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IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE # 24 FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA The Opinions handed down on the 9th day of April, 2003, are as follows: BY VICTORY, J.: 2002-C -1978 STATE OF LOUISIANA BOARD OF ETHICS v. CORBETT OURSO, JR. (Parish of Tangipahoa) For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

04/09/03

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 02-C-1978 STATE OF LOUISIANA BOARD OF ETHICS VERSUS CORBETT OURSO, JR. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF TANGIPAHOA VICTORY, J. We granted a writ in this case to determine whether the time period found in La. R.S. 18:1511.11 for filing actions under the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act, La. R.S. 18:1481 et seq. (the "CFDA"), is prescriptive or peremptive. Because we find that the time period is prescriptive, we reverse the judgments of the lower courts and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY During the October 3, 1998, primary and November 3, 1998, general elections, Corbett Ourso, Jr. ("Ourso"), a candidate for District Court Judge, 21st Judicial District, Division G, filed campaign finance disclosure reports as required by the CFDA. Believing that these reports evidenced his receipt of loans in excess of the contribution limits established in La. R.S. 18:1505.2(H), the Board of Ethics (the "Board") ordered an investigation into these apparent violations. After reviewing a proposed consent opinion, Ourso requested an appearance before the Board, which was scheduled for July 15, 1999, and then rescheduled for August 19, 1999. The Board then gave him ten days to accept the consent opinion offer or suit would be filed against him to collect civil penalties. Thereafter, the time limit was extended until September 6, 1999, and on September 3, 1999, Ourso suggested changes to the
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opinion and again requested an appearance before the Board. At Ourso's request, on September 22, 1999, the Board forwarded a waiver of prescription to Ourso to allow him the opportunity to appear before the Board at its October 14, 1999, meeting. The waiver provided as follows: I, Corbett Ourso, Jr., do hereby acknowledge the following: *my campaign for the October 1998 primary election has been subject to investigation by the Board of Ethics, acting as the Supervisory Committee on Campaign Finance, for the possible receipt of excessive loans; *the Board of Ethics may take enforcement action for this alleged violation by virtue of the filing of a civil lawsuit for penalties; *I have been offered the opportunity to enter into a consent agreement with the Board concerning the alleged violation; *I have asked the staff of the Board for the opportunity to appear before the Board at its October 14, 1999 meeting in order to request that any consent opinion reached allow me to seek judicial review of that opinion; and *I understand that the staff of the Board is opposed to allowing judicial review of the consent opinion. In consideration of the foregoing, and to preserve my opportunity to appear before the Board at its October 14, 1999 meeting, I do hereby agree to renounce, waive, and abandon any defense related to prescription or limitation of actions, particularly as to the provisions of R.S. 18:1500.11, that may have already accrued or which may accrue before November 19, 1999. (Emphasis added.) On September 28, 1999, Ourso signed the document and on October 14, 1999, he appeared before the Board. The Board then gave Ourso until October 29, 1999, to accept or reject the consent offer. On November 11, 1999, Ourso informed the Board by telephone that he would not accept the consent offer and was notified that the Board would file suit by November 19, 1999. On November 19, 1999, the Board filed suit against Ourso in the 21st Judicial District Court to collect civil penalties based on Ourso's alleged receipt of loans in excess of his contribution limits under the CFDA. Trial was conducted on April 20,
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2000, and the matter was taken under advisement. On June 13, 2000, Ourso filed a "Peremptory Exception Raising the Objections of: Peremption and Prescription with Incorporated Memorandum." On February 21, 2001, the trial court heard argument and found the exception of peremption to be of merit and dismissed the Board's petition. The First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed. State Bd. of Ethics v. Ourso, 01-1417 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/21/02). We granted the Board's writ to determine whether La. R.S. 18:1511.11, which provides the time period in which an action under the CFDA must be filed, is prescriptive or peremptive. State Bd. of Ethics v. Ourso, 021978 (La. 10/14/02), 827 So. 2d 410. DISCUSSION La. R.S. 18:1511.11 contains the limitation of actions period for all CFDA enforcement actions, providing as follows: B. Actions for violation of this Chapter must be commenced before three years have elapsed from the date of the violation or, if the violation is contained in a report, before one year has elapsed from filing of the relevant report. At issue in this case is the one-year period, because the alleged violations, the receipt of loans in excess of the contribution limits, were disclosed in reports filed with the Board.1 The reports were filed on various dates, all before November 19, 1998.

