Preview:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA No. 8-108 / 07-0833 Filed May 14, 2008 STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. ALEXANDER NELSON HUFFMAN, Defendant-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, Peter B. Newell, Judge.

The State appeals a dismissal of a trial information for violation of the speedy indictment rule. AFFIRMED.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Cristen Douglass, Assistant Attorney General, Jesse Marzen, County Attorney, and David Kuehner, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant. Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellee.

Heard by Miller, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Baker, JJ., decided by Miller, P.J., and Vaitheswaran, Eisenhauer, and Baker, JJ.

2

PER CURIAM A complaint charging Alexander Huffman with third-degree harassment, a simple misdemeanor, was filed on December 6, 2006, and he was arrested on December 8, 2006. After Huffman's request for a jury trial was granted, the Floyd county attorney filed an amended complaint to charge first-degree harassment on February 5, 2007. On February 12, 2007, sixty-six days after Huffman's initial arrest, the trial information charging first-degree harassment was filed. Under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(a), "the court must order the prosecution to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary is shown" when an indictment or trial information is not brought within forty-five days of arrest for a "public offense." The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on April 9, 2007, and the State appeals. "When interpreting . . . the speedy indictment rule, we review for correction of errors at law." State v. Rains, 574 N.W.2d 904, 909 (Iowa 1998). The sole issue is when Huffman was "arrested" for a "public offense" for purposes of the speedy indictment rule. The State does not rely on the good cause exception; rather, it contends the speedy indictment rule does not apply because the initial complaint was for a simple misdemeanor and it can therefore file a subsequent trial information charging an aggravated misdemeanor based on the same incident without violating the speedy indictment rule. Additionally, the State claims Huffman was not "arrested" for the purposes of the speedy indictment rule until February 12, when the trial information was filed. In support the State relies on three cases:

3

State v. Eichorn, 325 N.W.2d 95 (Iowa 1982), State v. Sunclades, 305 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1982), and State v. Burton, 231 N.W.2d 577 (Iowa 1975). However, none of these cases deals with an enhancement of the original charge after an arrest; rather, they resolve issues concerning different criminal charges arising from the same incident. The fact separate charges and different offenses were involved is a key factor in each ruling. In Burton, the defendant was originally charged with burglary with aggravation and the State later initiated a charge for robbery with aggravation arising from the same incident. Burton, 231 N.W.2d at 578. The court rejected the defendant's claim the speedy

indictment limitations "relating to the burglary charge were applicable to the separate robbery charge simply because both charges arose from the same episode." Id. Noting burglary and robbery "are separate and distinct offenses," the court concluded: "They are not the same offense." Id. In Sunclades, a defendant was arrested for attempt to commit murder and was later charged with going armed with intent and assault while participating in a felony. Sunclades, 305 N.W.2d at 494. The plain language of [the speedy indictment rule] provides that the period of time during which an indictment must be returned commences when the defendant is arrested. Under the Burton standard the time period applies only to the "public offense" for which the defendant was arrested, rather than to all offenses arising from the same incident or episode. We thus conclude the [speedy indictment period] that commenced when the defendant was arrested for attempt to commit murder . . . applied only to that charge and lesser-included offenses thereof. It did not apply to the separate charges of going armed with intent and assault while participating in a felony. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

4

The final case cited by the State also deals with separate charges and not an enhanced charge. In Eichorn, the court ruled the prosecutor could charge the defendant with burglary after the time for prosecution of robbery had expired. 325 N.W.2d at 96. "The two crimes are different. . . . We thus have two

different crimes in tandem, growing out of a single state of facts." Id. (emphasis added). Noting the speedy indictment time runs from the time of arrest, the court considered the time of arrest issue when a defendant is already incarcerated: Under such facts we deem the time of arrest to be the time the new charge is filed. We do not think the officers should have to engage in an idle ceremony of releasing the accused into the street and then retrieving him into jail. Id. at 96-97. Further, the court stated: "In [State v. Combs, 316 N.W.2d 880, 882 (Iowa 1982)] the prosecutor actually lost the first case after trial, but we permitted a second charge to be filed of a different crime based on the same event. Eichorn, 325 N.W.2d at 97 (emphasis added). Eichorn held "when authorities bring a new charge against a person already in their custody, the time of arrest for purposes of [the speedy indictment rule] is deemed to be the time the new charge is filed." State v. Boelman, 330 N.W.2d 794, 795 (Iowa 1983). Therefore, substituting the "time of the new

charge" for the statutory "time of arrest," as we are urged to do by the State, only occurs when the defendant is already in the custody of authorities1 and the same authorities charge a different crime. We conclude the State is not charging Huffman with a different crime. All crimes in Iowa are statutory and public offenses are defined by a description of

1

Huffman had posted bond and was not incarcerated at the time the State filed the trial information charging first-degree harassment.

5

the acts constituting the offense.

State v. Wallace, 259 Iowa 765, 772, 145

N.W.2d 615, 620 (Iowa 1966). Iowa Code section 708.7(1)(a) (2005) defines harassment and specifies the acts constituting the offense: "A person commits harassment when, with intent to intimidate, annoy, or alarm another person, the person does any of the following:" (1) communicates without legitimate purpose in a manner likely to cause annoyance/harm; (2) places simulated explosives; (3) orders merchandise/services without knowledge/consent; or (4) makes false reports to law enforcement.2 The next statutory subsections, 708.7(2), (3), and (4), classify the offense of harassment specified in subsection 708.7(1) into firstdegree harassment,3 second-degree harassment,4 and third degree harassment. The complaint leading to Huffman's arrest for third-degree harassment specified a violation of subsection (4), which provides only: "Any other act of harassment is harassment in the third degree. Harassment in the third degree is a simple misdemeanor." Iowa Code

Download STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff - Appellant, v s. ALEXANDER NELSON HUFFMAN, Defenda

Iowa Law