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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA No. 8-604 / 07-1659 Filed December 17, 2008

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MEGAN NICOLE PRICE, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, David H. Sivright Jr., Judge.

Megan Price appeals her conviction and sentence for voluntary manslaughter following a jury trial. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary E. Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, and Michael J. Walton, County Attorney, for appellee.

Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Eisenhauer and Doyle, JJ.

2 DOYLE, J. Defendant Megan Price appeals her conviction and sentence for voluntary manslaughter following a jury trial. Among other things, Price contends the

district court erred in excluding her expert's testimony concerning battered women's syndrome. Upon our review, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand for a new trial. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. On January 5, 2007, Price fatally stabbed Allen Johnson after a confrontation with him at his house in Davenport, Iowa. At the time, Price and Johnson had been involved in a romantic relationship for nearly a year and lived together three to four days a week. It is uncontroverted that throughout much of their relationship Johnson was abusive toward Price. Price was initially charged with voluntary manslaughter in violation of Iowa Code section 707.4 (2005). Price pleaded not guilty and filed a notice of selfdefense and diminished responsibility. Thereafter, the State amended the trial information to amend the charge to second-degree murder in violation of sections 707.1 and 707.3. Price applied for, and the district court approved, expert witness fees to have an expert evaluate her for and possibly testify as to battered women's syndrome. Dr. David McEchron then evaluated Price and subsequently issued a report. In the report, Dr. McEchron opined: The history of [Price's] relationship with [Johnson] is such that she also appears to fit the characteristics of [battered women's] syndrome. While Megan clearly has a history of antisocial behavior and has experienced serious psychological difficulties, her psychological limitations have been further impacted by . . . submitting to a seriously abusive relationship for a pattern of

3 months. Her thinking clearly reflects a great deal of confusion and an inability to care for herself in an abusive relationship. Price named Dr. McEchron as a defense witness, and the State, on the day of trial, filed a motion seeking to exclude Dr. McEchron's testimony. Price resisted and asserted that Dr. McEchron's testimony would pertain to battered women's syndrome and her claim of self-defense. The district court reserved its ruling on the issue at that time, and the trial commenced. The evidentiary matter came before the court again after the State rested its case in the trial. The State argued at that time that the expert's testimony was irrelevant. Conversely, Price argued that the testimony was relevant, citing two out-of-state cases where expert testimony on battered women's syndrome was permitted for the issue of the state of mind of the defendant and justification. Ultimately, the district court granted the State's motion to exclude Dr. McEchron's testimony. The court concluded the testimony was irrelevant because the killing arose out of a confrontation, not a non-confrontational situation where a defendant has an alternative course of action available but instead chose to attack the victim. The court explained: If this was a non-confrontational killing, I would deny this motion and allow Dr. McEchron to testify so that the jury could understand the defense. I think then . . . expert testimony would be of assistance to the jury. In this case, I don't think it would be. In a non-confrontational killing, expert testimony would be helpful to let the jury understand the mental state of the particular defendant and the reasonableness of her beliefs and her use of force. Here we have a confrontational incident. The jury has heard of the prior attacks, assaults, and threats, prior incidents. They have heard her response to that. . . . All in all, based on this record, I don't find that the jury needs expert help under rule 5.702 to evaluate the behavior of [Price] and interpret that behavior to determine her mental state at the time this happened. I don't think

4 Dr. McEchron will add any special understanding to the situational dynamics. I think the jury can do this on their own.1 After ruling on the matter, the court noted that it was "going to consider [Dr. McEchron's report] as an offer of proof by [Price] in response to this ruling." Thereafter, Price took the stand in her defense. Price testified that just prior to the stabbing, Johnson stated he was going to kill her. Price testified that Johnson came at her to punch her in the head, and Price, fearing for her life, then picked up a knife lying on the floor and stabbed Johnson. During crossexamination, Price acknowledged that she was told by friends that if she would stab Johnson, he would quit hitting her. Price stated, "I did make that plan in the future to try to stab him if he hit me again, and I had no intention in killing him." After the defense rested, the trial court instructed the jury on, among other matters, justification. The case was then submitted to the jury. During their deliberations, the jury sent back four notes asking questions regarding justification.2 Ultimately, the jury was unable to reach a verdict, and the district court declared a mistrial. Following the mistrial, Price filed a notice of expert defense witness indicating her intent to call Laurie Schipper, Executive Director of the Iowa Coalition Against Domestic Violence, to testify as to self-defense and battered women's syndrome. Price also filed a motion to allow testimony regarding the

Despite the district court's distinction, expert testimony on battered women's syndrome has been allowed in both confrontational and non-confrontational killing cases. See Commonwealth v. Dillon, 598 A.2d 963, 969 (Pa. 1991) (Cappy, J., concurring); see also Erin M. Masson, Annotation, Admissibility of Expert or Opinion Evidence of BatteredWoman Syndrome on Issue of Self-Defense, 58 A.L.R. 5th 749,

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