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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA No. 7-231 / 06-0967 Filed September 6, 2007

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF TRACIE GAYLE COBB AND TYSON KING COBB Upon the Petition of TRACIE GAYLE COBB, Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, And Concerning TYSON KING COBB, Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Bobbi M. Alpers, Judge.

Tyson and Tracie Cobb appeal and cross-appeal from the economic provisions of a dissolution decree. AFFIRMED.

Arthur L. Buzzell, Davenport, for appellant. Daniel L. Bray of Bray & Klockau, P.L.C., Iowa City, for appellee.

Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.

2 VAITHESWARAN, J. Tyson and Tracie Cobb appeal and cross-appeal from the economic provisions of a dissolution decree. We affirm. I. Background Facts and Procedings Tracie and Tyson met in 1988 and married in 1989. Three days before the marriage, they executed a premarital agreement. During the marriage, Tyson completed medical school and residency, received a master's degree in biomechanics, and earned significant wages as an orthopedic surgeon. Tracie maintained the home, raised the parties' four children and, in the early years, ran a home day-care service. The parties divorced in 2006. At trial, the only issues were financial, as the parents agreed Tracie would assume physical care of the children. On child support, the district court determined that Tyson's net monthly income was sufficiently high that the court had discretion to fix the amount of support. The court ordered Tyson to pay $10,000 per month for four children, $9000 for three, $8000 for two, and $7000 for one. The parties reached a partial stipulation with respect to the property division but disagreed on the validity and effect of the premarital agreement. The district court upheld the agreement, concluding Tracie waived her right to "much of the property" accumulated by Tyson during the marriage. The court divided the property accordingly. On the question of spousal support, the court found that the premarital agreement did not "clearly and directly set forth a waiver of any claim by either

3 party." The court ordered Tyson to pay Tracie $10,000 per month for ten years or until either party died or Tracie remarried. The district court finally addressed Tracie's claim for trial attorney fees, ordering Tyson to pay $45,000 towards her bill. Both parties filed motions for enlarged findings and conclusions. See

Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.904(2). The court reduced Tracie's attorney fee award by $7900, the amount of attorney fees Tyson incurred to litigate the applicability of the premarital agreement. This appeal followed. II. Child Support Tyson contends the district court should not have ordered him to pay child support of $10,000 per month for four children. We discern no inequity in this ruling. As the district court noted, Tyson's net monthly income was

"approximately five times the amount of the maximum net income on the chart." See Iowa Ct. R. 9.26. In this range, a district court is vested with discretion to determine the appropriate amount of support. Id. The court used Tyson's

income in 2005, which was approximately half his income in 2004. One-fifth of his net monthly income was allocated to the support of his four children. Had Tyson been subject to the guidelines, this percentage could have been higher. III. Spousal Support Tyson contends the district court acted inequitably in awarding Tracie spousal support. In his view, the premarital agreement prohibits such an award. On cross-appeal, Tracie maintains she should have received $23,900 of spousal support per month instead of the $10,000 per month that the district court

4 ordered, and the award should have continued beyond ten years until her death or remarriage, and for 108 months regardless of remarriage. A. Effect of Premarital Agreement As noted, the parties executed a premarital agreement in 1989. The

agreement was executed in Texas and provides that Texas law will govern its construction and enforcement. 1 The agreement further provides that any post-dissolution earnings shall be the separate property of the earning spouse and neither of the parties shall be entitled to contribution from the other for post-dissolution earnings from college degrees during the existence of marriage. The agreement additionally states that Tracie "waives and releases, all rights, claims, titles, and interests, actual, inchoate, or contingent, that either might, by reason of marriage to the other, acquire in the property or estate." Tyson

Tyson asserts that the contractual provision mandates application of Texas law. Tracie counters that Iowa law should apply because Texas law would "violate a fundamental policy of this state," and Iowa "would otherwise provide the applicable law and has a materially greater interest in the determination of the particular issue." Our highest court requires parties relying on out-of-state law to prove it. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co. v. Simoni, 641 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Iowa 2002). As Tyson has furnished a citation to the relevant Texas statute on premarital agreements, we conclude he has proven the applicable law. On the conflict-of-law question, our highest court applies the significant relationship test to contract cases, if there is no choice-of-law provision in the contract. Gabe's Const. Co., Inc. v. United Capitol Ins. Co., 539 N.W.2d 144, 146 (Iowa 1995). See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws

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