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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY PADUCAH DIVISION CASE NO. 5:12-CV-9 CINDY MITCHELL v. FOWLER FOODS/KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN, et al. MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (DN 24). Following a show cause order from the Court, (DN 25), Plaintiff filed her response (DN 26). This matter is now ripe for adjudication. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED. An appropriate Order of dismissal will issue concurrently with this Opinion. BACKGROUND Plaintiff, Cindy Mitchell ("Mitchell"), was hired by Defendant, Fowler Foods, Inc., ("Fowler Foods") on September 17, 2011, as a part-time customer service worker at the Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant on Irvin Cobb Drive. (See Defs.' Exh. A, DN 24-2.) Plaintiff, now 41 years old, was addicted to crack cocaine for 15 years from her early twenties until her late thirties and has been diagnosed with depression, bipolar disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. (C. Mitchell dep., 14, 26, DN 24-5, 24-7.) Mitchell has received Social Security "survivor's benefits" since her father's death when she was five years old. (Id. at 24-26.) Mitchell says she is unable to work full-time, in part because she would lose her benefits if she makes over $1,000 per month and in part because of her plantar fasciitis. (Id. at 29.) Mitchell, who has a tenth grade education, says that her cognitive functioning is sound, but that she has "a PLAINTIFF

DEFENDANTS

comprehension problem." (Id. 37-39.) Mitchell is able to perform such tasks as going grocery shopping, cooking, following directions and instructions, and counting money. (Id.) Her employment was terminated for "stealing, hazardous procedures" on October 8, 2011. (Defs.' Exh. B, DN 24-3.) After her termination from KFC, Mitchell filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). After conducting an investigation, the EEOC was unable to conclude Defendants violated any statute, but issued Mitchell a right to sue notice. (DN 1-1.) Thereafter, Mitchell, pro se, filed a Complaint with this Court, naming as defendants Fowler Foods and employees Jena Bayless, Rebecca Adams, Clay Love, and Jason Watkins. Mitchell's Complaint alleges that when Watkins hired her, he "[k]new that I had a disability," and that "a few days after I had been working there[,] $38.00 was stolen out of my purse [and] I called Paducah City Police[, and] a week later I w[as] fired." (Pl's. Compl., DN 1.) Mitchell further alleges that Bayless and Adams picked on her every day, and that Bayless called her retarded every day. Mitchell seeks monetary compensation and requests that Fowler Foods be required to fire the individual Defendants and hire a new crew. Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that certain Defendants should be dismissed for improper service, that the individual Defendants are not "employers" under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and, finally, that Mitchell has failed to prove Fowler Foods terminated her on the basis of her disability. STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all
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ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). "[N]ot every issue of fact or conflicting inference presents a genuine issue of material fact." Street v. J. C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir. 1989). The test is whether the party bearing the burden of proof has presented a jury question as to each element in the case. Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of his position; the plaintiff must present evidence on which the trier of fact could reasonably find for the plaintiff. See id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). Mere speculation will not suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment; "the mere existence of a colorable factual dispute will not defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. A genuine dispute between the parties on an issue of material fact must exist to render summary judgment inappropriate." Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1177 (6th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012). DISCUSSION I. No Individual Liability Exists under the ADA. Because the Court finds that Jena Bayless and Rebecca Adams are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, the Court will not address the matter of improper service. The basic rule of the ADA is that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . [the] privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C.

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