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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA No. 8-729 / 08-0384 Filed December 31, 2008

PATRICK A. HARRISON, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA and IOWA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, Defendants-Appellees. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Donna L. Paulsen, Judge.

Patrick A. Harrison appeals from a district court summary judgment ruling in favor of the defendants. AFFIRMED.

James L. Sayre of James L. Sayre, P.C., Clive, for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mark Hunacek, John R. Lundquist, and Heather L. Palmer, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees.

Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Eisenhauer and Doyle, JJ.

2 DOYLE, J. Patrick A. Harrison appeals from a district court summary judgment ruling in favor of the defendants. Harrison contends the district court erred in holding that he could not recover on a claim for breach of contract as a matter of law. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the district court I. Background Facts and Proceedings. The following facts are undisputed. On September 25, 2004, Harrison commenced employment as an electrician with the Iowa Department of Administrative Services (DAS). As an electrician, Harrison was a covered

employee under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) by and between the State and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 61 AFL-CIO (Union). Under the CBA, the State has the "exclusive

power, duty and right to . . . [s]uspend, discipline or discharge employees for proper cause." Additionally, under the CBA, the Union and the State "recognize the authority of the [State] to suspend, discharge or take other appropriate disciplinary action against employees for just cause." On June 21, 2005, Harrison severed a telephone cord with his personal buck knife while another employee was talking on that telephone with a contractor. Based upon the incident, the DAS terminated Harrisons

employment. The DAS stated that Harrisons actions were in violation of the DASs work rules and its violence-free workplace policy. Harrison did not receive any discipline prior to his termination, nor did he receive any progressive discipline from the DAS involving the incident.

3 Harrison timely grieved his termination pursuant to the CBA. Harrisons grievance proceeded through step three of the CBAs grievance procedures, at which time, on November 7, 2005, the DAS denied Harrisons grievance. On March 21, 2006, the Union, Harrisons certified bargaining representative, refused to take the matter to arbitration, step four of the CBAs grievance procedures. Harrison conceded that he did not have the individual right to take his grievance to arbitration under the provisions of the CBA. On May 25, 2006, Harrison filed a "Prohibited Practice Complaint" against the Union. The Iowa Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) set the

hearing on Harrisons complaint for November 15, 2005, which was continued. On January 8, 2007, Harrison and the Union filed a joint dismissal of the "Prohibited Practice Complaint" pending before the PERB. The same day, the PERB entered an order granting the joint dismissal. On February 15, 2007, Harrison filed an action in district court against the State and DAS (hereinafter referred to collectively as the State). Harrison

alleged that the State breached the collective bargaining agreement between the State and the Union by terminating his employment without just cause. Harrison further asserted a claim for unpaid wages pursuant to Iowa Code section 91A (2007). The State filed its answer on March 19, 2007, denying Harrisons claims and affirmatively asserting that Harrison failed to exhaust required remedies under the CBA and that the district court was without jurisdiction and/or authority to hear Harrisons claims. Thereafter, the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. On February 11, 2008, the district court entered its ruling granting the States

4 motion, finding both of Harrisons claims were derivative of the CBA and Harrison failed to exhaust the remedies outlined in the CBA or prove that the Union breached the duty of fair representation. Additionally, the court found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the necessary breach of the duty of fair representation element of Harrisons claims. As such, it denied Harrisons

motion, as it concerned the merits of the case, and dismissed Harrisons petition. Harrison appeals. He contends the district court erred in holding he could not recover on a claim for breach of contract as a matter of law. II. Scope and Standards of Review. We review the district courts summary judgment rulings for the correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; Alliant Energy-Interstate Power & Light Co. v. Duckett, 732 N.W.2d 869, 873 (Iowa 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3); Walderbach v. Archdiocese of Dubuque, Inc., 730 N.W.2d 198, 199 (Iowa 2007). A fact question arises if reasonable minds can differ on how the issue should be resolved. Walderbach, 730 N.W.2d at 199. No fact question arises if, as here, the only conflict concerns legal consequences flowing from undisputed facts. McNertney v. Kahler, 710 N.W.2d 209, 210 (Iowa 2006). III. Discussion. Harrison contends the district court erred in holding that he could not recover on a claim for breach of contract as a matter of law. Specifically,

Harrison argues that he is only required to attempt to exhaust the contractual

5 remedies set forth in the CBA, and that he in fact did everything he could do to exhaust the contractual remedies. Harrison further argues that his claim against his employer should not hinge on whether the union breached its duty of fair representation. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the district court. In order to promote ,,harmonious and cooperative relationships between government[s] and [their] employees, the Public Employment Relations Act ("the Act") authorizes collective bargaining between public employers and their employees, establishes procedures for the processing of employee grievances, and authorizes binding arbitration of disputes arising from claimed violations of collective bargaining agreements. Kucera v. Baldazo, 745 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Iowa 2008) (citing Iowa Code

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