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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 101,809

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

ANTHONY S. KIDD,
Appellant.


SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.
While voluntary intoxication is not a defense to general intent crimes, such a defense may be used to negate the intent element of a specific intent crime.

2.
A defendant is not entitled to an instruction on voluntary intoxication unless the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, is sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to conclude the defendant was intoxicated to the extent that the defendant's ability to form the requisite intent was impaired.  

3.
Evidence that the defendant consumed alcohol or drugs, or that the defendant was high or intoxicated at the time of the crime, does not permit an inference that the defendant was so impaired that he or she was unable to form the requisite intent.  

4.
Under the facts of this case, the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant was insufficient to demonstrate that the defendant was so intoxicated
that he was unable to form the specific intent necessary for first-degree murder, and the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication.

5.
Under the facts of this case, the State demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's violation of the duty to inform witnesses of an order in limine and one witness' subsequent violation of the limine order by a single reference to the defendant's mug shot did not affect the outcome of the trial.

Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; JOSEPH BRIBIESCA, judge. Opinion filed December 2, 2011. Affirmed.

Shawn E. Minihan, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant, and Anthony S. Kidd, appellant, was on a supplemental pro se brief.  

Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Nola Tedesco Foulston, district attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

MORITZ, J.:  Anthony Kidd appeals his convictions of first-degree murder, aggravated assault, criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling, and aggravated battery. Kidd seeks reversal of his convictions, arguing the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of voluntary intoxication; the prosecutor committed misconduct by violating his duty to inform witnesses about an order in limine; and cumulative error deprived him of a fair trial. Kidd also contends the district court violated his constitutional rights at sentencing. Acting pro se, Kidd challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, contends his trial counsel was ineffective, and argues the trial court denied him his right to a speedy trial.  

We conclude the district court did not err in failing to give the voluntary intoxication instruction, but the prosecutor did violate his duty to inform the State's witnesses that an order in limine prohibited reference to Kidd's prior crimes. However, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that this error did not affect the outcome of the trial. We reject Kidd's cumulative error claim, his sentencing argument, and his pro se claims.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 7, 2007, Ladria Gulley returned home from work at approximately 5:30 p.m. to find her husband, Tynus Gulley, Sr., working outside the house. Later that evening, Ladria's cousin, Les Labroi, stopped by the Gulleys' home and found Tynus mixing cement outside and Kidd "just standing there, drinking."  

When Labroi asked why the two men were working in the dark, Kidd pulled out a "little short shotgun" and said "ain't nobody coming back here. I'm a gator, you know. . . my eyes come up out of the water." Labroi characterized Kidd's comments as "just crazy talk, really." At trial, when the prosecutor questioned Labroi regarding Kidd's level of intoxication, Labroi testified Kidd "was probably buzzed a little bit, but he wasn't

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