Therefore, in the absence of a waiver of prescription by Ourso, the Board's case against him would have prescribed because more than one year had elapsed since the filing of the reports on which the violations were based. In the waiver, Ourso clearly agreed to "renounce, waive, and abandon any defense related to prescription or

Ourso argues that even if this period is prescriptive rather than peremptive, the Board's action has prescribed. First, he argues that he only agreed to waive prescription "that may have accrued or which may accrue before November 19, 1999," and that, because the Board did not file its action until November 19,1999 and not before, the action is prescribed. Secondly, he argues that at the time the waiver was presented to him, more than a year had elapsed since the filing of the reports setting forth six of the eight alleged violations, and therefore, any claims relating to those six violations have prescribed. These issues can be considered by the trial court on remand. 3

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limitation of actions, particularly as to the provisions of R.S. 18:1500.11, that may have already accrued or which may accrue before November 19, 1999." Ourso argued, and the lower courts agreed, that the time period in La. R.S. 18:1511.11 is peremptive and that as such, it cannot be "renounced, interrupted, or suspended" under La. C.C. Art. 3461. The Board argues that the time period is prescriptive, and prescription may be renounced, La. C.C. arts. 3449-51, interrupted, La. C.C. arts. 3462-66, and suspended, La. C.C. arts. 3467-72. The court of appeal found that "considering the plain language of the statute, the clear legislative intent and public policy considerations on which this statute was based, we conclude that the time period set forth in La. R.S. 18:1511.11 is peremptive." We disagree. This Court recently discussed the difference between peremption and prescription: Peremption differs from prescription in several respects. Although prescription prevents the enforcement of a right by legal action, it does not terminate the natural obligation (La. Civ. Code art. 1762(1)); peremption, however, extinguishes or destroys the right (La. Civ. Code Art. 3458). Public policy requires that rights to which peremptive periods attach are to be extinguished after passage of a specified period. Accordingly, nothing may interfere with the running of a peremptive period. It may not be interrupted or suspended; nor is there provision for its renunciation. And exceptions such as contra non valentem are not applicable. As an inchoate right, prescription, on the other hand may be renounced, interrupted, or suspended; and contra non valentem applies an exception to the statutory prescription period where in fact and for good cause a plaintiff is unable to exercise his cause of action when it accrues. Reeder v. North, 97-0239 (La. 10/21/97), 701 So. 2d 1291, 1298 (citing Herbert v. Doctors Memorial Hospital, 486 So. 2d 717, 723 (La. 1986)). Because the Civil Code gives no guidance on how to determine whether a particular time limitation is prescriptive or peremptive, "this court has resorted to an exploration of the legislative intent and public policy underlying a particular time limitation, for it is primarily whether the legislature intended a particular time period
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to be prescriptive or peremptive that is the deciding factor in such a case." State of Louisiana, Division of Administration v. McInnis Bros. Constr., 97-0742 (La. 10/21/97), 701 So. 2d 937, 940 (emphasis added). Thus, courts look to the language of the statute, the purpose behind the statute, and the public policy mitigating for or against suspension, interruption or renunciation of that time limit. See id. at 946 ("Considering the plain, explicit language of the statute, the obvious purpose behind the statute, and the readily apparent public policy which mitigates against suspension, interruption or renunciation of that time limit and in favor of certainty in the termination of causes of action," La. R.S. 38:2189 establishes a peremptive time period.) There is no language in La. R.S. 18:1511.11(B) which indicates the legislature's intent that the time period is peremptive, and we have held that it is unnecessary for the legislature to state in a statute that it is peremptive in order for this Court to hold that it is in fact peremptive. See id. at 947. But, in some other cases where this Court has found a time period to be peremptive, specific language in the statute clearly indicated the legislature's intent in that regard. See, e.g., Reeder, supra (La. R.S. 9:5605 expressly stated that the period is "peremptive" and "in accordance with Civil Code Article 3461, may not be renounced, interrupted, or suspended"); Metropolitan Erection Co., Inc. v. Landis Const. Co., 627 So. 2d 144 (La. 1993) (La. R.S. 9:4813(E) provided that the surety's liability was extinguished unless the claim is filed within one year). The legislature did, however, clearly state its intent in Acts 1997, No. 286,

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