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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY AT LOUISVILLE CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09CV-677-H

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. and J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES INC.

PLAINTIFFS

V.

DONALD F. KOHLER, JR., JAMES K. MILLER, JR., JERRY W. TYLER, JR., JACQUELINE M. CLAY, REGINA J. HAMMEL, LOVELLA G. MCKIM and GENE R. RICE

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. (collectively, "JPMorgan") have moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent seven former employees, Donald F. Kohler, Jr., James K. Miller, Jr., Jerry W. Tyler, Jr., Jacqueline M. Clay, Regina J. Hammel, Lovella G. McKim and Gene R. Rice (collectively, "Defendants") from further initiating contact with or soliciting clients they serviced during the previous two years while employed by Plaintiff. The Defendants recently left employment at JPMorgan to begin work at Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC ("Morgan Stanley"). For the reasons stated here and in court, the Court concludes that actions here are sufficient to warrant a preliminary injunction prohibiting Defendants' further solicitation of Plaintiff's clients.

I. In deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the Court considers the following four factors: "(1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the plaintiff may suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction; (3) whether granting the injunction will cause substantial harm to others; and (4) the impact of an injunction upon the public interest." Abney v. Amgen, 443 F.3d 540 at 546 (6th Cir. 2005), quoting Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, 274 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2001). These factors are balanced against one another and are not prerequisites to the grant of a preliminary injunction. Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000). The Court addresses three questions in resolving this case: 1) whether the customer data and customer lists Defendant provided to or used during their employment with Morgan Stanley are protected as trade secrets, 2) whether the actions of Defendants constitute misappropriation of JPMorgan's trade secrets and 3) whether Defendants' subsequent contact with the JPMorgan customers rose to the level of solicitation. The Court will address each issue in turn. II. The Kentucky Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as "information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, data, device, method, technique, or process, that: (a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." KY. REV. STAT. ANN.

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