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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 104 / 05-1103 / 05-1110 Filed March 30, 2007 MYRON J. RAAS, Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Appellee. MARK TRUNECEK, Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Appellee.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Thomas M. Horan, Judge.

Plaintiffs in separate suits against State appeal from district court orders sustaining State's motions to dismiss. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT REVERSED AND REMANDED AS TO PLAINTIFF RAAS AND AFFIRMED AS TO PLAINTIFF TRUNECEK.

Hugh G. Albrecht of Tom Riley Law Firm, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellants.

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Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and William A. Hill, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

3 LARSON, Justice. This appeal involves separate suits against the State by Myron J. Raas and Mark Trunecek arising out of the escape of two inmates from the state prison system. The State moved to dismiss the petitions under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.421(1)(a) and (f) on the grounds the court lacked jurisdiction and the plaintiffs failed to establish a duty of care. The district court sustained the motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs appealed separately, and we consolidated the cases. The court of appeals reversed, and we granted further review. We now vacate the decision of the court of appeals, affirm the judgment of the district court as to Trunecek, and reverse and remand the judgment of the district court as to Raas. I. Facts and Prior Proceedings. Because the cases were resolved under motions to dismiss, the only facts to be considered are those appearing on the face of the plaintiffs' petitions. Mark Trunecek and Myron Raas were injured by two inmates who escaped from the Iowa Medical and Classification Center in Oakdale, Iowa. Raas was attacked while in the parking lot of the Oakdale facility, where he had gone to visit a family member. Trunecek was attacked by the prisoners as he was fishing in the Iowa River near Swan Lake Road in Johnson County. The plaintiffs alleged that the prisoners' escape occurred as a result of the State's negligence in failing to properly supervise the inmates and failing to properly maintain and secure the facility. For

purposes of reviewing the order dismissing the case under rule 1.421(1), we assume the facts alleged in the petitions are true. II. Standard of Review. We review orders sustaining motions to dismiss for correction of errors at law. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co. v. Simoni, 641 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Iowa 2002). An order granting a motion to dismiss will be upheld only if

4 the petition, on its face, fails to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted under any circumstances. Fitzpatrick v. State, 439 N.W.2d 663, 665 (Iowa 1989) (affirming order dismissing plaintiff's suit for damages based on injury caused by parolee from Iowa penitentiary). On a motion to dismiss, the petition should be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, with all doubt resolved in the plaintiff's favor. Id. III. Discussion. To establish the plaintiffs' claims of negligence, they must prove that (1) the State owed them a duty of care, (2) the State breached or violated that duty of care, (3) its breach or violation was a proximate cause of their injuries, and (4) damages. Kolbe v. State, 625 N.W.2d 721, 725 (Iowa 2001). The issue in this case is whether the first requirement--a duty to the plaintiffs--was satisfied. A. The statutory-duty argument. The plaintiffs argue that the State's statutorily imposed responsibility for the care of prisoners necessarily includes a duty to prevent their escape. 904.102(4) (2003), [t]he Iowa department of corrections is established to be responsible for the control, treatment, and rehabilitation of offenders committed under law to the following institutions: .... 4. Iowa medical and classification center. Obviously, this statute does not expressly provide a cause of action for a breach of the State's duty. We, therefore, must decide if a cause of action is implied. In Kolbe, 625 N.W.2d 721, we stated that, when a private cause of action is not expressly granted by statutes or administrative rules, [w]e . . . must employ the following four-factor test to determine whether a private cause of action against the State may be implied from the statute: Under Iowa Code section

5 (1) Is the plaintiff a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted? (2) Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, to either create or deny such a remedy? (3) Would allowing such a cause of action be consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislation? (4) Would the private cause of action intrude into an area over which the federal government or a state administrative agency holds exclusive jurisdiction? Kolbe, 625 N.W.2d at 726

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