm as modified. SCOPE OF REVIEW. Our review is de novo. Zinger v. Zinger, 243

N.W.2d 639, 640 (Iowa 1976). In undertaking our review, we examine the entire record and decide anew the issues properly presented. See In re Marriage of Steenhoek, 305 N.W.2d 448, 452 (Iowa 1981). Although this court is not bound by the findings of the trial court, we give weight to them. Id. BACKGROUND. The parties were married in May of 1996. They

separated in November of 2005 and their marriage was dissolved on October 31, 2006. No children were born to the marriage. Russell was fifty-eight at the time of trial. A high school graduate, he drives trucks and also has farmed. He estimated he would have earnings of $52,000 in 2006. This is higher than his prior years' earnings. Debra, fifty-one, also apparently is a high school graduate. She primarily worked in minimum wage jobs but had not been employed for five years at the time of the dissolution. Debra's heart was damaged from rheumatic fever she suffered as a child and she has had surgery in an attempt to correct the defect. She also has some memory problems. She receives social security disability payments of $840 a month and is qualified for Medicare. At the time of the dissolution the parties had a combined net worth of just over $502,000. The district court allocated the assets and debt so that Russell received about $36,000 more in equities than did Debra. The larger distribution to Russell was the result of the district court giving him credit for having brought

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more assets to the marriage.

The district court also ordered Russell to pay

Debra alimony of $400 a month until he receives social security retirement income, at which time it was ordered that the alimony cease. Russell was also ordered to pay $1500 towards Debra's attorney fees. Debra contends (1) she should have additional assets, (2) she should have additional alimony, (3) the district court should have more specifically identified personal property awarded to Russell, and (4) she should have appellate attorney fees. DIVISION OF PROPERTY. Iowa is an equitable distribution state, which means the partners in a marriage that is to be dissolved are entitled to a just and equitable share of the property accumulated through their joint efforts. In re Marriage of Havran, 406 N.W.2d 450, 452 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987). The distribution of the property of the parties should be what is equitable under the circumstances after consideration of the criteria codified in Iowa Code section 598.21(1) (2005). In re Marriage of Estlund, 344 N.W.2d 276, 280 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983). Assets and liabilities are valued as of the date of dissolution. See In re Marriage of McLaughlin, 526 N.W.2d 342, 344 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994); see also Locke v. Locke, 246 N.W.2d 246, 252 (Iowa 1976); Schantz v. Schantz, 163 N.W.2d 398, 405 (Iowa 1968). We value property for division purposes at its value at the time of the dissolution. See Locke, 246 N.W.2d at 252. It is the net worth of the parties at the time of trial that is relevant in adjusting property rights. In re Marriage of Muelhaupt, 439 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Iowa 1989); In re Marriage of Moffatt, 279 N.W.2d 15, 20 (Iowa 1979). We look to the economic provisions of

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the decree as a whole in assessing the equity of the property division. See In re Marriage of Robison, 542 N.W.2d 4, 5 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). Debra first contends the district court erred in awarding a $37,482 certificate of deposit to Russell. She contends it was hers and that the parties had agreed it would go to her. She contends further that she was awarded nearly all of the parties' debt of about $40,000 and she is without liquid assets to pay the debts. We recognize that the pretrial stipulation showed the certificate as being in Debra's name and the parties agreeing it should go to her. We also note the stipulation showed the debts going to Debra. She testified she wanted to take them because then she could be certain they were paid. Much or all of the $40,000 debt was incurred by Debra after the parties' separation. The debts include a mortgage of about $10,500 on the $80,000 homestead Debra is receiving. Some $26,663 is owed on a sports car she bought, valued at $23,000, and the balance is for jewelry Debra purchased. While the parties were in agreement on the allocation of the certificate and of the debt, there were a number of economic issues the district court was required to resolve. In order for the district court to make what it determined to be an equitable distribution of assets it had to consider all assets and allocate them accordingly. There is no evidence that the district court had agreed to be bound by the parties' stipulation. A stipulation settling an issue in a dissolution proceeding is a contract between the parties that becomes final only when accepted and approved by the court. In re Marriage of Bries, 499 N.W.2d 319, 321 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993). Until approved, it is not binding on the court, but may be considered in rendering its decree. See Iowa Code

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