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100157 -- Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs v. City of Park City -- Green -- Kansas Court of Appeals

|||| No. 100,157 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SEDGWICK COUNTY, KANSAS, Appellee, v. CITY OF PARK CITY, KANSAS, Appellant. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. Kansas appellate courts may exercise jurisdiction only under the circumstances allowed by statute. As a result, appellate courts do not have discretionary power to entertain appeals from all trial court orders. 2. Time limits prescribed by statute are jurisdictional and cannot be waived or forfeited. 3. Because a 30-day period for filing an appeal is statutory, it is a jurisdictional requirement that must be met. 4. A trial court lacks authority to extend the 10-day period for filing a posttrial motion under K.S.A. 60-259(f). 5. A motion filed late under K.S.A. 60-259(f) does not toll the 30-day period in which to file a notice of appeal from the entry of the judgment. 6. Because the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal was jurisdictional, the unique circumstances doctrine could not be applied to extend the appeal period for a party which erroneously believed that a trial court's unauthorized extension of the 10-day period for filing a posttrial motion under K.S.A. 60-259(f) had the effect of tolling the appeal period while the posttrial motion was judicially determined. Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; JOHN J. KISNER, JR., judge. Opinion filed April 3, 2009. Affirmed in part and dismissed in part. Timothy J. Finnerty and Ryan D. Weltz, of Wallace, Saunders, Austin, Brown & Enochs, Chartered, of Wichita, for appellant. Robert W. Parnacott, assistant county counselor, for appellee. Before BUSER, P.J., ELLIOTT and GREEN, JJ. GREEN, J.: After summary judgment was granted in favor of the Board of County Commissioners of Sedgwick County (Board), Park City received an extension to file a posttrial motion under K.S.A. 60-259(f). In addition, Park City moved for relief under K.S.A. 60-260(b), arguing that the trial court had improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. The Board responded, arguing that the trial court had lacked the authority to extend the period to file the K.S.A. 60-259(f) motion. The trial court agreed and denied the motion. Moreover, the trial court denied the K.S.A. 60-260(b) motion. We dismiss in part for lack of appellate jurisdiction and affirm in part. Greatly summarized, on December 21, 2006, the Board brought a lawsuit in Sedgwick County District Court challenging Park City's annexation of property. On June 8, 2007, the Board moved for summary judgment. The sole issue the Board raised in its motion was whether K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 12-520a(d)(6) and K.S.A. 12-530 required Park

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100157 -- Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs v. City of Park City -- Green -- Kansas Court of Appeals

City to give notice to the Park City Planning Commission (PCPC) that Park City intended to annex the property. The fact that Park City failed to provide the PCPC notice was not in dispute. In its summary judgment motion, the Board argued that because Park City had failed to give notice to the PCPC, Park City's annexation of the property was invalid under K.S.A. 12-530(b) and K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 12-538. Park City responded to the summary judgment motion, arguing that the only planning commission that was entitled to notice under the applicable statutes was the Wichita-Sedgwick County Metropolitan Area Planning Commission (MAPC). The trial court ruled from the bench that K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 12-520a(d)(6) and K.S.A. 12-530 required Park City to notify, not only the MAPC, but also the PCPC that it intended to annex the land. Therefore, the trial court ruled that the annexation was nullified. After the hearing on the summary judgment motion, the City retained new counsel. Park City's new attorney entered his appearance on August 3, 2007. On August 15, 2007, the trial court filed its journal entry granting the Board's motion for summary judgment. On August 20, 2007, Park City (with the Board's approval) made an oral motion to the trial court asking it to grant an extension of time to file a posttrial motion. The court granted the motion and extended the deadline to August 31, 2007. On August 30, 2007, Park City again (with the Board's approval) made an oral motion to the trial court asking for another extension. The court granted the motion and moved the deadline to September 4, 2007. Finally, on September 4, 2007, Park City (again with the Board's approval) made another oral motion for an extension. The trial court granted the motion and extended the deadline to September 5, 2007. On September 5, 2007, Park City moved for relief under K.S.A. 60-259(f) and K.S.A. 60-260(b). In its motion, Park City argued that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the applicable statutes and, therefore, Park City was not required to give the PCPC notice that Park City intended to annex the property at issue. In regards to the 60-260(b) motion, Park City argued that the summary judgment order should be set aside because its previous counsel did not adequately oppose the summary judgment motion. Park City then submitted additional legal arguments and facts which it believed supported the conclusion that it was not required to give notice to the PCPC. The Board responded on September 24, 2007, arguing that Park City's K.S.A. 60-259(f) motion was untimely filed because such a motion had to be filed within 10 days after the entry of judgment and K.S.A. 60-206(b) prohibited a trial court from extending this time period. In regards to Park City's motion being treated entirely like a K.S.A. 60260(b) motion, the Board argued that Park City's previous attorney sufficiently argued against the summary judgment motion and that the additional facts Park City wished to now introduce had no relevance to the issue of whether the applicable statutes required Park City to notify the PCPC. Therefore, the Board argued that Park City did not make a showing of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" that would relieve it from the summary judgment order. The trial court denied the motions from the bench. A journal entry memorializing the trial court's ruling was filed on February 1, 2008. In its journal entry, the trial court found that based on K.S.A. 60-206(b), Park City's 60-259(f) motion was filed out of time and, as a result, had to be denied. In regards to Park City's 60-260(b) motion, the trial court stated that none of the additional legal arguments or facts changed its conclusion that K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 12520a(d)(6) and K.S.A. 12-530 required Park City to give notice to the PCPC. As a result, the trial court determined that Park City was not entitled to relief under K.S.A. 60-260(b). On February 12, 2008, a hearing was conducted to determine whether the unique circumstances doctrine should be applied to allow Park City to file a late 60-259(f) motion. The trial court denied the motion from the bench. Park City filed its notice of appeal on February 15, 2008. I. Does this court have jurisdiction to review the trial court's order granting the Board's summary judgment motion? A. Jurisdiction Our Supreme Court in Flores Rentals v. Flores, 283 Kan. 476, 480-481, 153 P.3d 523 (2007), stated:
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100157 -- Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs v. City of Park City -- Green -- Kansas Court of Appeals

"Appellate jurisdiction is defined by statute; the right to appeal is neither a vested nor constitutional right. The only reference in the Kansas Constitution to appellate jurisdiction iterates this principle, stating the Kansas Supreme Court shall have 'such appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by law.' Kansas Constitution, Article 3,

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