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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA No. 2-435 / 11-1464 Filed June 27, 2012 STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. KEVIN LAMAR BALLANGEE, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Washington County, Crystal S. Cronk, District Associate Judge.

Kevin Ballangee appeals his conviction of operating while intoxicated. AFFIRMED.

Jeffrey L. Powell of the Law Office of Jeffrey L. Powell, Washington, for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Larry Brock, County Attorney, and Shawn R. Showers, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Tabor and Bower, JJ.

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BOWER, J. Kevin Ballangee appeals his conviction of operating while intoxicated, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2011). He contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Upon our review, we conclude the facts and circumstances in this case gave rise to the stopping officer's reasonable suspicion that criminal activity had occurred or was occurring and therefore justified the investigatory stop. Accordingly, we affirm Ballangee's conviction and sentence for operating while intoxicated. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. At approximately 11:45 p.m. on December 3, 2010, Washington Police Officer Jamie Townsend was on routine patrol driving north on Fourth Avenue when he saw a white Chevrolet truck "stopped" in the "traveled portion" of the southbound roadway near the Fourth Avenue Bar & Grill. There was no other traffic on the street. He noticed the vehicle did not have a front license plate. The vehicle started driving as Officer Townsend passed. turned around and headed south to follow the vehicle. vehicle momentarily but caught up "within seconds." The vehicle stopped at a stop sign when Officer Townsend was approximately one block behind. Officer Townsend noticed the vehicle failed to use a turn signal before making a right turn onto Madison Street, but noted there was no other traffic around. Officer Townsend turned right onto Madison Street to follow. He observed the vehicle had a Georgia license plate, which explained Officer Townsend

He lost sight of the

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to him its lack of a front license plate.1 By this time, the vehicle was following closely behind a van. It crossed the double yellow centerline and "stayed on the yellow line until it turned [left to go] south." emergency lights to stop the vehicle. Officer Townsend identified Kevin Ballangee as the vehicle's driver. Ballangee showed signs of intoxication. His speech was "slurred" and "very hard to understand." He admitted to drinking "7 beers" since approximately 9:30 p.m . He stated he was on his way home from the Fourth Avenue Bar & Grill. Ballangee also failed field sobriety tests. Ballangee submitted to a preliminary breath test, which indicated his blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit. Officer Townsend arrested Ballangee for operating while intoxicated and issued citations for failure to give turn signal and improper use of lanes. Officer Townsend transported Ballangee to the Washington County Jail. At 12:30 a.m., Ballangee consented to a breath test, which indicated he had a blood alcohol concentration of .188. Ballangee filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the stop, alleging the stop violated his constitutional rights because Officer Townsend did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. Following a hearing, the district court entered an order denying Ballangee's motion to suppress. Ballangee waived his right to a jury trial. The district court found Officer Townsend activated his

Ballangee guilty of operating while intoxicated. The court also found Ballangee
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Some states, including Georgia, do not require a front license plate.

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guilty of improper use of lanes and failure to give turn signal, simple misdemeanor offenses. Ballangee now appeals, alleging the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. II. Scope and Standard of Review. Because Ballangee's challenge to the district court's denial of his motion to suppress implicates his constitutional rights, our review is de novo. State v. Otto, 566 N.W.2d 509, 510 (Iowa 1997). We independently evaluate the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record. State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 2004). While we give considerable deference to the district

court's findings regarding the credibility of witnesses, we are not bound by them. Id. III. Analysis. Ballangee contends the district court erred in overruling his motion to suppress because the record does not support a finding that Officer Townsend had reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. He argues Officer Townsend

"completely lost visual contact" with his vehicle after initially meeting it on the roadway for a time period "long enough to cast doubt as to whether the officer had any certainty whatsoever that the vehicle he eventually stopped was in fact the same vehicle he observed on Fourth Avenue." Ballangee further contends he was not required to use a turn signal when turning right onto Madison Street, because "no vehicles were present in the intersection that would have been

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affected by the turn."2 Finally, he argues he was "being careful and very much in control" while driving on the double yellow center line and was "merely attempting to gain a better view of where the cross street was, and of any oncoming traffic, prior to making [a] turn." The State must demonstrate Officer Townsend had a reasonable suspicion criminal activity was occurring or had occurred to justify stopping Ballangee's vehicle. Id. at 204. The evidence justifying a stop under reasonable suspicion does not need to rise to the level of probable cause. State v. Scott, 409 N.W.2d 465, 468 (Iowa 1987). The stopping officer must have specific and articulable facts that, along with rational inferences, demonstrate that he or she reasonably believed criminal activity was occurring or imminent. State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Iowa 2010). Reasonable suspicion is determined by an objective standard: whether a reasonable person would deem the officer 's actions appropriate given the totality of the circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the stop. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d at 100; see State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 641

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