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NOTTO BEPUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINIONISDESIGNATED "NOTTOBE PUBLISHED. " PURSUANTTO THERULESOF CIVIL PROCEDUREPROMULGATEDBY THE SUPREMECOURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION ISNOTTOBEPUBLISHEDANDSHALLNOTBE CITED OR USEDASAUTHORITYINANYOTHER CASEINANYCOURTOFTHIS STATE.
RENDERED: JUNE 16, 2005 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2004-SC-0462-MR
GARY DEAN VAUGHN APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
V. HONORABLE JERRY D. WINCHESTER, JUDGE
2003-CR-0201

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING

This appeal is from a judgment based on a jury verdict which convicted Vaughn of first-degree assault, first-degree robbery, first-degree arson and as a first-degree persistent felony offender. He was sentenced to life in prison on each count to run concurrently.
The sole question presented here is whether it was an abuse of discretion by the trial judge to decline to allow Vaughn to cross-examine a police officer regarding statements made to the victim because it infringed on the right to present a defense.
Vaughn went to the home of the victim seeking employment. After talking a few minutes and drinking a beer, the victim told Vaughn he did not have any work for him at that time. Vaughn left the home but returned at approximately 11 p.m ., demanded money, beat up the victim, took a small amount of money and set the house on fire .
The victim testified that Vaughn muttered that he could not let the victim live and that he did not have "no trouble killing [my daughter]," that is the defendant's daughter.
At trial, the victim testified regarding the statement uttered by Vaughn during the attack. Defense counsel did not object to the comment regarding the daughter of Vaughn and did not question the victim about the remark. The prosecution called the sheriff to testify as to the report of the crimes which he did. Defense counsel attempted to cross-examine the sheriff about his work on an unrelated prior crime, the death of the defendant's daughter. The prosecution objected to the cross-examination on the basis of relevancy. The trial judge considered the arguments of both counsel and concluded that the cross-examination was not relevant to the proceedings underway. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Vaughn guilty of all charges. This appeal followed.
Vaughn now argues that the refusal of the trial judge to permit the defendant to cross-examine the police officer regarding statements made to the victim is reversible error because it infringes on the right of the defendant to present a defense . We disagree.
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in limiting the cross-examination of the police witness in regard to an unrelated crime. The trial judge has broad discretion to regulate cross-examination. Commonwealth v. Maddox, 955 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1997). See also Moore v. Commonwealth, 771 S.W.2d 34 (Ky. 1988). The trial judge has the authority to establish the proper boundaries on cross-examination. We recognize that KRE 611 permits a witness to be cross-examined on any relevant matter to any issue in the case. However, the rule still allows the trial judge to limit cross

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Kentucky Law