State v. Braun.106176 Midwest Manufacturing, Inc. v. Ausland.106178 First Management v. Topeka Investment Group.106257 Kuhn v. Schmidt.(Corrected March 30, 2012) 106325 In re Adoption of C.A.T.

State: Kansas

Court: Court of Appeals

Docket No: 103560

Case Date: 03/30/2012

Preview:No. 103,560 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. CONRAD J. BRAUN, Appellant.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

Under K.S.A. 21-3428, which defined the crime blackmail in Kansas until July 1, 2011, the statute required either that the perpetrator (1) gain or attempt to gain something of value or (2) compel another person to act against the person's will. If nothing of monetary value was at stake, then the crime's victim must actually be compelled to take some action for the crime to constitute blackmail.

Appeal from Johnson District Court; STEPHEN R. TATUM, judge. Opinion filed March 30, 2012. Reversed.

Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Emilie Burdette and Steven J. Obermeier, assistant district attorneys, Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before MCANANY, P.J., LEBEN and ATCHESON, JJ.

LEBEN, J.: Conrad Braun appeals his blackmail conviction, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of blackmailing his ex-wife's husband. At the time Braun was charged, blackmail was defined by statute as "compelling another to act 1

against such person's will." Braun notes that the alleged victim, Tucker Kirk, didn't actually take any action that Braun asked Kirk to take--neither refraining from contact with Braun's children nor signing a contract Braun had prepared--in the communications that led to the blackmail charge.

Braun's point is well taken. The statute defined blackmail as compelling another to act, not attempting to do so. Since Kirk didn't act in response to Braun's communication, the State did not present sufficient evidence of blackmail, and Braun's conviction must be reversed.

The issue before us is primarily one of statutory interpretation, over which we exercise unlimited review. Thus, we give no specific deference to the district court's interpretation of the statute. State v. Finch, 291 Kan. 665, Syl.

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