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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 20, 2007 TO BE PUBLISHED
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2005-SC-000981-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURTOF APPEALS
V. CASE NOS. 2004-CA-000398-MR AND 2004-CA-000428-MR
FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT NOS. 03-CR-00142-001 AND 03-CR-00157

RONNIE LEE COKER APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BYJUSTICE MINTON
REVERSING
A circuit court jury convicted Ronnie Coker of theft by extortion and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree (PFO II) . The trial court sentenced Coker to two years' imprisonment for the theft conviction, which was enhanced to seven years' imprisonment under the PFO II conviction .
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed Coker's convictions on appeal because it found that the trial court erred when it denied Coker's Batson' challenges to an African-American veniremember against whom the Commonwealth had exercised one of its peremptory challenges. We granted discretionary review; and, having considered the applicable law, we conclude that the Court of Appeals did not show
Batson v. Kentucky, 476U.S. 79,106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).
proper deference to the wide latitude afforded trial courts in ruling on Batson challenges. Thus, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate Coker's conviction and sentence.
The sole issue before us involves the Commonwealth's exercise of a peremptory
challenge during jury selection in Coker's trial on charges that he extorted, or attempted
to extort, his former employer.
During voir dire, defense counsel asked the venire if they recalled some of the
rights protected by the Bill of Rights. After other veniremembers had mentioned other
rights, an African-American veniremember volunteered "due process." Defense counsel
complimented this veniremember and made a few brief remarks about due process.
Later in voir dire, defense counsel asked the venire what verdict it should return if it
found that the Commonwealth had not proven each element of the charges against
Coker beyond a reasonable doubt. The same African-American venireman who had
been complimented for his knowledge of due process responded, "Not guilty."
The Commonwealth later struck the African-American veniremember, prompting defense counsel to lodge a Batson challenge. Defense counsel stated that during an earlier conversation involving the exercise of peremptory strikes, the Commonwealth had expressed surprise that there had been two African-Americans in the venire . Defense counsel pointed out to the trial court that the veniremember in question did not have any disqualifying problems and that the Commonwealth's Attorney had a history on this issue because he was involved in a case where a conviction was overturned on
appeal under the auspices of Batson.
The Commonwealth responded by stating that it had struck the veniremember in
question because he had volunteered information and spoke up regarding constitutional issues, including due process and presumption of innocence. So the Commonwealth believed that this potential juror was"aligning himself with the defendant." The Commonwealth also argued that it had exercised peremptory challenges on three other potential jurors who had volunteered answers to defense counsel's voir dire questions, none of whom were African-American.
The trial court ruled without elaboration that there had been no Batson violation . Defense counsel chose not to argue the matter further.
The Equal Protection Clause is violated when a potential juror is struck from a venire solely on the basis of race. When a litigant believes that a potential juror has been impermissibly struck for racial reasons, the complaining litigant's objection is governed by the three-step process the United States Supreme Court set forth in Batson. 3 The Batson framework is designed to be efficient in order for jury selection to be as uninterrupted as possible.
Step one required Coker to make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination by the Commonwealth in its strike of the African-American veniremember. 5 The Commonwealth was not required to respond to Coker's challenge
Washington v. Commonwealth, 34 S.W.3d 376,378-79 (Ky. 2000) ("Challenging
prospective jurors on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause.").

Id. at 379 ("In Batson, supra, the United States Supreme Court outlined a three-step processfor evaluating such claims.").
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358,111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) ("Theanalysis set forth in Batson permits prompt rulings on objections to peremptory challengeswithout substantial disruption of the jury selection process.") (plurality opinion).
Washington, 34 S.W.3d at 379; see also Gray v. Commonwealth, 203 S.W.3d 679, 690 (Ky. 2006).
unless the trial court found that Coker had satisfied his burden of making a prima facie
showing. But whether Coker actually made asufficient prima facie showing is moot since the Commonwealth responded to Coker's Batson objections Sothe parties proceeded to step two of the Batson framework.
Under steptwo, the burden shifted to the Commonwealth to demonstrate a racially neutral reason for exercising its peremptory challenge.' At this step, all that is required is that a prosecutor's articulated reason for exercising a peremptory challenge be race-neutral on its face. $ As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he second step of this [Batson process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible."9 There is nothing inherently racially-oriented about the Commonwealth's proffered reason-its belief that the veniremember's volunteered answers evidenced a bias in favor of the defendant. And the fact that the Commonwealth did not directly engage in a colloquy with the veniremember in question before striking him does not negate the facially race-neutral reason given by the Commonwealth for exercising its peremptory challenge. After all, the exercise of peremptory challenges is much more of an art than a science; and an attorney does not
Commonwealth v. Snodgrass, 831 S.W.2d 176,179 (Ky. 1992) ("But since the prosecutor
offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing also becomes moot.").
Grav, 203 S. W.3d at 690.
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 ("At this step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor'sexplanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.") .
Purkett v. Elam, 514 U.S . 765, 767-68,115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995).
necessarily violate the Constitution by following the attorney's hunches when exercising
peremptory challenges.'

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